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Abstract 
The mechanism by which monetary policy is transmitted to the real economy has 
always been at the centre of macroeconomic debate. This thesis analyzes two important 
channels of monetary policy transmission: the conventional money channel and the 
bank lending channel. The conventional money channel, traditionally inferred in the 
standard IS-LM model, has long been a dominant work horse in macroeconomics. 
However, in recent years, there has been a resurgence of interest in what is known as 
the bank lending channel of monetary policy transmission. The foundation of the 
lending view rests on the notion of asymmetric information leading to imperfections in 
the capital market. The lending view contends that owing to imperfect information 
there are a large number of potential borrowers who do not have access to open market 
funds, and hence have to rely on banks for financing their investment and spending. As 
a result, anything which disrupts normal banking activity is likely to affect these bank-
dependent borrowers and have macroeconomic implications. 
To see how the lending view can be distinguished from the conventional money 
channel and how it operates, a simple theoretical model is developed and then tested 
using Thailand's data. Thailand is a country where the commercial banks are the most 
dominant institutions in the financial market. As a result, monetary policy which affects 
the commercial banks' normal activity should have a major impact on the real 
economy. 
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This thesis attempts to analyze the lending view both theoretically and empirically. In 
the theoretical analysis, it is argued that if monetary policy is conducted through 
conventional open market operations, the lending channel is likely to be an 
enhancement mechanism of the conventional money channel, not a truly independent 
channel. 
Nonetheless, if the central bank is prepared to cause a "credit crunch" by bringing down 
the supply of bank loans more directly, then the lending channel can possibly operate 
independently of the conventional money channel. Except in the special case of direct 
credit actions, the lending channel's effectiveness depends crucially on how banks 
respond to monetary tightening. If banks were able to offset a decline in bank reserves 
after a tightening of monetary policy either by selling off excess government bonds or 
issuing their own "bonds" ( e.g. certificates of deposits), then the lending channel would 
be ineffective. 
In the empirical analysis, it is found that in the short run it is possible for bank loans to 
initially rise, instead of falling, after monetary tightening. This "perverse" short term 
behaviour of bank loans can be attributable, among other things, to the existence of 
bank liability management and the quasi-con,tractual nature of bank loans. It is also 
found that in comparison with narrow monetary aggregates (Ml), bank credit appears 
to explain more of the changes in the output measure than M 1, lending some support 
for the lending view's call for the recognition of bank loans in monetary policy 
transmission. 
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Chapter One 
Introduction 
1.1. Overview 
In macroeconomic analysis, it is commonly agreed that monetary policy does have real 
effects, at least in the short run. However, there are different views on how monetary 
policy is transmitted to the real economy. In the conventional view of monetary policy 
transmission, monetary policy operates through the liability (money) side of bank 
balance sheets. Monetary tightening reduces reserves from the banking system. A fall in 
reserves results in a decline in transactions deposits, driving up the nominal interest 
rate. A rise in the interest rate in turn affects the real economy. In this conventional 
money view, reduced availability of bank loans does not matter as firms can supposedly 
1naintain their investment and spending by borrowing elsewhere. 
The lending view, on the other hand, contends that bank loans do matter and monetary 
policy can also be transmitted through the asset ( credit) side of bank balance sheets. 
The lending view's key point of departure from the conventional money view is its 
rejection of the notion that all non-monetary assets are perfect substitutes. In the 
lending view, for some borrowers, non-bank sources of credit are not perfect substitutes 
for bank credit. Thus, a tight monetary policy shrinking the supply of bank loans is 
likely to affect these bank-dependent borrowers' spending and investment and hence 
aggregate demand. 
1 
The lending view proposes a three-asset model as an alternative to the conventional 
two-asset IS-LM model. This three-asset model explicitly incorporates bank loans into 
the analysis of monetary policy transmission. In the IS-LM model, there are two assets: 
money and bonds. In the lending-view model, there are three assets: money, bonds, and 
bank loans , The lending view argues that due to imperfect information in the capital 
market bonds and loans are imperfect substitutes and should be taken into account 
separately when analyzing monetary policy propagation. 
1.2. Thesis Purpose 
This thesis is borne out of frustration. Most studies on the lending view tend to either 
verbally discuss the theoretical logic behind the lending view or focus on empirical 
testing. For example, Bernanke and Blinder (1988) study appears to be the first and 
perhaps the only theoretical study attempting to set up a formal theoretical model of the 
lending channel. However, their study is rather too short to give a complete picture of 
the lending view. Studies which follow seem to pay even less attention to the 
theoretical setting. Kashyap and Stein (1993) study, despite being the only one which 
appears to provide the most comprehensive theoretical analysis and review of the 
lending view, is still nothing more than a verbal account of the lending view. 
To analyze the lending view both theoretically and empirically, this study will attempt 
not only to develop a theoretical model but also to undertake ernpirical testing using 
Thailand's data. Most studies on the lending view have been drawn entirely from 
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developed countries, largely the United States. This study will attempt to apply the 
theory of the lending view to Thailand, an emerging developing country. 
In the theoretical model, we will analyze the operation of the lending channel, the 
distinction between the conventional money channel and the lending channel, and the 
necessary conditions required for the existence of the lending channel. In the empirical 
model, we will examine the operation and the importance of the lending channel to 
monetary policy management in Thailand and how the importance of the lending 
channel has been affected by recent financial deregulation and development. A number 
of studies have been done on various aspects of monetary policy in Thailand, but none 
of these studies has ever analyzed Thailand's monetary policy from the perspective of 
the lending-view theory. Our study is probably in the vanguard of this direction of 
research on Thailand. 
1.3. Methodology used in this thesis 
As mentioned above, this study attempts to analyze the lending view both theoretically 
and empirically. 
1.3.a. Theoretical analysis 
To see how the lending channel operates and how it can be distinguished from the 
conventional money channel, a simple theoretical model is developed. As suggested by 
Kashyap and Stein (1993), the easiest way to define exactly what the lending view 
means is to contrast the lending view with the simpler and better-known money view. 
Following Bernanke and Blinder (1988), the conventional IS-LM model is modified to 
incorporate the bank-loan market. In the conventional IS-LM model, on the demand 
3 
side of the economy there are only two markets: the goods market and the money 
market; the bond market is conveniently suppressed by Walras' Law. 
The equilibrium condition in the goods market is represented by the IS curve, while that 
in the money market is represented by the LM curve. The introduction of the third 
market (the loan market) entails the modification of the IS curve to incorporate the loan 
market. The incorporation of the goods market and the loan market results in the 
creation of the CC (credit and commodity) curve and the CC-LM model. By exploiting 
the principle of bank profit maximization, the theoretical model is then further 
expanded to analyze the conditions required for the existence and effectiveness of the 
lending channel. 
1.3.b. Empirical analysis 
To examine the operation and importance of the lending channel, two key empirical 
tests are undertaken on the transmission of monetary policy through the lending 
channel and on the forecasting power of credit shocks relative to money shocks. The 
econometric technique used in the study is a vector autoregression (VAR). The VAR 
model introduced by Sims (1980) provides a flexible and tractable framework for 
analyzing a dynamic inter-relationship or inter-dependence among economic time 
series variables. 
In this study, two empirical results are extracted from the VAR model: the impulse 
response function and the variance decomposition. The impulse response function is 
useful for analyzing the dynamic response of endogenous variables to exogenous 
4 
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shocks. The variance decomposition is useful for analyzing the relative importance of 
exogenous shocks to movements in endogenous variables. 
1.4. Thesis Structure 
The rest of this thesis is organized as follows. Chapter Two provides an overview of 
Thailand's financial market, recent financial development and monetary policy 
procedure. It explains the structure of the Thai financial market, the scope of recent 
financial liberalization, and the mechanism of monetary policy implementation in 
Thailand. Chapter Three briefly reviews the literature of monetary policy transmission 
channels. It will spell out what is meant by the conventional money channel and the 
lending channel. 
Chapter Four develops a theoretical model of the lending view. This theoretical model 
is developed to address three key questions: first, how can the lending channel be 
distinguished from the conventional money channel?; second, is the lending channel an 
independent channel or merely an enhancement mechanism to the money channel?; and 
third, what are the necessary conditions for the existence of the lending channel. 
Chapter Five describes econometric techniques used in the empirical analysis and 
outlines the model specification. Chapter six undertakes the empirical investigations 
and presents the results. Chapter Seven concludes and gives some final remarks. 
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Chapter Two 
Monetary Policy and Thailand's Financial Market 
2.1. Introduction 
To understand the mechanism of monetary policy transmission, one needs to 
understand a country's financial and monetary structure. As pointed out by Kash yap 
and Stein (1993), the importance of the lending channel is likely to be sensitive to a 
number of institutional characteristics of the financial market. The aim of this chapter is 
to provide an overview of Thailand's financial and monetary structure and recent 
financial development. The main focus is on the financial market, monetary policy 
procedure, and recent financial liberalization. This chapter is organized into five 
sections. Section 2.2 describes Thailand's money and capital markets. Section 2.3 
summarizes the scope of financial liberalization from the late 1980s. Section 2.4 
explains Thailand's monetary policy procedure. Section 2.5 concludes. 
2.2. Thailand's Financial Market 
The Thai financial market can be categorized into two distinct markets: money and 
capital markets. The money market is a market where temporary surpluses are 
channelled into temporary loans of funds usually with maturity of one year or less. 
Commercial banks and finance companies are traditionally major institutions in this 
market. The capital market is, on the other hand, a market for long-term lending and 
borrowing, normally longer than one year. The stock market and debt instrument (bond) 
market are typically the most important institutions in the capital market. 
6 
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2.2.a. Money market 
In the money market, there is a wide variety of financial institutions. Most of them are 
privately owned, but some are wholly or partially owned by the government. 
Commercial banks are by far the most important among the different types of financial 
institutions and form the largest group in terms of total assets,_ deposits and credit 
extension. Since the money market is largely dominated by the commercial banks and, 
to a much lesser extent, by finance companies, only the commercial banks and finance 
companies are to be discussed here. 
2.2.a.i. Commercial banks 
As discussed at length in the following chapters, in the lending view, banks play a 
special and unique role in providing credit to a number of potential borrowers who find 
it difficult and expensive to borrow directly in open markets. The banks' prominent role 
is highlighted by the existence of asymmetric or imperfect information between 
borrowers and lenders. With their expertise in gathering information about borrowers, 
evaluating investment plans, and monitoring borrowers after receipt of loans, banks 
have a competitive edge over security and debt instrument markets for financing certain 
types of borrowers. 
• 
In Thailand, the first commercial bank was a foreign bank branch, the Hong Kong and 
Shanghai Bank, set up in 1888. The first Thai commercial bank was established in 
1906. Prior to the boom in the stock market in 1986, the commercial banks were by far 
the most dominant players not only in the money market but also in the capital market. 
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Table 2.1: Thailand's Commercial Banks (as of January 1997, in millions of baht) 
Banks Major Shareholders Year of Assets Loans Deposits 
Opening 8$ % 8$ % 8$ % 
Large Banks 
Bangkok B Sophonpanich family 1944 1,149 22.43 903 21.9 791 21 .8 
Thai Farmers B Lamsam family 1945 661 12.9 525 12.7 520 14.3 
Krung Thai B* Ministry of Finance 1966 713 13.92 586 14.2 533 14.7 
Siam Commercial B Crown Property Bureau 1906 545 10.64 443 10.7 393 10.8 
sub-total 3,068 59.9 2,457 59.5 2,237 61 .6 
Medium Banks 
B of Ayudhya Ratanarak family 1945 426 8.3 351 8.5 343 9.5 
Thai Military B Thai Armed Forces 1957 332 6.5 270 6.6 195 5.4 
First Bangkok City B Siriwatanapakdi family 1934 251 4.9 217 5.3 159 4.4 
Siam City B Mahadamrongkul and 1941 237 4.6 181 4.4 169 4.7 
Srifungueng families 
Bangkok Metro B Tejapaibul family 1950 198 3.9 158 3.8 146 4 
Bangkok B of Com** Jalichadra family 1944 186 3.6 154 3.7 111 3.1 
sub-total 1,630 31.8 1,331 32.3 1,123 31 .1 
Small Banks 
B of Asia Euarchukiati and 1939 128 2.5 105 2.6 71 2 
Phatraprasit families 
Thai Danu B Tuchida and 1949 121 2.4 99 2.4 76 2.1 
Thavisin Families 
Union B of Bangkok Cholvijarn and 1949 67 1.3 49 1.2 46 1.3 
Asvinvichitr families 
Nakornthon B Wanglee family 1933 68 1.31 51 1.3 45 1.2 
Laem Thong B Chansrichawla family 1948 42 0.8 31 0.8 29 0.8 
sub-total 426 8.31 335 8.3 267 7.4 
Total 5,124 100 4,123 100 3,627 100 
Source: Asia Week (August 3, 1994) and the Asian Wallstreet Journal (22 June 95), Bangkok Post 
(7 March 1997) and Bank of Thailand Monthly Bulletin 
*Established as a result of a merger between the Bank of Agriculture (found in 1950) and the Provincial 
Bank (found in 1943) (Chiyasoot, 1993) 
* *Due to its massive-scale mismanagement, Bangkok Bank of Commerce was taken over by the Bank of 
Thailand on 17 May 1996, and is currently under a "rehabilitation" program. 
At the end of 1996, there were 15 commercial banks. In Table 2.1 , among the existing 
15 commercial banks, the Krung Thai Bank is the only government-owned bank. The 
Thai Military Bank is partially owned by the military, which controls around 30% of 
the bank's shares. The four largest banks control around 60 % of the total commercial 
bank assets and market share. As shown in Table 2.1, major shareholders of most 
commercial banks are big families of Chinese origin. This is not a surprise given that 
most of these banks were set up by the trading houses of these families. 
8 
Banking reform 
After the second oil shock in the late 1970s, the Thai government was preoccupied with 
the promotion of export-oriented policy with no serious attempt to reform the financial 
system. Prior to the late 1980s, Thailand's domestic financial market was highly 
protected. Foreign banks were allowed to have just one branch in Bangkok, and faced 
many restrictions preventing them from competing with the domestic banks. The 
number of domestic banks was also limited. As shown in Table 2.1, currently there are 
just 15 banks. 
The result of the long negligence on financial reform was a financial crisis in 1983. 
Several financial companies collapsed and a handful of major commercial banks were 
on the brink of bankruptcy. The monetary authorities were prompted to embark upon 
serious reform in- the financial sector with the aim of restoring credibility to the 
financial institutions and making them more efficient in mobilizing badly-needed funds 
for the country's rapidly growing investment 1. 
The first stage of banking reform was the introduction of a new legislation prohibiting 
an individual from holding more than 5% of bank shares outstanding. This legislation 
was aimed specifically at diversifying bank ownership. However, the legislation seems 
to have failed to diversify bank ownership: loopholes in the legislation have allowed the 
initial owners of the existing banks to get around it2. 
1 As discussed later, financial reform without proper financial supervision can lead to financial crisis as 
Thailand is currently experiencing. 
2On the heels of the flotation of the baht in July 1997, many small and medium sized banks faced a run 
on their deposits and mounting bad debts due to a sharp slowdown of the economy and the collapse of 
the property sector. These banks were forced to increase their capital or face insolvency. Because the 
country is in the middle of a financial crisis, these banks have had to woo foreign investors to buy their 
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It was not until the late 1980s that wide-ranging banking reform was undertaken as part 
of a comprehensive financial liberalization plan. (Section 2.3 will describe the scope of 
financial liberalization in detail.) This financial reform was aimed at increasing 
competition and efficiency in the banking sector. With the advent of financial 
liberalization, the commercial banks are now facing unprecedented challenges from two 
fronts. 
The first is on savings mobilization. The emergence of the stock market and the fixed-
income debt instruments market has drained savings away from bank deposits. There 
are now a number of mutual funds available to Thai savers who otherwise would have 
deposited their money in the banks. From 1992 to the first quarter of 1994, equity and 
fixed-income mutual funds expanded more than 20 fold to over B$ 200 billion. 
The second is on credit extension. Financial deregulation has come with mixed 
blessings for the commercial banks. On one hand, they enjoy greater freedom in 
running their businesses. On the other hand, they have to face stiffer competition from 
not only among themselves but also from non-intermediary institutions, for example, 
the stock market and the debt instrument market. A booming stock market and a 
burgeoning bond market have provided potential borrowers with a wider option to raise 
new shares. On September 14, 1997, the government introduced various measures to rescue the ailing 
financial sector. One of the measures was a relaxation of the ownership rule allowing foreigners to hold 
more than 50 % of equity in the financial institutions for up to 10 years (Previously foreigners were not 
allowed to own more than 25%). After the ten-year period their stake will be diluted by a capital 
increase. However, there is a grandfather clause which will allow foreign investors to extend their 
majority ownership beyond the 10-year period, if the capital increase does not reduce foreign ownership 
below 50%. In any case, foreign shareholding of up to 49% would be granted indefinitely, making 
Thailand's financial system one of the most open in Asia. 
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funds. Large and medium sized firms are now able to raise funds more directly from the 
public through the stock and the debt instruments markets. 
2.2.a.ii. Finance companies 
The first fully-fledged finance companies in Thailand began operating in 1969. As of 
January 1997, there were 91 licensed finance companies, their activities ranging from 
short-term finance, hire purchase, underwriting, and investment advisory services. 
Unlike commercial banks, finance companies are not permitted to take deposits from 
the public, but they can raise funds through the issuance of promissory notes or other 
similar instruments. 
Even though the operations of finance companies are in many ways similar to those of 
the commercial banks and the interest rates on promissory notes are generally 
significantly higher than those of bank deposits, finance companies are by no means 
serious rivals to the commercial banks, particularly in the area of lending and 
mobilizing funds. Figure 2.1 shows that lending by the commercial banks is far larger 
than that by finance companies. 
The commercial banks' relatively better and more solid reputation has appeared to be 
attractive enough to draw most of the funds from the public. Another reason which 
could also explain why there has been no serious competition between the finance 
companies and the commercial banks is that many finance companies are, in fact, 
affiliates of the commercial banks (especially the big ones). Before interest rate ceilings 
were lifted, the commercial banks which have financial affiliates channelled some of 
their funds to their affiliates: financial firm lending rates are generally higher than the 
11 
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commercial bank rates. Thus, the only conflict, if any, may be a conflict of interest due 
to the cross-ownership3. 
Figure 2.1: Commercial Banks and Finance Companies' Lending 
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As mentioned above, the commercial banks are facing increasing competition not only 
among themselves but also from non-bank institutions, especially the stock market and 
the debt instrument market. The following section will explain the phenomenal growth 
of the capital market driven by the rapid expansion of the stock market and the debt 
instrument market . 
2.2b. Capital market 
At present, the Thai capital market comprises three major markets: the stock market, 
the debt instrlllilent market, and more recently the offshore banking market. 
3 Due to a financial crisis caused by a slump in the property sector and the financial institutions ' over-
exposure to the property sector, 58 of a total 91 fmancial firms were suspended and ordered by the 
Central Bank to come up with viable merger or recapitalization plans (16 were suspended on June 27, 
1997 and another 42 on August 5, 1997). Only two of the 58 suspended fmance firms were able to come 
12 
.4 
:iii 
2.2.b.i. The Stock Exchange of Thailand (SET) 
Equity markets have a number of benefits to both equity borrowers (firms) and equity 
investors (households). The primary market provides firms with access to low risk 
finance. In the secondary market, share prices reflect investor expectations of firm 
performance and prospects which serves as a discipline on firm management. The 
equity market also provides a measure of firm costs of funds that is useful for 
investment decisions as well as a guide to aggregate economic expectations (Asian 
Development Outlook, 1993). 
The Stock Exchange of Thailand (SET) was established in 197 5 but led a rather 
subdued life until 1986. Realizing the importance of a stock market as an alternative for 
mobilizing savings and drawing additional capital inflows, the government 
promulgated the "Securities Exchange of Thailand Act (1986)" to expedite the 
development of the equity market. This 1986 Act was aimed at encouraging private 
companies to list in the market by offering them tax incentives. The government also 
introduced a package of generous tax privileges for domestic and foreign investors. 
These tax incentives together with the attractiveness of the booming economy have led 
to a surge in foreign portfolio investment. 
Domestic investors have also played a major role in expanding the stock market. They 
now have a choice of investing in the market either directly or indirectly via mutual 
funds. Investing via mutual funds has been encouraged by the monetary authorities as 
an efficient way to mobilize long-term savings and to enhance the stability of the equity 
up with viable recapitalization plans and allowed to reopen on December 8, 1997. The remaining 56 
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market. In 1994, there were around 70 mutual funds, mostly closed-end equity funds, 
with assets worth more than 200 billion baht. These mutual funds accounted for about 
7. 7% of the SET capitalization in 1994. 
Table 2.2: Total Market Capitalization(billions of baht) at SET, 1987-94 
Year Total Market %GDP Bank Credit 
Capitalization 
1987 138.16 11.3 691 .78 
1988 223.87 16 866.86 
1989 658.94 39.5 1,126 
1990 613.51 29.5 1,494.00 
1991 897.16 37.7 1,807.56 
1992 1,485 55.5 2,182.36 
1993 3,325.40 112.1 2,662.90 
1994 3,300.80 93.3 3,341 .90 
Source: Bank of Thailand Annual Report 
In Table 2.2, Thailand's equity market grew at an exceptional pace in terms of 
capitalization. The total market capitalization increased from 138 billion baht (11.3% of 
GDP) in 1987 to 3,325 billion baht (112.1 % of GDP) in 1993, surpassing loans 
outstanding of the commercial banks. The SET index increased from 879 in 1989 to 
1,380 in 1993. The stock market's phenomenal growth can be attributable to an 
increase in the number of listed corporations (from 175 in 1989 to 389 in 1994), a 
growing number of new share issues, a strong growth in share prices and dividends, and 
a relaxation of exchange policy helping to facilitate foreign portfolio investment. Given 
its relatively low ratio of capitalization to GDP, about 106.2 at the peak in 1993 
compared to 328% in Malaysia, 350% in Hong Kong, and 242% in Singapore, the SET 
has the potential to grow even larger in the long term. 
firms are expected to be shut down. 
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Though the equity market is currently the most important institution in the capital 
market, its dominance is facing a challenge from the newly-emerged debt instruments 
market. According to the World Bank (1995), Thailand's debt instrument market's 
potential growth is by no means less than the stock market's. 
2.2. b.ii. Debt instrument market 
In the early stages of economic development, financial markets are typically very 
limited. Intermediaries, mainly banks, receive most savings and provide the bulk of 
finance. As economies develop and become more sophisticated, however, stock and 
bond markets generally account for a larger share of financing. The range of financial 
products broadens and the services provided by financial markets respond to the 
increasingly diverse demands of both investors and borrowers. 
The availability of more financial instruments increases the way in which investors can 
save. Investors no longer restrict themselves to placing funds in bank deposits. Instead, 
they can place their savings directly in government and private securities. Likewise, as 
markets develop, borrowers have more means of raising funds. Instead of being 
restricted to bank loans, borrowers can reduce risk and cost by spreading funds between 
many types of financial instruments (Asian Development Bank, 1993). 
In Thailand, debt instruments have become more popular among Thai corporations in 
recent years. From the corporations' point of view, debt instruments have provided 
them with a greater opportunity to finance large-scale and long-term investment which 
usually cannot easily be satisfied by bank finance or internally generated funds. In 
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addition, unlike equity financing, debt financing allows firms to retain greater control 
over corporate decision making. Some debt instruments, such as Eurobond, or 
convertible and non-convertible debentures can be used to raise funds at a lower cost 
than bank loans. Another advantage of raising funds through issuing debt instruments 
over bank borrowing is that firms are not subject to stringent collateral requirements. 
Realizing the important role of a debt instruments market in mobilizing domestic 
savings, the monetary authorities have been vigorously promoting the development of 
the market by encouraging both state enterprises and corporations to raise funds 
through the issuance of debt instruments. The monetary authorities' main objective in 
fostering the bond market is twofold: first, to enhance the efficiency of saving 
mobilization to reduce the country's chronic current account deficit which is entirely 
derived from the gap between domestic private savings and investment4; second, to 
promote fixed long-term savings which are more important to the country's 
infrastructure development than prevalent short-term and usually floating-rate bank 
deposits. 
Prior to 1992, some debentures and other long-term debt instruments were issued by the 
private sector, but were not popular due to complex laws and lack of investor 
understanding. In addition, the Civil and Commercial Code only allowed public 
companies listed in the stock market to issue debentures. As a result, the number of 
primary issues by the private sector was quite limited. However, after the enactment of 
4Current account balance = (Saving-Investment) + (Tax Revenue - Government Expenditure). Since 
1988, the government's fiscal balance has been in surplus, so the current account deficit is solely a result 
of the gap between saving and (private) investment. This gap has largely been filled by short-term capital 
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the Securities and Exchange Act in May 1992, private limited companies were also 
allowed to issue debentures. 
Qualified companies have since mobilized funds through debentures. The volume of 
domestic debentures quadrupled from $B 2.9 billion in 1992 to $B 30.3 billion in 1994. 
Unlike the market for government bonds where financial intermediaries are major 
investors, in the private bond market, investors are individuals and corporations who 
have excess liquidity and consider corporate debenture investment as an alternative to 
bank deposits. 
Types of Debt Instruments in Thailand 
Debt instruments in Thailand can be categorized into three distinctive groups. 
Long-term instruments 
From 1933 to 1990, the government was the main issuer of long-term bonds. Owing to 
the government successive budget surpluses since 1988, no new government bonds 
have been issued since 1990. However, the government has encouraged the state 
enterprises to finance infrastructure investment through bond issues. State enterprises 
now become major issuers of long-term bonds. Table 2.3 shows that the share of 
government bonds in the bond market declined from 95% in 1988 to just 18% in 1994, 
while that of state enterprise bonds increased from 5% to 56% during the same period. 
inflows, mostly short term funds, leaving the domestic economy very vulnerable to capital outflows. 
Thailand's financial crisis in 1997 is a classic example of the danger posed by short-term "hot" money. 
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Table 2.3: Composition of the Domestic Bond Market (billions of baht) 
1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 
Government 213 201.4 195.2 150.8 133.9 100.7 66.2 
[95J [94J [91J [75J [62J [38J [18J 
State Enterprise 10.5 12 18.2 50.2 76.2 134.9 190.4 
[5J [6J [9J [25J [35J [52J [56J 
I Corporate 0 0 0 0 5.1 26.3 88 
I 
I 
"r 
I [OJ [OJ [OJ [OJ [3J [1 OJ [26J 
I 
I 
Total 223.5 213.4 213 201 215.2 261 .9 334.6 
[1 OOJ [100J [100J [100J [100J [100J [100J 
Source: The Bank of Thailand(BOT), The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), The World Bank 
(WB). Percentages are shown in parenthesis 
Table 2.4: Primary Market Issuance of Private Fixed-Income Securities(billion Baht) 
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 
1. Domestic Issues 
1.1. Debentures 6.3 8.84 20.35 58.89 50.55 
1.2. Bill of Exchange* 0 0 0 0 38.72 
' ,11( 
1.3. Negotiable Certificate 0.05 1.56 17.95 17.31 21 .39 
of Deposit (outstanding)** 
1.4. Floating Rate Note 6.4 5.8 5.73 4.73 3.73 
(outstanding) 
1.5. Commercial Paper 271 .28 311 390.4 525.43 574.45 
(outstanding) 
2. Overseas Issues 
2.1. Debenture 0 0 31 .23 50.45 34.98 
2.2. Floating Rate Note n.a 9.29 26.6 49.61 66.29 
and Floating Rate 
Certificate of Deposit 
2.3. Negotiable Certificate n.a n.a 65.7 65.71 78.261 
of Deposits(outstanding) 
2.4. Asian Currency Note 0 0 1 1.3 2.13 
*only those issued by finance companies and finance and securities companies 
**only those issued by commercial banks 
Source: The Bank of Thailand 
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Medium-term instruments 
Corporate convertible bonds with and without warrant, debentures, and medium-term 
certificates of deposit can be considered medium-term instruments. Following the 
enactment of the Securities and Exchange Act in May 1992, both public and limited 
companies (both are listed in the stock market) were allowed to issue corporate 
debentures and bonds. Table 2.3 indicates that corporate bonds increased from B 5.1 
billion ( or 3 % of the market share) in 1992 to B 8 8 billion ( or 26% of the market share) 
in 1994. 
Short-term instruments 
Negotiable certificates of deposits (NCDs), promissory notes, banker's acceptances, 
bills of exchange, and floating rate notes are typical short-term instruments. NCDs are 
issued by the commercial banks. Promissory notes are issued by the finance companies. 
Bill of exchange and banker's acceptances are issued by firms with high credit rating. 
In the past, treasury bills issued by the Ministry of Finance (MOF) constituted a major 
portion of short-term instruments. Since 1989, the MOF has stopped issuing treasury 
bills. Since then the market for short-term instruments has been steadily dominated by 
private short-term instruments. In recent years, the market for commercial bills in 
Thailand has grown rapidly and gained popularity among institutional investors who 
consider commercial bills as an alternative to bank deposits. 
Unlike commercial paper, certificates of deposit are still not widely accepted by 
domestic investors due to pending tax issues and cumbersome regulations concerning 
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the issuance of the certificates. Under the current regulations, banks and finance 
companies are allowed to issue certificates of deposit with a minimum denomination of 
500,000 baht, while an amount above 500,000 baht has to be in multiples of 100,000 
baht with the maturity of no less than 3 months or more than 3 years. As shown in 
Table 2.4 , the volume of NCDs is far less than that of commercial paper. 
One major obstacle to the development of the bond market in Thailand is the scarcity of 
government bonds normally used as a benchmark yield for the corporate bond market. 
Government bonds are generally deemed the best grade bonds in most situations and in 
most countries. The price of bonds issued by other organizations, such as corporations, 
is measured against that of government bonds, setting a price for the entire financial 
system. to follow. In response to a steady decline in the supply of government bonds, in 
1997 the government amended the Fiscal Budget Act to allow the Ministry of Finance 
to issue bonds, even when the government was running fiscal surpluses (between 1988-
1996 the government budget was in surplus). 
Apart from being a source of financing, the bond market can also provide different 
kinds of market-based monetary policy instruments to substitute for direct instruments, 
e.g, credit and interest rate ceilings, which tend to be ineffective in a liberalized 
financial system, Tue basic idea underlying indirect monetary policy is that given the 
demand for the central bank liabilities in the form of bank notes and reserve deposits 
held by banks for clearing purposes or meeting reserve requirements, the central bank 
can influence short-term interest rates in the interbank market by varying the supply of 
reserves, over which it has almost total control. 
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The central bank can manipulate the supply of reserves by buying and selling bonds and 
other money market instruments. This will, in turn, indirectly affect the availability of 
credit and interest rates. This kind of indirect mechanism can, however, only work if 
there is a well-functioning market for bonds and short-term commercial papers. Section 
2.4 will discuss in detail the implications of the bond market in monetary policy 
procedures. 
In Thailand, unlike in many other countries, domestic borrowers are allowed to have 
access to domestic off-shore banking facilities. As part of the government policy to 
open the domestic market to external competition and to develop Thailand as a regional 
financial centre, Bangkok International Banking Facility (BIBF) was introduced in 
1992 as Thailand's own offshore banking facility. 
2.2.b.iii. Bangkok International Banking Facility (BIBF) 
An international banking facility or offshore financial centre can be distinguished from 
its domestic counterpart by three important characteristics. 
First, it normally deals with external currencies, not the currency of the country where 
the facility is located. In this way, financial transactions in the facility are not directly 
linked with the domestic banking system. 
Second, the offshore centre is generally granted a special tax incentive, and exchange 
controls that are imposed upon the domestic financial market are exempted. 
Third, the offshore financial centre is primarily, but not exclusively, for non-resident 
clients. The scope of interface between residents and their offshore centre must be 
closely controlled by the host government, which has to balance its conflicting 
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objectives of promoting its offshore centre and controlling potential abuse by residents 
(Park and Zwick, 1984: 149). 
The Bangkok International Banking Facility (BIBF) was established as Thailand's own 
offshore banking market with two principal goals: first, to allow more foreign 
competition in the domestic financial market. As a signatory to the concluded Uruguay 
Round of GATT, Thailand is committed to increasing foreign access to its domestic 
market. Therefore, the BIBF was set up to provide greater access for foreign banks in 
the Thai financial market. The second goal was to develop Bangkok as a regional 
financial centre. In the initial stage, the government wanted to promote Bangkok as a 
funding centre for Indochina. As the financial system becomes more sophisticated, the 
funding centre could be upgraded to a fully-fledged international financial centre like 
those in Hong Kong and Singapore. 
the BIBF was officially unveiled in September 1992 when the Bank of Thailand 
announced its policy to establish the BIBF and then invited Thai and foreign banks to 
join the facility. The main business of the BIBF is to mobilize funds from overseas 
sources to finance domestic and foreign investments in foreign currencies. Banks 
joining the BIBF are also allowed to raise funds by issuing bonds denominated in major 
currencies and to engage in loan syndication by acquiring foreign currency loans 
extended to overseas borrowers. Two special conditions were imposed on the BIBF 
operations. First, the BIBF activities must be clearly separated from other activities. 
This includes the separation of assets, documents and accounts. Second, the BIBF 
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activities for lending in foreign countries must be separated from those for local 
lending. 
Since its inception, most of the lending through the BIBF has gone to domestic 
borrowers rather than clients in Indochina. A much bigger and more vibrant domestic 
market makes lending to domestic borrowers relatively more attractive. In 1995, loans 
via BIBF accounted for around 65.5% of the country's external debt and 57.5% of 
estimated short-term foreign debt. A rapid increase in domestic lending by the BIBF 
prompted the Bank of Thailand to impose a ceiling on the BIBF domestic lending, and 
to raise the minimum amount for each loan from US$ 2 to 5 million in order to keep the 
BIBF domestic lending under control. 
Massive external funds channelled through the BIBF were blamed for causing a bubble 
growth in the property sector which burst in 1997 and plunged the Thai economy into a 
deep financial crisis. Thailand's policy of maintaining a stable exchange rate together 
with a relatively higher domestic interest rate are major incentives for domestic 
borrowers to seek funds from abroad directly and indirectly via the BIBF. Thailand's de 
facto fixed exchange rate was abolished in favour of a managed floated system on July 
2, 1997 (see Appendix II for the detailed evolution of Thailand's exchange rate 
system). 
In Thailand, opening the domestic financial market to foreign competition was driven 
by not only the country's obligation to the GATT agreement on trade in services but 
also the government's policy to expedite the development of the financial system and 
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the integration of the domestic financial market with the international markets. The 
financial integration has a number of advantages for every country involved. Foreign 
competition forces domestic institutions to be more efficient and competitive, and helps 
broaden the range of financial services. It can also accelerate the transfer of financial 
technology, especially important for developing countries. Countries that succeed in 
integrating their markets with the rest of the world will gain greater access to capital 
and many vital financial services5. 
To maximize the benefits of foreign presence in a domestic financial market requires 
the liberalization of domestic financial institutions and the establishment of a 
competitive environment. Artificially low interest rates, direct credit controls, barriers 
to entry and other impediments to competition make it likely that foreign intermediaries 
will simply come in and capture economic rents from financial distortion, rather than 
promoting competition and efficiency. the next section will summarize the range of 
recent financial deregulations in Thailand. 
2.3. Recent Financial Liberalization in Thailand 
Prior to the late 1980s, financial reform was implemented primarily in response to 
specific problems, rather than as part of an overall reform strategy. Early financial 
reforms included, among other things, the introduction of laws empowering the 
Ministry of Finance to vary the ceiling on the interest rates offered by financial 
5 However, as discussed later in section 2.4, opening domestic financial markets to outside competition 
can also pose 1nany potential problems. For instance, if the opening is carried out prematurely and 
without proper financial supervision, it can lead to volatile capital flows that can threaten domestic 
financial stability. 
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institutions; the establishment of the repurchase market in 1979; and the amendment of 
the Commercial Banking Act to broaden the ownership of the commercial banks. 
In the wake of the financial crisis in 1983 triggered by huge losses in finance 
companies and their affiliates, the monetary authorities were prompted to strengthen the 
supervisory and regulatory framework for financial institutions. In 1984, some reforms 
of the capital market were instituted to stimulate trading in the stock market. By the end 
of the 1980s, as Thailand's economic development accelerated, it became increasingly 
evident that comprehensive financial liberalization was urgently needed if the 
momentum of economic growth was to be maintained. 
2.3.a. Rationale for financial liberalization 
The rationale for a comprehensive financial liberalization was threefold: first, to 
enhance the capability and efficiency of the financial sector in mobilizing domestic 
savings to meet a rapidly growing investment demand; second, to comply with the 
GA TT agreement on trade in services; and third, to promote Thailand as a regional 
financial centre. 
2.3.b. The scope of financial liberalization 
The process of financial liberalization in Thailand has been a gradual one. As 
mentioned above, the early deregulation was concentrated on restructuring domestic 
interest rates and diversifying bank ownership. In 1989, the monetary authorities took 
the first step towards comprehensive financial liberalization by partially lifting interest 
rate ceilings; since then a series of financial deregulations has followed. 
25 
l 
I 
2.3.b.i. Abolition of interest rate ceilings 
Like many other developing countries, Thailand had used interest rate ceilings on loans 
and deposits as a means to prevent excessive competition and to ensure stability of the 
financial system as well as to provide low cost funds to encourage investment in a 
"priority" sector. However, artificially low interest rates produce a bias towards current 
consumption reducing savings below the socially optimum level. In a situation where 
inflation is high, real interest rate on bank deposits falls. Savers tend to reduce their 
bank deposits, and attempt to hedge against inflation by holding non-depreciating 
assets. As a consequence, financial deepening is discouraged, and more resources are 
turned away from productive activities. The abolition of interest rate ceilings is, thus, a 
crucial step towards a liberalized financial system. 
In Thailand, the first important step towards interest rate liberalization was the floating 
of interest rates on time deposits with maturity of more than one year in June 1989. 
This interest rate floating was taken with two main objectives: first, to create a more 
flexible interest rate regime; second, to encourage long-term savings. After the first 
floating, interest rate ceilings were gradually removed. In March 1990, the ceilings on 
all time deposits were lifted. In January 1992, the ceilings on saving deposits were 
abolished; five months later the last ceilings, the ceilings on loans, were removed. All 
interest rates were allowed to move in tandem with market forces6. 
6 On September 26, 1997, the Bank of Thailand reintroduced interest rate ceilings on deposits to allay 
the financial institutions' intense competition for deposits which could threaten the country's financial 
stability. Continuous capital outflows and a run on bank deposits in the wake of the financial crisis 
leading to a flotation of the baht and a suspension of 5 8 financial companies have forced the commercial 
banks and finance companies to fiercely compete for domestic funds. 
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Interest rate liberalization has major implications for the behaviour of financial 
aggregates. Lifting interest rate ceilings gives banks greater control over the interest 
rates they pay on deposits and opens the way for a change from asset to liability 
management. Under the ceiling system in which there were controls on interest rates 
banks could pay on deposits, on interest rates they could charge on loans, and on the 
maturity of deposits they could raise; banks behave largely as asset managers. They 
have to accept passively whatever deposits come their way, since controls over interest 
rates limit their scope to go out into the market and compete for deposits. In a 
deregulated system, banks tend to move towards managing their liability ( deposit) 
flows to meet loan demand. 
2.3.b.ii. Relaxation of foreign exchange controls 
In Thailand, foreign exchange controls were employed to stabilize exchange fluctuation 
between the baht and other foreign currencies and to ensure that sufficient foreign 
exchange reserves were maintained at all times. The Bank of Thailand administered the 
exchange control by delegating responsibility for the approval of most transactions to 
authorized banks. The banks were only allowed to purchase foreign currencies in the 
form of notes and travel cheques and to sell a limited amount of foreign note and coins. 
These exchange controls have become increasingly ineffective as the economy becomes 
more integrated into the world economy. The opening up of foreign trade has led to 
greater opportunities for evasion of capital controls via, for instance, under and over-
invoicing of trade transactions. Eventually, it becomes inevitable for the government to 
contemplate the relaxation of exchange controls. 
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The most important exchange liberalization occurred on 22 May 1990 when the 
government announced its acceptance of Article VIII of the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) agreement. The acceptance means that Thailand no longer places 
restrictions on payments and transfers for international current account transactions, 
and refrain from imposing multiple exchange rates in order to give fair financial 
treatment to all trading partners. Commercial banks were allowed to engage freely in 
foreign exchange transactions related to import and export of goods and services. 
After the acceptance of Article VIII, further exchange deregulation was carried out. The 
first round of deregulation allowed selling and buying foreign currencies by the 
commercial banks to the public for current transactions without prior approval from the 
Bank of Thailand. Nonetheless, there are some exceptions where approvals are still 
required, for example, the purchase of foreign exchange for buying foreign real estate 
and securities. In April 1991, the second round of deregulation was undertaken, which 
included, inter alia, free repatriation of direct and portfolio investment funds, dividends, 
and offshore loans repayment, and permission to non-residents to open "non- resident" 
baht accounts with any authorized banks in Thailand7. 
2.3.b.iii. Improving efficiency of portfolio management 
In a financially repressed country, government intervention in banking activities and 
portfolio management is common. For example, a high reserve requirement is usually 
used as a means by which the government can impose an implicit tax on the financial 
7In an attempt to curb unscrupulous currency speculation, the Bank of Thailand announced "temporary" 
capital controls in May 1997, which, in effect, resulted in a two-tier exchange rate system: onshore and 
offshore exchange rates for the baht. Restrictions were imposed on some foreign exchange transactions 
and the amount of the baht to be taken out of the country. 
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system. In a country where an open market for primary securities does not exist, the 
government cannot sell treasury bonds or bills directly to the public. The government, 
thus, has to extract implicit tax revenue from the financial system by setting a non-
interest-bearing reserve requirement. 
If inflation is high and unpredictable, the reserve requirement of commercial banks 
becomes a basis on which the inflation tax is levied. A high reserve requirement forces 
commercial banks to reduce deposit rates and raise lending rates, thereby, contracting 
the flow of loanable funds. The inflation on reserves is, thus, shared between 
depositors, whose interest earnings are driven down, and borrowers, whose cost of 
borrowing is driven up (McKinnon, 1991: 48). 
Between 1966-87, the Thai government continuously ran a budget deficit at an average 
of around 2.5% of GDP. To finance the deficit, the government had to issue bonds and 
treasury bills. Since the real rates of return on the government securities were relatively 
lower than those on bank deposits, there was not enough public demand for the 
securities. As a result, the government had to sell them to the commercial banks by 
requiring them to hold government securities as part of their legal reserves. The 
government also required the banks to hold its securities in the amount of no less than 
16% of outstanding deposits as a condition for opening new branches. These 
requirements created a significant constraint for the banks in managing their assets and 
liabilities. 
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Since 1988, due to a commitment to a disciplinary fiscal policy and a windfall from the 
booming economy, the government has managed to run successive budget surpluses at 
an average of 2-3 % of GDP. As a result, the government has had no need to borrow 
from the public. The last series of treasury bills was issued in 1989 and government 
bonds in 1990. With no new government securities, banks found it difficult to meet the 
reserve requirement and the condition required for opening new branches. To relieve 
the security shortage and also to promote greater flexibility and efficiency in banking 
operations, the banks were allowed to open new branches without holding government 
securities. The commercial banks were also permitted to use non-government securities, 
for example, the Bank of Thailand's bonds, debentures and other debt instruments 
issued by state enterprises as part of their legal reserves. 
2.3.b.iv. Expansion of financial institutions' activities 
In general, financial institutions' contribution to the economy depends on the quantity 
and quality of their services and the efficiency with which these services are provided. 
As the real economy becomes more developed and sophisticated, there is a need for 
new financial services. In addition, an increase in competition leads to a narrow loan-
deposit interest rate spread, forcing the commercial banks to look for other sources of 
income to compensate for a decline in interest income. Understanding this situation, the 
Bank of Thailand allowed the commercial banks to undertake the following activities: 
-In 1987, banks were allowed to undertake the preparation of feasibility studies for 
investment projects; loan syndication; the provision of consulting services on 
acquisitions, mergers or consolidation, recommendation of insurance companies to 
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insure collateral assets, and the provision of custodian services. In 1988, finance 
companies were also permitted to engage in these activities. 
-In 1992, commercial banks as well as financial companies were permitted to act as 
financial advisers and underwriters for government securities and debt instruments for 
state enterprises and provide information services for their clients. 
The commercial banks themselves have introduced a variety of financial instruments to 
meet a more sophisticated demand for commercial bank services. Most of these 
services and instruments come from banks' own initiative. Since the mid 1980s, a 
number of financial innovations have been introduced into the market. These can be 
broadly classified into two groups: 
Introduction of modern technology in the banking operations 
The introduction of Automatic Teller Machines (ATMs) and credit cards in the mid 
1980s, was one of the most important milestone in the banking sector and has led to 
major changes in payment transferring, and the structure of bank deposits. These 
changes have been reflected by a continuous shift from demand deposits to saving 
deposits; the demand deposits to total deposits ratio declined steadily from about 22 per 
cent in 1971 to 4 per cent in 1990 while the saving deposits to total deposits ratio 
increased from around 9 per cent to 28 per cent during the same period. 
Changes in the composition of bank deposits have created a problem of how to define 
money, particularly the targeted monetary aggregates. With the growing popularity of 
the automatic fund transfer system, the boundary between monetary assets ( e.g, current 
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account) and non-monetary assets(e.g, transaction account) became ambiguous. The 
narrowly-defined monetary aggregate, Ml, appeared to decrease while the broadly-
defined M2 tended to increase. Choosing between the two monetary aggregates as 
targeted aggregates is not easy: Ml is more easily controlled, but its links to the real 
sector have become tenuous as the interest elasticity of demand for money has risen as 
a result of financial liberalization and innovation8. On the other hand, M2 is generally 
less susceptible to the monetary authorities' control, but more closely related to the real 
sector (Glick 1988). 
Introduction of new domestic money market instruments and international 
financial instruments 
Since the mid 1980s, a number of new types of domestic financial instruments, such as, 
floating rate notes, transferable/negotiable certificates of deposit, warrants, Asian 
Euro bonds, Euro-baht bonds, and (Euro) convertible/ non-convertible debentures, have 
been introduced (see Appendix I for definitions of these financial instruments). There 
are also a variety of hedging instruments mostly initiated by branches of foreign banks, 
and then adopted by domestic banks. These hedging instruments include currency and 
interest rate swaps, option, and forward rate agreements (FRAs ). 
These instruments are very important in the world with growing global financial 
integration and deregulation which requires more sophisticated financial products to 
manage financial risks. These financial risks increase as more and more countries begin 
8 Since the mid 1980s, many new financial products which are close substitutes to money have been 
introduced. These include a number of non-Ml assets which can readily substitute for the transaction 
assets in Ml. Ml now contains saving-type assets subject to portfolio redistribution. 
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to liberalize their financial systems. As interest rates and exchange rates which used to 
be tightly controlled have become more flexible, the business costs of finance have 
become volatile. Consequently, firms want to be protected from the volatility. This 
creates a demand for a new variety of financial instruments. 
2.4. Monetary Policy Procedure in Thailand 
Monetary policy is a major tool for achieving medium-term goals of price stability and 
output growth and short-term stabilization in response to economic disturbances. In 
Thailand, the main monetary policy goal is to achieve sustainable economic growth 
with a reasonable level of financial system stability. In recent years, price stability 
seems to have been the most important in monetary policy goal (Kittisrikanwan, 
Supapongse, Jantarangs, 1995). 
Mechanisms through which the monetary policy is operated depend on the financial and 
monetary structure of the country. In Thailand, monetary policy has traditionally been 
conducted via three major mechanisms: the discount window facility; the repurchase 
market; and the Exchange Equalization Fund (EEF). Through these mechanisms, the 
Bank of Thailand exerts its influence over the supply of money and credit; domestic 
interest rates; and in some cases the value of the currency. 
2.4.a. Monetary policy mechanisms 
2.4.a.i. Discount window facility 
The commercial banks can borrow through the discount window by placing 
government, state enterprise, and central bank bonds as collateral. By operating through 
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this facility the central bank acts as a lender of last resort. The central bank can 
influence the availability and cost of reserve money by varying a discount rate (a bank 
rate) as well as setting a discount lending ceiling. 
In Thailand, there are two types of discount operations: discount and rediscount 
operations. 
Discount operations 
Discount operations provide banks with borrowed reserves at a discount rate usually set 
somewhat below short-term market rates. Discount lending is extended against the 
pledge of government, qualified state enterprise and central bank securities at 90% of 
face value for a maximum duration of 7 days. Prior to November 1994, only the 
commercial banks were allowed access to this facility. After financial deregulation, the 
demarcation line between finance companies and commercial banks became blurred, so 
finance companies were also allowed access to the facility. Each individual institution 
is given a quota based on the size of its deposits or the volume of public borrowing in 
the case of finance companies which are not allowed to take deposits. When banks and 
finance companies borrow from a discount window, they deposit the amount of the 
borrowed reserves at the Bank of Thailand in their names. 
Discount window operations provide the commercial banks and finance companies with 
the opportunity to acquire reserves cheaply and quickly within the context of overall 
credit conditions set by the Bank of Thailand. Discount operations thus contribute to 
the significant degree of the Central Bank's control over the money supply. For 
instance, if the commercial banks' access to a discount facility is tightened, banks must 
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take greater precaution when extending loans. Adjustment of the discount rate ( or the 
bank rate), which is usually not very frequent, normally carries a strong policy signal to 
the financial market about the future direction of interest rates that the central bank 
would like to pursue. 
Rediscount Operations 
Rediscount operations involve a two-tier process in which the commercial banks 
purchase and discount papers from their customers, and this reduces their reserves. As a 
consequence, the banks will have to rediscount these papers with the Bank of Thailand. 
Under this operation, the Bank of Thailand can change the rediscount rate, which in 
turn affects the willingness to engage in rediscounting and hence the reserve position of 
the commercial banks. Traditionally, the Bank of Thailand employs rediscount facilities 
as a means of allocating financial resources at preferential interest rates to priority 
sectors, mostly the export sector, through the banks. 
Each bank is allocated a quota within which it can sell eligible promissory notes to the 
Bank of Thailand at concessional rates. During the 1970s and 1980s, the amount of 
refinancing grew rapidly as the interest rates charged were fixed. In 1988, alarmed by 
mounting monetary pressure, The Bank of Thailand restructured the refinancing 
scheme to restrain an excessive use of this facility. After the establishment of the 
Export-Import Bank in February 1994, the operation of the export credit refinancing 
scheme was transferred to the Export-Import Bank. 
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2.4.a.ii. Repurchase market 
In many countries, open market operations are employed relatively more often than 
other instruments. With open market operations, the central bank can reduce or increase 
the monetary base. However, in order to conduct effective open-market operations, the 
volume of government securities in the secondary markets must be large enough for the 
central bank to trade in them in order to regulate the flow of domestic credits from the 
commercial banking system. 
In Thailand, owing to the scarcity of government bonds as well as the relatively 
underdeveloped secondary market, open market operations are only confined to trading 
in approved securities between the Bank of Thailand and the commercial banks and 
among the commercial banks themselves. The market for this trading is called a 
"repurchase market", which was established in 1979, and since then has become the 
Bank of Thailand's most important channel for liquidity management. 
Generally, the repurchase market is a place where the central bank provides non-
borrowed reserves to commercial banks. In the repurchase market, market participants 
purchase and sell bonds with an agreement to repurchase and resell. In Thailand, the 
Bank of Thailand acts as an arranger for trading between the commercial banks. Since 
all transactions go through the Bank, it can influence the movements of repurchase 
agreement transactions through changes in interest rates as well as through 
discretionary intervention in the market. 
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However, as a monetary policy tool, the repurchase market still has two notable 
shortcomings: first, acting as an arranger does not allow the Bank of Thailand to take 
the initiative in its open market operations; it can only exercise its influence in the 
market when there is an imbalance of bids and offers outstanding in the market. Self-
initiated operations are not applicable within the existing arrangement. Second, market 
participants mostly prefer short-term transactions; over 90% of the transaction volume 
is concentrated on the transaction of maturity of less than 14 days. This limits the Bank 
of Thailand's ability to influence the liquidity in the financial market over a longer time 
horizon (Kittisrikanwan, Supapongse, Jantarangs 1995). 
As shown in Table 2.5, the share of the commercial banks' borrowing from the Bank of 
Thailand steadily decreased from 49% of total borrowing in 1988 to just over 1 % in 
1995, while that from banks abroad markedly increased from about 45% to over 90% 
during the same period. In Table 2.6, the share of borrowing in the banks' total funds 
doubled from about 11 % in 1988 to 24% in 1995, whereas that of deposits declined 
from around 83 % to 67% during the same period. Financial deregulation while 
maintaining a policy of stable exchange rate is the major contributing factor to the 
commercial banks' increasing dependence on foreign borrowing. 
Alarmed by the commercial banks' heavy reliance on short-term foreign borrowing, in 
1996 the Bank of Thailand was prompted to respond by specifically imposing a cash 
reserve requirement ratio of 7% on a short-term borrowing of less than one year and 
raising the limit on the net open foreign liability position of the commercial banks. 
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Table 2.5: Sources of Borrowing by Thai Commercial Banks (billion of baht) 
From 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 
Bank of Thailand 57.57 41 .22 42.34 37.61 37.67 21 .22 13.69 14.68 
(48.91) (32 .81) (27.46) (24.38) (21 .61) (5 .95) (1 .72) (1 .25) 
Other financial 7.3 14.9 15.39 10.37 16.38 20 55.86 86.31 
institutions in (6.2) (11 .86) (9.98) (6.72) (9.40) (5.62) (6 .98) (7 .35) 
Thailand 
Banks abroad 52.83 69.52 96.43 106.3 120.24 314.22 721 .83 1064.15 
(44.89) (55.33) (62 .56) (68.90) (68.99) (88.14) (90 .24) (90.66) 
Other 1.05 8.48 8.52 
(.29) (1 .06) (0.74) 
Total Borrowing 117.7 125.64 154.16 154.28 174.29 356.49 799.86 1173.66 
Source: Bank of Thailand Monthly Bulletin 
Table 2.6: Sources of Funds Supplying Thai Commercial Banks(billion of baht) 
Sources of funds 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 
Capital fund 68.33 83.11 111 .31 143.46 170.23 222.44 306.45 394.95 
(6 .33) (6 .18) (6.52) (7.00) (7.15) (7.40) (7 .92) (8 .20) 
Borrowing 117.7 125.64 154.16 154.28 174.29 356.49 799.86 1,173.66 
(10.90) (9.35) (9.03) (7.52) (7.32) (11 .86) (20.68) (24.36) 
Deposits 893.41 1,135.07 1,440.81 1,751.47 2,035.08 2,427.29 2,760.94 3,249.98 
(82.77) (84.47) (84.45) (85.48) (85.53) (80.74) (71.39) (67.44) 
Total funds 1,079.44 1,343.82 1,706.28 2,049.21 2,379.60 3,006.22 3,867.25 4,818.59 
Source: Bank of Thailand Monthly Bulletin 
To boost its declining influence in managing market liquidity and interest rates in the 
post deregulation era, the Bank of Thailand in 1996 embarked on developing a new 
system of open market operations which would be similar to those used in developed 
economies. Under the new system, the Bank of Thailand appoints direct bond dealers to 
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act as representatives for the Bank in the bond market. Through these dealers, the Bank 
of Thailand can manage money market liquidity without having to wait for financial 
institutions' call to buy and sell as in the repurchase market. 
By instructing the representative dealers to quote the biding and offering bond rate it 
deems appropriate, the Bank of Thailand stands ready to intervene in the market at that 
rate. The Bank of Thailand also set up the Financial Institutions Development Fund 
which has become a liquidity pipeline in the inter-bank and inter-finance markets. The 
Fund will borrow from the financial institutions when there is excess liquidity, and lend 
when there is tight liquidity. 
2.4.a.iii. Exchange Equalization Fund (EEF) 
The EEF is an authority under the jurisdiction of the Bank of Thailand. Its main 
responsibility is to handle the stabilization of the exchange rate. During 1963 to 1972 
and 1981 to 1984, the EEF was solely responsible for maintaining the fixed exchange 
rate between the baht and the U.S dollar. After the adoption of a basket-pegged 
exchange rate system in late 1984, the EEF served as a mechanism through which the 
basket-pegged system was implemented (see Appendix II for the chronological 
evolution of Thailand's exchange rate system). 
Under the basket-pegged regime, the EEF daily announces the mid-rate for US$/baht 
and stands ready to buy and sell US$ in an unlimited amount at the announced mid-rate 
plus or minus 0.02 baht. This effectively sets the fluctuation band for the exchange rate. 
As shown in Figure 2.2, in spite of a move to a more flexible exchange rate system in 
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1984, the baht has been kept relatively stable. In July 1997, after facing unprecedented 
speculative attacks on the baht, the Bank of Thailand was forced to adopt a managed 
floated system. Under this system, the Bank through the EEF will occasionally 
intervene in the currency market whenever it deems necessary. 
Figure 2.2: Thai Baht/US Dollar 
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Source: IMF Financial Statistics 
Before the baht was floated in 1997, the EEF also had served as a channel for the 
commercial banks to adjust not only their foreign exchange position but also their 
(baht) liquidity. The commercial banks tended to sell dollars to the EEF when liquidity 
was tight and interest rates were high and buy dollars when liquidity was high and 
interest rates were low. In effect, the EEF acted as a "safety valve" for banks to manage 
their liquidity, especially during periods of abrupt capital inflows or outflows 
(Kittisrikanwan, Supapongse, Jantarangs 1995). 
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Apart from the above mechanisms, the Bank of Thailand also conducts its monetary 
policy through prudential regulations, credit planning, and moral suasion. 
2.4.b. Prudential regulations, credit planning, and moral suasion. 
2.4.b.i. Prudential regulations 
Prudential regulations are normally in the form of a reserve requirement ratio, loan-to-
deposit ratio, and capital-to-risk asset ratio. A change in the reserve requirement ratio 
has direct and immediate effects on the banks' funding and lending activity. A change 
in the reserve requirement affects the money supply through the money multiplier. An 
increase in the required reserve ratio purposely causes the money stock to fall, whereas 
a reduction in the reserve ratio causes the money stock to rise. Though the reserve 
requirement has immediate and direct effects, it has limitations. 
First, it affects the volume of bank intermediation primarily in the manner of an indirect 
tax. Second, it does not take into account the liquidity inequality of each individual 
bank. The reserve ratio is imposed on every bank no matter what their liquidity 
position. Banks with plentiful liquid assets will be able to adjust more easily than banks 
with a rigid liquidity position. Third, it is very inflexible, only a small change in the 
ratio will have a profound impact on the bank's provision of intermediary services 
credit. 
In Thailand, the reserve requirement has rarely been altered. The current reserve 
requirement has been maintained at 7% of total deposits since 1979, previously it was 
set at 6%. At present, the commercial banks are required to hold 2% of the 7% reserve 
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requirement ratio in non-interest bearing deposits at the Bank of Thailand, the rest has 
to be kept as cash in a vault and bonds issued by the government, approved state 
enterprises and the Bank of Thailand. The reserve maintenance period is currently set at 
an average of two weeks (previously one week) to allow banks more time to adjust their 
reserve and thus help to avoid drastic fluctuations in the money market. 
Apart from the reserve requirement ratio, the Bank of Thailand has also occasionally 
imposed the loan-to-deposit ratio in order to restraint banks' credit extension whenever 
it believes the banks is over-lending and inflationary pressure is mounting. The loan-to-
deposit ratio is often introduced in conjunction with a regulation on the commercial 
banks' foreign exchange exposure used to discourage the banks' reliance on foreign 
borrowing. As shown in Table 2.5, since the early 1990s, the commercial banks have 
become heavily dependent on foreign borrowing. 
The capital-to-risk asset ratio is also another prudential regulation usually used to 
ensure a stability of the banking sector. In the wake of the financial crisis in 1997, the 
Bank of Thailand raised the level of the capital adequacy ratio to ensure the solvency of 
banks and financial firms. At the onset of the financial crisis, many banks, mostly small 
and medium-sized banks, and financial companies experienced a run on their deposits. 
They also faced mounting bad debt as the crisis began to worsen. Recapitalization 
seems to be the only option for avoiding insolvency. Currently, the banks have to 
maintain a capital-to-risk asset ratio of 8.5%, and finance firms 7.5%. 
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2.4.b.ii. Credit planing and moral suasion 
The Bank of Thailand has always attached a great deal of importance to commercial 
banks' credit extension, both in terms of overall growth and sectional distribution. In 
post financial deregulation, the Bank of Thailand has appeared to rely more on moral 
suasion which primarily centers on dialogue and discussion between the Bank of 
Thailand and the commercial banks on the growth and distribution of bank loans. 
Banks are often required to submit their credit plan to the Bank of Thailand. By 
analyzing the credit plan, the Bank of Thailand can monitor overall lending growth as 
well as evaluate its macroeconomic impacts. 
In the wake of the financial crisis which began in mid 1997, the adequacy and efficacy 
of the Bank of Thailand' s financial supervision have been under a cloud. Even the Bank 
itself admitted that its supervision system may have been inadequate, and contributed to 
the crisis (Joint Statement by the Ministry of Finance and the Bank of Thailand, 
October, 14, 1997). To understand the extent to which the Bank of Thailand's financial 
supervision may have contributed to the current financial crisis, one has to look at the 
origin of the crisis. According to Phatra Thanakit Research Institute, one of Thailand' s 
best known economic research centers, the crisis is the result of a massive misallocation 
of resources and improper financing9. 
During the first half of the 1990s, Thailand had a very high rate of investment, probably 
one of the highest in the world, about 40% of its GDP (see Table 2. 7). This high rate of 
investment was in itself not a problem, as long as investments were in sectors that 
9 An in-depth analysis of the cunent financial crisis is beyond the scope of this thesis . 
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generated a reasonable rate of return. Unfortunately, a large proportion of investments 
went into non-traded (low productivity) sectors, in particular the property sector, and 
also some protected industrial sectors, such as, steel, petrochemical, and cement. The 
non-traded sector received a huge portion of capital inflows as it was then perceived to 
have a high profit potential and relatively easy business compared to much more 
competitive exporting sectors. In short, the first problem was a misallocation of 
resources on a grand scale. 
The other problem was that these investments were "improperly financed". Foreign 
short-term capital was used to finance longer-term investments which generated little or 
no foreign exchange earnings. This "improper financing" was made possible by 
financial liberalization which allowed huge capital inflows. Thailand's external debt 
increased from US$25 billion in 1990 to US$75 billion in 1996: most of the debt was 
private. Massive capital inflows were encouraged by Thailand's impressive high rate of 
economic growth over the past decade and the stability of the currency. 
Thai financial institutions found it much cheaper to borrow abroad and lend to their 
domestic clients (see Table 2.5 for a surge in banks' foreign borrowing). Exchange rate 
risk was secured by the country's de facto fixed exchange rate. Low cost foreign capital 
made many projects, which would otherwise be commercially un-viable, viable. 
Foreign lenders, mostly the Japaneses, were pleased to lend to Thai borrowers as the 
economy looked healthy. But they were, nonetheless, still cautious and hence largely 
lent short-term, rather than long term. Thai financial institutions were led to believe that 
the country's high economic growth would be sustainable, and were willing to borrow 
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short term 10. Thus, the second cause of the crisis was the improper or mismatched 
financing: short-term funds were used to finance long term projects. 
Table 2.7: Thailand's Macroeconomic Figures 
1985 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 
Gross Domestic Investment 24 41.3 42.7 40 40.4 41 40 41 
(percent of GDP) 
Gross Domestic Saving 20.6 34.2 35.2 35.2 35 35.2 34.2 35 
(percent of GDP) 
Current Account -4.1 -8.5 -7.7 -5.7 -5.1 -5.6 -7.1 -8.6 
(percent of GDP) 
Budget Balance -5.3 5 4.9 3 2.2 1.8 2.7 1.5 
(percent of GDP) 
International Reserves 3 14.3 18.4 21.2 25.4 30.3 37 38.7 
(US$ billion) 
External Debt Outstanding 14.7 25.1 33.4 37.4 46.8 55 68.2 75 
(US$ billion) [10.1] [11.5] [12.8] [13.1] [14.2] [15. 7] [16.4] [16. 7] 
Numbers in bracket are public external debt 
Sources: Bank of Thailand Annual Report and Asian Development Outlook 
Thailand's financial woe was exacerbated by a sudden slump in export. In 1996, export 
growth was registered at a rare zero per cent. The current account deficit soared to 8.6% 
of GDP in 199611 . As a result, speculations on the devaluation of the baht were 
mounting. In May 1997, the Bank of Thailand spent some US$24 billion of its foreign 
reserves in a futile attempt to defend the baht. The baht was in the end floated on June 
2, 1997. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) had to arrange a US$17 .2 billion 
package to rescue Thailand's battered economy. 
A sharp fall of the baht after the float blew up the country's external debt. Most of 
Thailand's foreign borrowing was un-hedged. Financial institutions have had to face 
10rn fact, it was not only the financial institutions that borrowed heavily overseas, big non-bank 
corporates also borrowed abroad. 
11 Warr (1997) points out that a loss of competitiveness in the export-oriented labour-intensive industries 
was the main cause of Thailand's export slump. In recent years, Thailand's labour intensive export has 
faced fierce c01npetition from China and Vietnam. 
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not only a blown-up foreign debt but also rising non-performing loans. High interest 
rate, economic slump, and a sharp depreciation of the baht have pushed a number of 
companies, especially in the property sector, to the a brink of bankruptcy; many have 
already gone bankrupt. 
Questions have been asked: Was the Bank of Thailand aware that banks and finance 
companies had become heavily dependent on (short-term) foreign borrowing and over-
exposure to the property sector? and Did the Bank try to do something to curb it? To 
answer these questions, one has to look at the monetary policy procedure and the 
exchange rate system. Theoretically, Thailand could not have an independent monetary 
policy under a fixed exchange rate: any attempt by the Central Bank to alter domestic 
money supply would be offset by capital flows. Historically, what helped the Bank of 
Thailand to retain some degree of monetary independence were various forms of capital 
controls (Warr, 1997). 
In the early 1990s, most of the capital controls were removed as part of a financial 
liberalization program. Because the exchange rate system was kept unchanged, the 
Bank of Thailand was unable to use conventional monetary policy tools, such as, 
interest rate policy, to curb massive (short-term) capital inflows, and had to resort to 
several forms of quantitative measures, such as, the reserve requirement ratio, loan-to-
deposit ratio, and credit targeting. 
A reserve requirement of 7% on non-resident baht deposits was imposed in August 
1995. In June 1996, a 7% cash reserve requirement on short-term lending through the 
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Bangkok International Banking Facility (BIBF) was introduced. The loan-to-deposit 
ratio was also adjusted many times during 1995-1996 to encourage the commercial 
banks to rely more on domestic funds. By mid-1996, the economy still showed signs of 
overheating. Inflationary pressure was on the rise. A glut in the property sector also 
became palpable. The Bank of Thailand was prompted to set a target of 21 % credit 
growth for 1996; loans to the property sector were specifically targeted to squeeze12. 
By late 1996, as tight monetary measures began to bear fruit, the country's export 
suddenly slumped and consequently the current account deficit surged. The economy 
quickly deteriorated due to a combination of high interest rates and low export growth. 
By mid-1997, things had gone from bad to worse after the Bank of Thailand gave up 
the 13-year-old basket-pegged exchange rate system. The baht plunged from about 26 
baht per US dollar before the float to, at one time, around 56 baht. 
The Bank of Thailand is now subject to strong criticism for its weak financial 
supervision which allowed banks and financial firms to become heavily dependent on 
(short-term) foreign borrowing and over-exposure to the property lending. Some critics 
have argued that had the Bank of Thailand acted quicker to curb banks and financial 
firms' heavy foreign borrowing and over-lending to the property sector, the financial 
crisis could have been avoid or, at least, less severe. 
12 The importance of direct credit actions, e.g, credit controls, will be discussed in Chapters Four and 
Six. As pointed out by Bemanke and Lown ( 1991 ), a credit crunch tends to precede an economic 
slowdown or even recession. 
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The Bank of Thailand's exchange rate policy was also a target of criticism. Rumours of 
an impending devaluation had been in the air for some time before the baht was finally 
floated. These rumours had major financial effects. The expectation of a devaluation 
induced outflows of speculative capital, and might, in part, have contributed to the 
sudden slump in the property market and the stock market in 1996. Had the Bank of 
Thailand floated the baht in the early 1990s after financial deregulation or, at least, 
loosened its tight grip on the baht, it could have, to a significant extent, deterred 
speculative capital inflows and also enhanced the Bank's monetary policy management. 
The causes and consequences of the current financial crisis and the lessons to be 
learned from the crisis will surely be a subject of study for years to come. At the time 
this thesis is being finalized, the crisis is not yet over and may get even worse. 
Ironically, the crisis could, in the long term, tum out to be a blessing in disguise. 
Politically, it has already led to a speedy promulgation of a new constitution which will 
pave the way for radical political reform. Economically, it will lead to a major 
restructuring of the financial system. A sharp devaluation of the baht will also lead to a 
reallocation of resources from the non-traded sector to the exporting sector. 
2.5. Conclusion 
Thailand's financial market can be divided into two distinct markets: money market 
and capital market. Prior to the late 1980s, the distinction between the two markets was 
blurred, as the commercial banks in the absence of active equity and bond markets were 
by far the most dominant institutions in both money and capital markets. In recent 
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years, the commercial banks have experienced an increased challenge not only from 
intermediary financial institutions but also from non-intermediary institutions. 
Since the late 1980s, Thailand has embarked on a wide-ranging financial reform to 
enhance the capacity and efficiency of the financial sector and also to comply with the 
GATT agreement on trade in services. Financial reform covers four main areas: 
abolishing interest rate ceilings, relaxing foreign exchange controls, improving 
efficiency of financial institutions' portfolio management, and expanding financial 
institutions' activities. 
In Thailand, monetary policy has traditionally been conducted via three maJor 
mechanisms: the discount window facility; the repurchase market; and the Exchange 
Equalization Fund (EEF). Through these mechanisms, the Bank of Thailand exerts its 
influence over the supply of money and credit, domestic interest rates; and in some 
cases the value of the currency. The Bank of Thailand also conducts its monetary policy 
through prudential regulations, credit planning, and moral suasion. In the wake of the 
financial crisis which began in 1997, the adequacy and efficacy of the Bank of 
Thailand's financial supervision have come under a cloud. The financial supervision 
may have been inadequate, and contributed to the financial crisis. 
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Chapter Three 
Literature Review on Monetary Policy Transmission Channels 
3.1. Introduction 
Monetary policy is a tool for achieving short and medium-term stabilization of output 
and inflation. Despite being a major policy tool, monetary policy has sometimes 
generated unexpected and unwanted consequences. To achieve desirable results, the 
central bank must have an accurate assessment of the timing and the impact of its 
policy on the economy. This requires an understanding of the channel through which 
monetary policy decisions are transmitted to the real economy (Mishkin, 1995). 
The aim of this chapter is to provide a concise survey of the literature on the channels 
of monetary policy transmission with emphasis on the lending channel of monetary 
policy transmission. This chapter is organized into five sections. Section 3 .2 outlines 
major approaches to monetary policy analysis. Section 3.3 and 3.4 articulate the 
concept of the money view and the lending view of monetary policy transmission, and a 
conceptual distinction between the two views. Section 3.5 concludes 
3.2. Approaches to Monetary Policy Analysis 
For decades, the issue of how monetary policy action is transmitted to the real economy 
has been a key topic of debate in macroeconomics. Traditionally, monetary policy 
transmission has been explained by what is known as the Keynesian interest-rate 
transmission mechanism, entrenched in the conventional IS-LM model. Though widely 
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referred to in most macroeconomics textbooks, the IS-LM model is definitely not the 
only model used to analyze the transmission of monetary policy. 
As pointed out by Brunner and Meltzer (1990), there are several alternative approaches 
to the analysis of the money supply process and monetary policy transmission. Three 
approaches have been used most extensively in recent work. The first one was 
illustrated by the work of Benjamin Friedman (1977). Friedman sought to estimate a 
structural model of the determination of long term interest rates. The primary thrust of 
Friedman's model was to eschew a familiar unrestricted reduced-form term-structure 
equation, and to use instead a set of structural equations representing supplies of and 
demands for long-term bonds. 
The second approach involves extending the range of assets and the number of relative 
prices that affect aggregate demand. A work by Brunner and Meltzer (1990) is one that 
follows this approach. Departing from standard analyses, such as, the IS-LM model, 
Brunner and Meltzer showed that in a model where there is more than one asset price 
and interest rate, one can see interaction between the credit market and the money 
market. Changes in the stocks of money and debt caused by either government 
financing or open market operations lead to substitution between money, bonds, and 
capital, even if a market interest rate is controlled. 
The third approach, the one adopted in this thesis, remains within the standard IS-LM 
paradigm, but involves some modifications, such as, disaggregating asset markets to 
achieve a more complete analysis of the money market without altering the existing 
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structure of the model. In the IS-LM model, the entire system of all asset-market 
equations is reduced into a single money market equilibrium condition, represented by 
the LM curve, and a single interest rate for analytical purposes. No distinction is, thus, 
made between inside money (money produced by the central bank) and outside money 
(money created by intermediaries). The role of bank credit in monetary policy 
transmission and the interaction between the credit market and the money market are 
left unrecognized in the conventional IS-LM model. 
The inadequacy of the conventional IS-LM model in recognizing and identifying the 
important role of bank has led to a quest for an alternative model which can provide a 
more complete analysis of monetary policy. In recent years, there has been a growing 
interest in what is known as the lending view of monetary policy transmission. In the 
lending view, it is argued that due to the existence of market imperfection, bank loans 
and bonds are not perfect substitutes. The imperfect substitution between bank loans 
and bonds means they should be taken into account separately in the analysis of 
monetary policy propagation1. 
A theoretical model to be developed in the fallowing chapter is inspired by a model 
proposed by Bernanke and Blinder (1988). In our model, we slightly modify the 
conventional IS-LM model without altering the structure of the conventional model. 
But before we proceed to the theoretical model, it is useful to spell out what exactly the 
lending view is and how it can be distinguished from the well-know money view. 
1Although there appear to be some similarities between the lending-view model and the model proposed 
by Brunner and Meltzer (1990) which also argues that bonds and capital are not perfect substitutes, the 
latter model does not seem to clearly indicate the important role of bank loans. 
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Kashyap and Stein (1994) suggest that the easiest way to understand the operation of 
the lending channel is to contrast the lending view with the better-known money view. 
So we begin by briefly revisiting the money view. 
3.3. The Conventional View of Monetary Policy Transmission 
For over half of a century, since Hicks introduced the IS-LM model to relate money and 
interest rate to aggregate income or output in 193 7, the IS-LM model has become a 
work-horse model of most macroeconomics textbook and policy discussion (Meltzer, 
1995). In the IS-LM model, there are two assets: money and bonds and one interest 
rate. Monetary policy is transmitted through changes in the interest rate. A reduction in 
the money supply is conducive to a rise in the interest rate2• 
A rise in the interest rate or the cost of borrowing reduces producer investment 
spending on inventories and capital goods, and also consumer spending on durable 
goods, thereby leading to a decline in aggregate demand and a fall in output, provided 
that there is some form of imperfect price adjustment3 • This transmission channel is 
generally known as the conventional money view of monetary policy transmission ( or 
the basic Keynesian textbook model). 
2Open market sale of government bonds leaves households to hold more bonds and less money in their 
portfolios. If prices do not instaneously adjust to changes in the money supply, the fall in households' 
money holdings represents a decline in real money balances. To restore equilibrium, the real interest rate 
on bonds must rise, raising the cost of capital for a range of planned investment activities and interest-
sensitive spending (Hubbard, 1994). 
3Price adjustment is crucial to a distinction between real and nominal interest rates and is guided by two 
important assumptions: rational expectations and rigidities of wages and goods prices. An increase in the 
nominal interest rate will bring about an increase in the real interest rate if the rationally expected 
inflation rate does not increase by the same amount. However, over the long run, once knowledge of the 
size of monetary impulses become available, money wages and commodity prices will rise, and the 
effect on the real interest rate will fade away. Prices and money increase in the same proportion, and the 
real long-term interest rate returns to the path determined by fundamental economic factors (Taylor, 
1995). 
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The conventional money view is, however, criticized for its incomplete explanation of 
the transmission process. In particular, it does not explain exactly how monetary policy 
affects the real economy. The money view only predicts that changes in monetary 
policy are eventually followed by changes in output. What happens in the interim is left 
un-answered. This is why some call what occurs in between the monetary policy 
procedure and the final outcome a "black box" mechanism. 
The money view o"nly assumes that changes in the interest rate caused by changes in the 
money supply will influence the cost of capital and spending on durable goods. It does 
not say how the interest rate that is considered relevant to money demand (the short-
term rate) affects the rate deemed relevant to investment (the long-term rate). 
Even though it is conceivable that there is a link between the short-term and the long-
term interest rates, empirical studies of the so-called interest rate sensitive components 
of aggregate spending have had great difficulty in identifying quantitatively significant 
"interest-rate" effects (Bernanke and Gertler, 1995)4 . Disenchantment with the 
conventional money view over its incomplete explanation of the transmission 
mechanism and the lack of support for a strong "interest-rate" effect has led to a search 
for other alternative explanations for monetary policy transmission channels5• The bank 
4The link between the short-term and the long-term interest rates can be explained by the expectation 
model of the term structure. According to this model, the long-term rate is influenced by the expected 
weighted average of the future short-term rate. For instance, if the central bank takes actions to raise the 
short-term interest rate and market participants expect the short-term rate to decline gradually back to 
staring value in the future, then the long-term rate will rise less than the short-term rate. On the other 
hand, if the central bank takes actions to raise the short-term rate and market participants expect that this 
increase is just the first stage of longer sequence of increases, then the long-term rate will rise by more 
than the short-term rate. 
5 According to Duguay ( 1994 ), the lack of support for a strong interest rate effect may be in part 
attributable to the methodology of the study. It is not unconunon to find that large-scale econometric 
models often fail to find a significant interest rate effect. This is because the interest rate effect on 
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lending channel of monetary policy transmission is one which has recently received 
much attention. 
3.4. The Lending View of Monetary Policy Transmission 
According to Kashyap and Stein (1993), the lending view of monetary policy 
transmission has, in one form or another, been around for some time. Much of the early 
work on the lending view, such as, Roosa (1951), Radcliffe's report (1959), Tobin and 
Brainard (1963), Brunner and Meltzer (1963) and Modigliani (1963), tends to focus on 
whether monetary policy works, in part, by changing the relative costs of bank loans 
and open-market paper, and whether such shifts in bank loan supply are accompanied 
by variations in the degree of non-price rationing. 
Recent studies on the lending view, for example. Bernanke and Blinder (1988, 1990) 
and Kashyap, Stein, and Wilcox (1993), Kashyap and Stein (1993) and others, are quite 
different from those in the early days. These recent studies seem to give much less or 
perhaps even no importance to non-price credit rationing, and more to analyzing how 
monetary tightening through a banking reserve system affects the supply of banks loans 
and the following macroeconomic implications. 
The lending view attempts to look into the so-called "black box" to search for a more 
complete explanation of how monetary policy affects the real economy. The lending 
view believes that imperfect information in the capital market may be a crucial factor in 
individual components of spending is either lost in the noise surrounding disaggregate data or already 
embodied in the endogenous explanatory variables. Duguay suggests that a s1nall aggregative model is 
better suited to quantify the interest-rate effect of monetary policy than a large-scale econometric 1nodel. 
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explaining a propagation of monetary policy shocks to the real economy. The lending 
view argues that asymmetric information between borrowers and lenders leads to 
capital market imperfection. 
One of the main features of capital market imperfection is imperfect monitoring, which 
renders the cost of external funds generally higher than the cost of internal funds 
(Bernanke and Gerlter, 1989). The lending view contends that banks which have special 
access to monitoring technology can provide loans to some borrowers for whom the 
cost of alternative sources of funds is high (Diamond, 1984). As analyzed in the 
following chapter, the lending view's main point of departure from the conventional 
money view is its rejection of perfect substitutability of all financial assets, especially 
bank loans and bonds. The existence of the lending channel essentially hinges on the 
assumption that loans and bonds are not perfect substitutes. 
According to Bernanke and Gertler (1995), the actions taken by the central bank can 
have real effects through two channels: the balance sheet channel and the bank lending 
channel. 
3.4.a. The balance sheet channel 
The balance sheet channel is based on a theoretical postulation that the external finance 
premium facing borrowers should depend on borrowers' financial positions. The 
stronger the financial position, the lower the external finance premium, defined as the 
difference in cost between funds raised externally and funds generated internally. The 
financial position is measured by borrowers' net worth, defined as the sum of their 
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liquid assets and marketable collateral. The balance sheet channel of monetary policy 
originates from the fact that changes in monetary policy affect not only market interest 
rates but also the financial situation of borrowers, both directly and indirectly. 
3.4.a.i. Direct effect channel 
A tight monetary policy directly weakens borrower balance sheets at least in two ways. 
First, a rise in interest rates would increase the interest rate cost of the borrower 
outstanding short-term or floating-rate debts, reducing net cash flows and weakening 
borrower financial positions. Second, rising interest rates are typically associated with 
declining asset prices, which among other things shrink the value of borrower 
collateral. 
3.4.a.ii. Indirect effect channel 
A tight monetary policy reduces customer spending, firm revenue will decline while 
various fixed and quasi-fixed costs (including interest and wage payments) do not 
adjust in the short-run. The result is an increase in the "financing gap" (the difference 
between firm uses and sources of funds), eroding firm net worth and creditworthiness. 
As a matter of fact, the argument that monetary policy may affect firm balance sheets 
and financial situations is by no means new. It was raised before by Tobin(l 969) in his 
"q" theory of investment and wealth effects on consumption, where "q" is defined as 
the market value of firms divided by the replacement cost. Tobin argues that monetary 
policy can affect the economy through its effect on equity. If q is high, the market price 
of firms is also high relative to the replacement cost of capital, new plant and 
equipment capital is cheap relative to the market value of business firms. Firms can 
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then issue equity with a high price. As a result, investment spending will increase as 
firms can purchase new investment goods with only a small issue of equity. 
In Tobin's wealth effect model, a contractionary monetary policy implies the public has 
less money than it wants and hence has to cut its spending and investment, which 
include, inter alia, portfolio investment. With the lower demand for equity, the equity 
price is expected to fall. In a Keynesian context, a rise in the interest rate driven by 
monetary policy tightening would also make bonds more attractive relative to equity, 
thereby causing the prices of equity to fall. In short, lower equity prices will lead to a 
lower "q" and hence to lower investment spending. 
Tobin's (1969) wealth effect theory was, in part, backed by Modigliani's (1975) life-
cycle theory. In Modigliani's life-cycle model, consumption spending is determined by 
the life-time resources of consumers, which are made up of human capital, real capital 
and financial wealth. A major component of financial wealth is common stocks. When 
stock prices fall, so does the value of financial wealth, thereby decreasing the life-time 
resources of consumers and consumption. 
Even if there are some similarities between the lending view' balance sheet effect and 
Tobin's wealth effect and Modigliani's life-cycle effect, the lending view appears to 
place more emphasis on the impact of monetary policy on firm external finance 
premium. Succinctly, the lending view argues that there are two reasons which explain 
why corporate cash flows and profits decline following a tightening of monetary policy. 
First, an increase in interest payments directly reduce firms' profit. Second, following a 
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monetary tightening, corporate income tends to fall more quickly than costs, causing a 
problem of cash flows. 
The balance sheet channel's necessary conditions 
The effects of the corporate cash flows on economic behaviour depend largely on the 
ability of firms to smooth the problem of cash flows by borrowing. Firms that have 
relatively poor access to credit markets may have to respond to the declining cash flows 
by cutting production and employment, while firms with good access to credit will face 
less financial pressure. The lending view argues that due to asymmetric information 
some firms, especially those with less established reputation, cannot borrow in open 
markets, so they have to rely on banks for finance. As a result, any monetary policy 
shocks that affect the supply of bank loans will have real effects. 
3.4. b. The bank lending channel 
The bank lending channel is based on the assumption of market imperfection that gives 
banks a unique and essential role in allocating the economy's financial resources. 
Unlike lenders in other markets such as a commercial paper market, banks are special in 
the sense that they have expertise in gathering information about borrowers, evaluating 
projects, and monitoring borrowers after the receipt of loans. The significance of this 
expertise is that some borrowers may only be able to borrow from banks as they are 
unable to borrow from other sources or can borrow only at increased costs. This means 
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that anything that disrupts normal banking activity can reduce the supply of loans to 
bank-dependent borrowers and thus have macroeconomic implications6 • 
In most countries, small firms with little reputation are generally bank-dependent. In 
Thailand, for example, small firms are relatively more reliant on intermediated loans for 
financing than are larger firms. Table 3 .1 shows that intermediated credit (mostly bank 
loans) accounts for almost 67 % of debt finance for firms with assets of less than one 
billion baht, compared to just around 13 % for large firms with assets over 10 billions 
baht. 
Table 3.1:Composition of Industrial Firms' Debt Finance by Asset Size(as of June 1996) 
Type of debt as % of total liabilities Asset size (in billions of baht) 
Overdrafts and Joans from 
financial institutions 
Trade accounts and notes payable 
Debentures 
Long-term liabilities 
Loans and amount due 
to related parties 
Other 
All 
18.65 
7.77 
7.33 
36.48 
1.08 
28.69 
<1 
66.85 
14.64 
4.38 
3.06 
11.07 
Total 100 100 
Source: The Stock Exchange of Thailand's Monthly Review 
1-4 4-10 
47.8 34.93 
21.65 10.91 
15.42 
28.33 17.05 
0.84 1.72 
1.38 19.97 
100 100 
10> 
12.75 
5.67 
6.17 
41.44 
0.95 
33.02 
100 
6For instance, the central bank sells government securities to the public in exchange for checks drawn on 
commercial banks. As the central bank debits the reserve accounts of these banks, reserves in the 
banking system will fall relative to deposits. If the reserves fall below the statutory reserve requirement, 
the banking system as a whole must reduce its holdings of deposits. 
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In the conventional money channel, there is no role for banks in monetary policy 
transmission; money is either the monetary base or directly proportional to the 
monetary base. Banks offer no special services on the asset side of their balance sheet. 
On the liability side of their balance sheet, banks perform a special role: the banking 
system creates money by issuing demand deposits (Hubbard, 1994). 
In the IS-LM model, it is assumed that asset holders (households) have to choose 
between two types of assets: money and bonds. Money includes currency plus demand 
deposits which normally pay no interest, while bonds include all kinds of liquid assets, 
including bank loans. This implies that in order to dichotomize the markets into two 
markets, bonds and loans are lumped into one group of assets. The amalgamation of 
loans and bonds implies that they are assumed to be perfect substitutes. 
Because of its restriction to a single portfolio equation representing all asset markets, 
the IS-LM money channel cannot recognize the operation of the lending channel. 
Agitating for monetary policy transmission via the lending channel, the lending view 
proposes a three-asset model. In this model, it is assumed that there are three assets: 
money, bonds, and loans. These three assets differ from each other in meaningful ways 
and must be accounted for separately when analyzing the impact of monetary policy 
shocks (a theoretical analysis of the three-asset model is presented in Chapter Four). 
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The bank lending channel's necessary condition 
The impacts of monetary policy on the bank loan supply depend on the extent to which 
banks can replace lost (retail) deposits with other sources of funds , such as issuing 
certificates of deposit. The existence of the bank lending channel does not, however, 
require banks to be totally incapable of replacing lost deposits. It is only required that 
banks do not face a perfectly elastic demand for their managed liabilities( certificates of 
deposit), so that an open market sale by the central bank- which shrinks the banks ' core 
deposit base and forces them to rely more on managed liabilities- also increases the 
banks' relative cost of funds (Kashyap and Stein, 1994 ). An increase in the cost of 
funds to banks should shift the supply of loans inward, squeezing out bank-dependent 
borrowers and raising the external finance premium. 
Bernanke and Gerlter (1995) point out, despite financial deregulation and innovation, it 
remains likely that the demand for banks ' managed liabilities is not perfectly elastic. 
This is because of, among other things, lack of deposit insurance, liquidity (many CDs 
are non-negotiable or difficult to trade on secondary markets). As a result, new 
investors will only be induced to hold CDs if they are paid higher interest rates. 
Nonetheless, with the advent of bank liability management (paying the public to switch 
more to less liquid bank liabilities), it is expected that the bank lending channel is likely 
to be less important than it was before. 
In a nutshell, the existence of the bank lending channel depends on two key conditions. 
First, firms must not be able to offset a decline in the supply of bank loans by switching 
to borrow directly from the public in open markets. Second, the banking sector as a 
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whole must not be able to completely insulate its lending activities from shocks to 
reserves by switching from traditional deposits to less reserve-intensive forms of 
finance. 
Although the lending view can be decomposed into two channels: the balance sheet 
channel and the bank lending channel, it is extremely difficult to carry out an empirical 
test that could conclusively separate the two (Bernanke and Gerlter, 1995). A tightening 
of monetary policy leads to not only a reduction in bank reserves but also a worsening 
of both firm and bank balance sheets. For example, if rising interest rates lower the 
value of securities, impairing bank capital, then the banks' ability to attract funds and 
hence their capacity to make loans may be limited. A rise in interest rates means 
borrowing from the public becomes more expensive as banks must promise a higher 
interest rate to sell their CDs. 
Despite the fact that a clear distinction between the two channels of the lending view 
may be difficult to make, the existence of the lending channel whose foundation is 
based on market imperfection is relatively easier to identify. As discussed above, the 
existence of the lending view depends on the extent to which banks and firms can 
obtain funds in open markets. If funds can be raised freely and cheaply in open markets, 
or in other words, that is, the degree of information imperfection in the capital market 
decreases, the importance of the credit ( or lending) channel is likely to diminish. In the 
lending view's three-asset model, for the lending channel to exist distinctively, it is 
required that bonds and loans must not be perfect substitutes. 
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In the above review, there is, in fact, another transmission channel which has not been 
discussed, that is, the exchange rate channel. In an open economy, changes in monetary 
policy can also be transmitted through changes in the exchange rate. Mundell (1963) 
and Fleming (1962) propose a well-known theoretical framework for analyzing the 
impact of monetary policy on the real economy through changes in the exchange rate. 
For example, they argue that when the domestic real interest rate rises, domestic 
currency becomes more attractive and entices capital inflows causing the domestic 
currency to appreciate. The higher value of the domestic currency makes domestic 
goods more expensive, thereby causing a fall in net export and hence output. 
In the theoretical model to be developed in the following chapter, it will be assumed 
that the economy is a closed economy, so the exchange rate channel is excluded. The 
real wealth effect channel stemming from portfolio investment as suggested by 
Tobin(1969), Modigliani(1975), and to some extent Bernanke and Gertler(1995) will 
also be ignored. Firms, banks and households will be assumed to be separate entities. 
Although households may earn their income from working in the corporate sector, they 
hold no equity in it. All corporate physical capital is assumed to be financed by 
borrowing, either directly through the issuance of commercial paper or indirectly 
through an intermediary. By putting aside the exchange rate channel and the real wealth 
effect channel, we are able to focus exclusively on the analysis of the lending channel, 
which is the main theme of this thesis. 
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3.5. Conclusion 
The main feature of the conventional money view is that the central bank, through a 
change in its nominal supply of outside money, can affect nominal as well as real short-
term interest rates, provided that prices do not adjust instantaneously. A policy-induced 
change in a real short-term interest rate somehow transmits to a change in a longer-term 
interest rate, thereby influencing household and business spending decisions. The 
money view does not, however, elucidate exactly how monetary policy affects the real 
economy. The money view's "incomplete" explanation of the transmission channel 
together with the lack of empirical support for the so-called "interest-sensitive" effect 
has led to a search for an alternative view of monetary policy transmission. 
In recent years, the lending view of monetary policy transmission has received much 
attention, especially following studies by Bernanke and Blinder (1988, 1990) and 
Kashyap, Stein, and Wilcox (1993). The lending view stresses the existence of 
asymmetric information in the capital market and the role of bank loans in the monetary 
policy transmission. Even though the lending view can be decomposed into two 
channels: the balance sheet channel and the bank lending channel, the existence of these 
two channels or the lending view as a whole depends essentially on the fundamental 
assumption that bank loans and bonds are imperfect substitutes. 
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Chapter Four 
The Lending View of Monetary Policy Transmission: A Theoretical 
Analysis 
4.1. Introduction 
In the previous chapter, the two views of monetary policy transmission have been 
conceptually expounded; one has long been established in most macroeconomic 
textbooks (the money view) and the other has recently received a revival of interest (the 
lending view). This chapter will develop a simple theoretical model to help understand 
the bank lending channel of monetary policy transmission. The three questions are to be 
addressed by the model developed in this chapter: first, how can the lending channel be 
distinguished from the conventional money channel?; second, is the lending channel an 
independent channel or merely an enhancement mechanism to the conventional money 
channel?; and third, what are the necessary conditions for the existence of the lending 
channel? 
This chapter is organized into eight sections. Section 4.2 explains how the lending view 
can be distinguished from the conventional money channel. Section 4.3 establishes the 
conditions under which the lending channel will be a distinct channel or just an 
enhancement mechanism to the money channel. Section 4.4 analyzes the conditions 
required for the existence of the lending channel. Section 4.5 examines the implications 
of bank portfolio redistribution on the effectiveness of the lending channel. Section 4.6 
describes the operation of the lending channel and the money channel in an open 
economy. Section 4.7 analyzes the role of credit rationing in monetary policy 
transmission through the lending channel. Section 4.8 concludes. 
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4.2. How Can the Lending Channel Be Distinguished from the Conventional 
Money Channel? 
According to Kashyap and Stein (1993), the easiest way to define what the lending 
view means is to contrast the lending view with the simpler and better known money 
view. In the pure money view, there are two assets: money and bonds and one interest 
rate. This single interest rate is taken to be a summary statistic for all credit market 
conditions. That is, it is thought of as simultaneously capturing the return on all assets, 
such as, government bonds, bank loans, and real capital. The traditional IS-LM model's 
version of monetary transmission is one which can be regarded as a pure money view. 
4.2.a. The conventional money view 
In the traditional IS-LM money view of monetary policy transmission, a contractionary 
monetary policy is transmitted to the real economy through a change in the interest rate. 
For instance, assuming that the price level is constant, a decline in a monetary base 
leads to a fall in the supply of money stock, which in turn raises real interest rates and 
hence the cost of capital, thereby causing a decline in investment spending, aggregate 
demand and eventually output. 
Bernanke and Blinder(1988) suggest that the easiest way to develop the lending view 
model is to modify the conventional IS-LM model to incorporate the lending view. So 
let us begin by briefly revisiting the IS-LM model. 
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4.2.a.i. Derivation of the IS and the LM Curves 
Following Branson (1989) and Wells (1995), the IS and the LM curves are derived as 
follows. 
Derivation of the IS curve 
The IS curve represents the pair of the bond rate (r), and real income (y) that will keep 
the goods market in equilibrium. This equilibrium condition implies that 
CE + I + G + NX = GNP = C + S + T + Rf 
where 
CE= total value of (private) consumption expenditure 
I= total value of investment expenditure 
G= government expenditure 
GNP = gross national product 
NX= net export 
S = gross private saving 
T = net tax revenue 
Rf= total private transfer payments to foreigners 
(4.1) 
It is assumed for the moment that the economy is a closed economy ( this assumption 
will later be relaxed). Therefore, net export, NX, and Rf become zero. It is also 
assumed that indirect business tax and capital depreciation are negligible and will be 
ignored. As a result, Y, national income, stands for both income and output. 
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The real equilibrium condition for a closed economy is 
c+i+g =y=c+s+t (4.2) 
where y ( y) is the standard symbol for the real national income or real GDP. Real p 
(private) consumption expenditure, c ( = CE), is assumed to be a function of real 
p 
disposal income. Real tax, t, is assumed to be a function of real income. 
( 4.2) can be re-arranged as 
y = C [y - t(y)] + i + g (4.3) 
or 
y -c = s(y - t(y)) + t(y) = i + g (4.4) 
Investment demand is assumed to a decreasing function of the interest rate; i.e. i(r), ir < 
0. For simplicity, it is assumed that the price level is constant, so the real and nominal 
interest rates are equal. 
The goods market equilibrium condition is 
IS: y = c[y- t(y)] + i(r) + g 
Total differentiation of ( 4.5) yields 
dy = cy(l- ty)dy + irdr 
0 < cy,ty < l 
The slope of the IS, holding g constant is 
dr [ 1 - c Y ( 1 - t Y)] < 
0 --
dy lr 
(4.5) 
(4.6) 
(4.7) 
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Derivation of the LM curve 
The LM curve represents the pairs of r and y that will keep the money market in 
equilibrium at a given level of money supply, M, and a given price level, P. Like any 
other market, the money market has both demand and supply sides. Real money 
demand is defined as 
Md ) 
= f(r,y 
p - + 
(4.8) 
The real money demand (4.8) is a pure transactions demand for money, and assumed to 
be a function of the interest rate (r) reflecting the opportunity cost of holding money 
and the real income or output (y) reflecting the transactions demand for money. In the 
IS-LM model, consumption, investment, and money demand functions do not include 
wealth as arguments. Conveniently, it is implicitly assumed in the IS-LM model that an 
increase in private wealth is allocated entirely to bonds, with no effects on either 
consumption or money holdings (Turnovsky, 1977: 40). In this study, it will be further 
assumed that households hold no equity, so Tobin's wealth effects through equity 
investment are excluded (sub-section 4.2.b.i will discuss in detail all assumptions 
concerned). In addition, as assumed earlier, the price level (P) is constant, so "real 
wealth effects" are also excluded. 
The money market equilibrium is 
Ms MD 
-----
p p 
Ms = m = f(~Jj_) 
p 
(4.9) 
( 4.10) 
70 
To derive the slope of the LM curve, we totally differentiate ( 4.10) 
dm = frdr + f ydy 
dm f y 
dr=---dy 
fr fr 
The slope of the LM curve is 
dr 
dy 
f y 
fr 
Substituting ( 4.12) into ( 4.6) yields 
Zr 
dy= f, f dm>O 
[1- Cy(l - fy)] + ir ; 
( 4.11) 
(4.12) 
( 4.13) 
(4.14) 
Equation (4.14) reflects the traditional IS-LM model's version of monetary policy 
transmission. In equation ( 4.14 ), changes in the money base lead to changes in the 
money supply. Changes in the money supply are transmitted to the goods market via 
changes in the interest rate1. In the conventional money view, there is no independent 
role for bank loans in monetary policy transmission. Reduced availability of bank loans 
does not matter because firms can supposedly maintain their spending by borrowing 
elsewhere(issuing bonds). In the IS-LM model, bonds and loans are implicitly assumed 
to be perfect substitutes2. 
1 Although it is admitted that many central banks since the 1980s have turned away from quantitative 
policy like open market operations to interest rate policy, it will be assumed that the monetary policy 
instrument is the central bank' s open market operations in the bond market, directed towards changes in 
the stock of the money base. This assumption is made simply to keep our analysis within the orthodox 
IS-LM framework. 
2 The traditional theory of corporate finance pioneered by Modigliani and Miller (1958) also disregards 
bank loans. Bank loans are considered to be irrelevant to real decisions, such as, investment decisions, 
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4.2. b. The lending view 
The lending view argues that owing to asymmetric or imperfect information in the 
capital market, bank loans and bonds are deemed imperfect substitutes, and hence 
cannot be lumped into one group of assets as in the conventional money view. The 
imperfect substitution between bank loans and bonds implies that there are three 
distinctive assets: money, bonds, and loans, and there are three markets: goods, money, 
and loan markets. 
The goods market and the money market have already been introduced above. So in 
this section, the third market (the loan market) is to be introduced. But before 
introducing the loan market, it may be useful to clarify the economy-wide balance sheet 
upon which the lending view is based. This clarification will help to spell out any 
potential confusion which may arise from the lending view's reclassification of assets 
into three distinctive groups. 
4.2.b.i. Simplified ( closed) economy-wide balance sheet, definitions of the three 
assets, and related assumptions 
In Table 4.1, the three assets are defined as follows: 
Money includes currency plus demand deposits, assumed to pay no interest. 
Loans are bank loans. 
Bonds includes government bonds, commercial paper, and certificates of deposit3. 
for any class of firms. Like the conventional IS-LM model, Modigliani and Miller's model depends on 
the assumption of perfect capital markets, with equal access for all firms and investors to equity finance. 
3 For simplicity, it is assumed that commercial paper represents all firms' debt instruments and 
certificates of deposit represents all banks' debt instruments(or managed liabilities). In the real world, 
both banks and firms can issue various kinds of debt instruments with various maturities and rates of 
interest to raise funds. 
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Table 4.1: Simplified Economy-Wide Balance Sheet 
Central Bank Banks Firms Households 
Assets Liabilities Assets Liabilities Assets Liabilities Assets Liabilities 
BC cc CB DD K F LF CH LH 
BO BO CD CF CP. DD 
K B CP 
BB CD 
L BH 
where B ( = Bc +BB+ BH) = government bonds, BD = bank deposits with the central 
bank (part of bank reserve requirement), DD = demand deposits, CP = commercial 
paper, CDs = certificates of deposit (for the sake of neatness, hereafter CD), L 
( = LF + L H) = loans, K B= bank physical capital, K F = firm physical capital, and C 
(=C B+ CF+ CH)= currency 
Because of the lending view' s fundamental three-asset assumption, it is implicitly 
assumed, although rather unrealistically, that commercial paper, certificates of deposit 
and government bonds are perfect substitutes, and hence their rates of return are 
assumed to be equal. 
From the above balance sheet and definitions, the following assumptions are made 
1. There are four sectors in the economy: the central bank, the banking sector, the 
corporate sector, and the household sector. 
2. The government pursues a conservative fiscal policy leading to a balanced budget. 
As a result, the role of the government in monetary policy procedures is very minor, 
and will, therefore, be excluded. Though the budget is balanced, there are still 
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government bonds outstanding (i.e, bonds which were issued to finance the deficit in 
the past or "residual" bonds). 
3. The household sector is a net lender, while the corporate sector is a net borrower. 
Although some households earn their income from working in the corporate sector, it is 
assumed that they hold no corporate shares. All corporate physical capital is financed 
by borrowing, either directly through the issuance of commercial paper or indirectly 
through intermediaries (i.e. banks). Let us think that the economy in this model 
constitutes largely small and medium sized firms which may be family-owned or not 
"publicly-traded" firms. Small and medium sized firms generally have limited internal 
finance, and tend to rely on banks for finance. 
4. The household sector's earning is, in part, allocated to purchases of goods and 
services and the rest is put in bank deposits and invested in debt instruments. Since it is 
assumed that the government has no need to borrow from the public, it means that apart 
from government bonds outstanding, should the households want to invest in debt 
instruments, they are only able to invest in privately-issued debt instruments. 
4.2.b.ii. Net wealth of the four sectors 
Based on the above balance sheet, definitions, and assumptions, the four sectors' net 
real wealth is defined as follows: 
The corporate sector's net wealth 
WF = KF + C F - LF - CP 
The household sector's net wealth 
WH =CH+DD+CP+CD+BH-LH 
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The banking sector's net wealth 
WB = CB+ BD + BB + L+ KB - DD - CD 
The central bank's net wealth 
we= BC- C - BD 
From the balance sheet, it can be seen that the central bank can influence the loan 
supply either by changing its holding of government bonds (B e ), i.e. open market 
operations, affecting bank deposits and reserves or altering credit to banks at the 
discount window. Since changes in the central bank's credit to banks and holding of 
· government bonds are directly and indirectly conducive to changes in bank reserves and 
loan supply, they need to be elaborated. 
4.2.b.iii. Bank reserve system, loan supply and money supply mechanism 
Reserve system and loan supply 
The central bank normally has three ways of influencing the loan supply, all operating 
through the reserve mechanism: open market operations, discount window lending, or 
changes in the reserve requirement ratio. 
The total reserves (TR) of the banking system consist of required reserves (RR) and 
excess reserves (RE). 
TR=RR+RE ( 4.15) 
Sometimes due to unanticipated flows of funds or because it is profitable, banks may 
find that reserves are below the required level, and thus they have to borrow reserves 
from the central bank. As a result, total reserve can be decomposed into non-borrowed 
reserves (RU) and borrowed reserves (RB): 
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TR=RU+RB ( 4.16) 
The central bank supplies borrowed reserves (RB) through the discount window and 
unborrowed reserves (RU) through the repurchase market or the bond market4 . Banks 
can allocate the reserves to required reserves (RR) and to excess reserves (RE). Some of 
the reserves provided by the central bank through open market purchases of bonds may 
end up as currency in the hands of the households (CH). Hence, ( 4.16) can be 
expressed as 
RU+ RB= TR=RR + RE+CH ( 4.17) 
or 
RU= RR+ (RE-RB) +CH= RR+ RF +CH ( 4.18) 
where RF ( = RE-RB) is net free reserves 
It is assumed that banks are required to hold part of their required reserves (RR) in the 
form of no-interest-bearing deposits at the central bank (BD) and the rest in the form of 
government bonds (BB). 
Reserve system and money supply 
Following Branson (1989), let h be the ratio of public demand for holding money, 
defined as 
4 When banks borrow from the central bank at the discount window, they place bonds as collateral in 
return for credit which will be put in their deposits (BD) at the central banks. In the above central bank' s 
balance sheet, an increase in the central bank credit ( or borrowed reserves) results in a rise in Be and 
BD. A similar result can also be achieved by the central bank' s open market purchases of government 
bonds in the repurchase market or the bond market. 
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C=hMl 
where Ml = money supply 
Let z be the ratio of reserve requirement, defined as 
RR= zDD = z(l-h)Ml 
where z is a statutory reserve requirement ratio 
Unborrowed reserves can be expressed as 
RU= z(l-h)Ml +RF+ hMl 
Solving for M gives the following money supply equation, 
Ml= RU-RF 
[z + h(l - z)] 
oM oM oM oM 
oRU > o, oRF' az ' a, < 0 
( 4.19) 
(4.20) 
( 4.21) 
(4.22) 
( 4.23) 
From equation ( 4.22), the public can influence the money supply via changes in h. 
Commercial banks influence the money supply through their decision on excess 
reserves (RE) and borrowed reserves (RB), which, in turn, determines RF(=RE-RB). 
The central bank influences the money supply via changes in RU and RR (which affects 
z in the multiplier). Changes in RU may originate from the central bank's open market 
operations either in the repurchase market or the bond market or possibly both. 
Having defined the three assets, net wealth of the four sectors and the money supply 
mechanism, we can now examine the loan market. 
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4.2. b.iv. The loan market 
Like the money market, the loan market has both demand and supply sides. 
Loan demand 
It is assumed that firms' demand for loans is the difference between planned 
accumulation of physical and financial assets and their saving5. 
LD(rL ,r,y) = {I(rL ,r) + MD(r,y)}-S(y) ( 4.24)6 
+ + + 
where S denotes saving. I denotes investment demand and is assumed to be a function 
of the loan rate and the bond rate, reflecting firms' choice of financing. MD denotes 
firms'(transaction) money demand. It is assumed that firms have to pay at least some of 
their production factors before they receive their revenues, so they need some liquidity 
in the form of money. The higher the liquidity, the smoother the production process 
(Ramey,1993). 
In the absence of depreciation, the term in the curly brackets is a planned net 
accumulation of physical and financial assets. In equation ( 4.24), an increase in income 
gives rise to two conflicting effects: it increases saving and hence the capacity of self-
financing which reduces borrowing, but it also increases the demand for real money 
balances which raises the demand for borrowing. Let us assume that the latter effect 
dominates (Papademos and Modigliani, 1990) and (Wells, 1995). 
5 In most of the literature on the lending view, the behaviour of firms is the focus of theoretical analysis. 
However, this does not mean that the lending channel does not have impacts on households. "The credit 
market frictions that affect firms should also be relevant to the borrowing and spending decisions made 
by households, particularly spending on costly durable items, such as, automobiles and houses" 
(Bemanke and Gertler, 1995, page 44). For the sake of silnplicity, our theoretical analysis will only 
focus on firms' loan demand. 
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Loan supply 
The loan supply function derives from bank profit maximization in which the loan 
supply is assumed to be a negative function of the bond rate, the opportunity cost of 
bank lending, but a positive function of the loan rate. 
Ls(rL;r/11,) (4.25) 
+ - + 
The loan supply function ( 4.25) is specifically assumed to be a function of the real 
money supply, rather than the real money base. This assumption, in turn, implies that 
the money multiplier is assumed to be, more or less, constant or stable. As derived 
below, this assumption is made for the sake of convenience to embed the loan market in 
the goods market. By assuming that the money multiplier is constant or stable, changes 
in the monetary base are directly conducive to changes in the money supply. 
The loan market equilibrium is 
L D (r L ; r, y) = Ls (r L ; r, m) (4.26) 
+ + - + 
Taking the total derivative of equation ( 4.26), we obtain 
L [ ars oLD oLS oLD ] 
dr = <D (---)dr+-dm--dy a- a- an cy (4.27) 
1 
where <D = D _ 
(aL ar ) - - -a,-L a,L 
6 Loan de1nand (LD) and money demand (MD) in (4.24) are flow variables. For convenience, a 
change sign ( ~ ) is suppressed. 
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Since a,r < 0, a,, r > 0, each term of the denominator of equation (4.27) is negative. 
oLD 
The third term on the right-hand side is positive as -- > 0. That is, at a given level of 
01 
bank reserves, a rise in the real income or output puts upward pressure on the loan rate. 
oL8 
The second term is also negative as an > 0, reflecting what is inferred in the above 
oL8 
money supply mechanism. The sign of the first term depends on whether ( &<0) is 
OLD 
greater or less than ( &<O). Let us assume the latter dominates, so that a rise in the 
bond rate leads to a rise in the loan rate. 
Derivation of the CC curve 
From equation ( 4.27), we have 
rL =rL(r,y,m) ( 4.28) 
+ + -
The introduction of the bank loan market makes it necessary to modify the traditional 
IS-LM model. Following Bernanke and Blinder (1988), the IS curve is modified to 
incorporate the loan market into the goods market. 
Substituting equation ( 4.28) into the investment function in equation ( 4.5) results in 
CC ( credit and commodity): y = c[y - t(y)] + i [r,r L(r,y,m )] + g (4.29) 
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In equation ( 4.29), the investment demand is a function of not only the bond rate but 
also the loan rate. The incorporation of the goods and the loan markets makes it 
possible to represent the three markets: goods, money, loan markets by the two 
schedules (CC and LM curves), which can be plotted in a two-space diagram. 
Totally differentiating equation ( 4.29) yields 
a a a,.L a a,.L a a,.L 
dy = c (l - t )dy +(-+ - -)dr +(--)dy +(--)dm + dg 
y y a a,.L a a,.L 0I a,.L ml ( 4.30) 
Substituting equation ( 4.12) into equation ( 4.30), while keeping g constant, we have 
dy = nl b! _1 +~ a,.L _l +~ a,.L]dm la- Ir a,L a- Ir a,.r om 
1 
where n = bl a,L fy ] 
[ 1 - Cy (l - f y ) ] - ( a L 01 ) + fr rp 
a a a,.r 
~ = a + a,.L & < Q 
( 4.31) 
The first term in equation (4.31) corresponds to the solid arrows in Figure 4.1; it 
reflects the conventional money view of monetary policy transmission and is analogous 
to the multiplier effect in the pure money channel model equation (4.14). The second 
term in equation ( 4.31) can be considered as an "interest rate" lending channel, and 
corresponds to the dotted arrow in Figure 4.1. This "interest rate" channel reflects the 
impact of changes in the bond rate ( or the central bank's open market rates) on the loan 
rate. The third term in equation ( 4.31) can be regarded as a "reserve" lending channel, 
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and corresponds to the dashed arrows in Figure 4.1. This "reserve" channel can also be 
related to the loan supply function ( 4.25) and the money supply equation ( 4.22). 
Figure 4.1: Monetary Policy Transmission Channel 
------• 
Monetary base Bank reserves 
I 
' i 
Money supply Loan supply 
I 
'~ 
Bond rate Loan rate 
,r j. 
Spending by 
Aggregate spending - - - - --t bank-dependent firms 
As pointed out by Kashyap and Stein (1993), to see the distinction between the money 
channel and the lending channel, one can take an extreme case in which the households 
view bonds and money as very close substitutes. In this case, a decrease in the money 
base which leads to a decline in the money supply will have a minimal impact on the 
bond rate (that is, the LM curve is very flat). The conventional money channel is, thus, 
attenuated. However, through the lending channel monetary policy transmission can 
still be effective, even when the LM curve becomes horizontal, i.e. dr = - f Y • O as 
dy fr 
fr • oo. In equation ( 4.31 ), if fr • oo, then 
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a:r& >0 dy = _i!_ a,L) 
dm [I-cy(I-t)]-(a-L 01 
(4.32) 
In Figure 4.2, even if the LM curve is flat and the conventional money channel is weak, 
monetary policy transmission through the lending channel can still have a real effect. 
Remember that the CC curve is an incorporation of both the goods and the loan 
markets. 
r 
ro 
Figure 4.2: The CC-LM Curve 
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4.3. Is the Lending Channel a Distinct Channel or just an Enhancement 
Mechanism to the Conventional Money Channel? 
In equation ( 4.32), the real effect of monetary shocks arises from an increase in the loan 
rate. In Figure 4.1, a rise in the loan rate could be the result of either a rise in the bond 
rate or a fall in bank reserves 7. Therefore, one can argue that the lending channel may 
7 The central bank sells government bonds to the public in exchange for a check drawn on commercial 
banks. As the central bank debits the reserve accounts on these banks, reserves in the banking system fall 
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be merely a supplement, not an alternative channel to the conventional money channel. 
Bernanke and Blinder (1992) and Bemanke and Gertler (1995) are among advocates of 
the lending view who believe that the lending channel is just an enhancement 
mechanism of the conventional money channel, not a truly independent channel, 
whereas Kashyap, Stein, Wilcox (1993), Kashyap and Stein (1993) believe otherwise8. 
The crux of this conflicting view may stem from the way in which monetary policy is 
implemented. In Figure 4.1, the lending channel can be a truly independent channel, if 
changes in monetary policy directly affect the loan supply and cause a "credit crunch". 
For instance, if the central bank is prepared to reduce the supply of loans more directly, 
say, by imposing credit ceilings, then it is plausible to have an independent lending 
channel. 
In the presence of direct credit actions by the central bank, the loan supply in equation 
( 4.26) should be modified to take into account these direct actions. 
L D (r L; r, y) = Ls (r L; r, m, m *) ( 4.33) 
+ + - + -
relative to deposits. If reserves fall below the central bank's legal reserves requirement, the banking 
syste1n as a whole must reduce its holdings of deposits, and this will affect the banking sector lending 
capacity. In equation ( 4.14), at a given price level, a fall in money supply means a fall in real money 
balances. To restore equilibrium, the real interest rate on bonds must rise. 
8 The term "enhance1nent" and "independent" are often used in the literature without explicit definition. 
In our model, the enhancement mechanism of the lending channel can be inferred from Figure 4.1. 
Under conventional open market operations, changes in the monetary base automatically affect bank 
lending through changes in bank reserves and the loan rate. However, by imposing direct credit ceilings, 
the central bank can bypass the conventional mechanism shown in Table 4.1 and directly bring down the 
supply of bank loans ( chapter six will discuss this issue in greater detail). 
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where m* denotes a one-off direct credit action by the central bank. It could represent 
any regulatory actions by the central banks, such as a credit ceiling or a rise in the 
reserve requirement ratio. 
Taking the total derivative of equation ( 4.33), we obtain 
dr L = <D (---)dr--dy+-dm+--dm* [ 
oL8 oLD oLD oL8 oL8 ] 
a- a- 0J an an* 
1 
where ct> = oLu _ t3L ) 
( a L a,,L 
From equation (4.34), we have 
L _ L ( *) r - r r,y,m,m 
+ + - + 
( 4.34) 
(4.35) 
Substitute equation ( 4.35) into the investment function in equation ( 4.5), and then 
follow the same procedure as shown in equations ( 4.30) and ( 4.31 ), we obtain 
[ 
¢ a a,,L a a,, L ] 
dy=O (-+--)dm+---dm* 
J,. a,,L an a,,L an* ( 4.36) 
In equation ( 4.36), monetary policy transmission through the lending channel is direct 
because it does not depend on how much, or whether, the bond rate (denoted by r) rises. 
Suppose that the "interest rate" channel and the "reserve" channel failed to affect the 
loan rate and the loan supply, the first term in the numerator of equation ( 4.36) becomes 
zero, but a tight monetary policy can still have real effects through its direct impact on 
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the supply of bank loans. As a result, the lending channel could operate independently 
of and concurrently with the money channel. When both channels are operating, they 
should reinforce each other9. 
Here we have to make it clear that we are (theoretically) discussing how the lending 
channel can work independently; whether or not direct credit actions are desirable 
policy choices is another matter. In many countries, the advent of financial 
liberalization means that many direct credit actions have become obsolete and 
undesirable due to their economic distortions10. 
As discussed above, the foundation of the lending view is based on the fundamental 
assumption of market imperfection which gives banks a unique and important role in 
allocating the financial resources of the economy. Any shocks affecting the ability of 
banks to provide intermediary services or affecting the cost of intermediation will have 
real effects. However, to have an effective lending channel, certain conditions must be 
met. 
9 Since the 1980s, many central banks have turned away from quantitative policy, such as, open market 
operations to interest rate policy. For example, rather than instructing its money traders to purchase or 
sell a particular quantity of bonds, the central bank instructs its dealers to stand ready to trade at a 
particular bond price, or equivalently, a particular interest rate (Wells, 1995). This interest rate policy 
will affect the whole structure of interest rates, including the loan rate. This change in monetary policy 
procedure, however, does not affect our conclusion about the possibility of an independent lending 
channel, which is centred at the central bank's direct credit actions. 
10 In spite of their immediate effects, direct credit actions, such as, credit ceilings, make it difficult for 
certain borrowers to obtain loans, or force particular borrowers to pay a premium for funds that is not 
justified by difference in risk. Certain borrowers are dissuaded from undertaking investment simply 
because of the lack of funds. Thus, any direct credit action may merely create an inefficiency in the 
provision of credit (Romer and Romer, 1993). Generally, one of the main objectives of financial 
deregulation is to address any inefficiency in the provision of financial resources, and this is why direct 
credit actions are often dee1ned undesirable. 
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4.4. What Conditions Are Required for the Existence and Effectiveness of the 
Lending Channel? 
According to Bernanke and Blinder (1988) and Kashyap and Stein (1993), the 
following two conditions are deemed necessary for the existence and effectiveness of 
the lending channel. 
Cl: Intermediated loans and open-market bonds must not be perfect substitutes on 
the liability side of firm balance sheets, so that firms are unable to offset a decline 
in the supply of bank loans simply by borrowing 1nore directly from the household 
sector in the open market. 
C2: The central bank must be able to affect the bank loan supply by changing the 
quantity of reserves available to the banking system. That is, the banking sector as a 
whole must not be able to completely insulate its lending activity fro1n shocks to 
reserves, either by switching from traditional deposits to less reserve-intensive or 
reserve-free forms of finance or by running down its net holding of bonds 11 
Though C 1 and C2 can be set as separate conditions, they are, in a broader sense, "the 
same". In the lending view's three-asset model, what is actually implied in C 1 and C2 
is that bonds and bank loans must not be perfect substitutes. In C 1, if firm-issued bonds 
(for example, commercial paper) and loans are perfect substitutes, then bonds and loans 
11 Strictly speaking, for C2 to hold, it must also be assumed that banks do not or cannot engage in off-
balance sheet transactions. In the lending view model, it is implicitly assumed that there are no non-bank 
intermediaries or if there are, they only play a very minor role in the financial market. So, potential 
borrowers cannot respond to changes in monetary policy by turning to non-bank intermediaries for 
financing, and depositors cannot shift their assets between bank and non-bank institutions. 
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can be lumped into one group of assets as in the traditional IS-LM model and 
investment demand will be a function of a single interest rate, represented by the bond 
rate. In equation ( 4.29), this means that the CC curve reduces to the conventional IS 
curve. 
In ( 4.31 ), if investment demand is not determined by the loan rate, then aL =O and a-
consequently equation (4.31) reduces to equation (4.14), and the lending channel 
collapses to the money channel. In the three-asset model, it is implicitly assumed, 
although rather realistically, that private bonds and public bonds are perfect substitutes, 
(i.e. differences in risk and liquidity are ignored). As a result, if commercial paper is a 
perfect substitute for bank loans, so are certificates of deposit, and vice versa. In 
equation ( 4.31 ), if C2 does not hold, then the loan rate is not determined by the real 
. a,L 
money supply, 1.e. -=0. 
an 
In equation ( 4.27), there are two possibilities that changes in the money supply may fail 
oLs 
to affect the loan supply and hence the loan rate. One possibility is - • 0, i.e. the an 
loan supply is not influenced by changes in the real money stock; this possibility can 
refer to the dashed arrows in Figure 4.1. The other possibility is that either 8L: • -oo a-
or oLs • oo. According to Bernanke and Blinder (1988), if loans and bonds are perfect a, L 
oLD oLs 
substitutes either for borrowers (--L • -oo) or for lenders(-L • oo ), the CC curve a- a-
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reduces to the IS curve. In our model, it means that equation ( 4.31) will reduce to 
a,.L a 
equation (4.14), as - and -L become zero. 
an a-
Although Cl and C2 may be "the same" in the broader sense (i.e one implies the other), 
they need to be carefully analyzed. Cl only requires that loans and bonds must not be 
perfect substitutes on the liability side of firm balance sheets12. C2 requires that loans 
and bonds must not be perfect substitutes on both the liability and asset sides of bank 
balance sheets. As explained in the following section, as far as monetary policy 
implementation is concerned, C2 is especially important since it is directly linked to 
monetary policy procedure. 
In addition, by virtue of the three-asset assumption in which publicly and privately-
issued bonds are assumed to be perfect substitutes, in order to establish that the lending 
channel does exist, one only needs to establish that either of these bonds is not a perfect 
substitute for bank loans. This can be done in the following section by analyzing banks' 
portfolio which constitutes both government bonds and bank-issued "bonds". 
Kashyap and Stein (1993) contend that monetary policy shocks will affect the loan 
supply, if banks are unable to avoid tight monetary policy either by selling government 
bonds or issuing their own "bonds". The former is a case of asset management, while 
12 Diamond (1991) proposes a theoretical model examining firms' choice between bank loans and 
directly placed debt (bonds). He concludes, among other things, that due to imperfect information in the 
capital market, new firms begin financing their investment by borrowing from banks with being subject 
to monitoring. Once these firms' reputation becomes well-established, they will begin directly borrowing 
from the public without being subject to bank 1nonitoring. 
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the latter is a case of liability management. To analyze the impact of bank portfolio 
redistribution on the effectiveness of the lending channel, we now turn to a profit 
maximizing model of bank behaviour. 
4.5. The Implications of Bank Portfolio Redistribution on the Existence and 
Effectiveness of the Lending Channel 
To see the impact of bank portfolio redistribution on the existence and effectiveness of 
the lending view, we will utilize the principle of bank profit maximization and make 
assumptions as follows: 
1. There is perfect competition in the central bank's open market for bonds, but 
imperfect competition in the loan market. Thus, in the open market for bonds, a 
representative bank is a price-taker, while in the market for loans, it is a price-setter. 
This assumption implies a monopolistic competition in which each bank faces a 
downward sloping demand curve for its loans and has to choose the loan rate so as to 
maximize its profit13 . 
2. The bank holds two earning assets: open market securities (bonds) and loans and 
takes two kinds of deposits: demand deposits (DD) and certificates of deposit (CD). 
3. Although demand deposits (DD) pay no interest, providing services for the deposits 
incurs some cost, assumed to be a fixed proportion of the deposits denoted by lf/. For 
13 It is assumed that the banking sector in this model has a high degree of concentration in which a few 
big banks control most of the market share, but none of them has absolute monopoly power. In Thailand, 
for example, there are 15 banks, but the four largest banks control around two-thirds of the market share. 
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simplicity, all the bank's other operational costs, such as labour costs, are ignored as 
they are irrelevant to our analysis. 
4. While DD are subject to a statutory reserve requirement, CD may or may not be 
subject to the requirement. For the moment, we assume that CD are subject to a reserve 
requirement; later we will discuss the impact, if this assumption is to be relaxed. 
5. The bank's capital is assumed to be fixed, so the bank is supposed to offset any 
uncertain flows of deposits by either liquidating government bonds (BB) or issuing its 
own "bonds" (CD). The operational costs of these two transactions are assumed to be 
negligible, and hence ignored. 
From Table 4.1, a representative bank's balance sheet is 
L+ BB+ CB+ BD + KB = DD + CD ( 4.37) 
where L = loans made by the bank to the public sector; BB = government bonds held 
by the bank; CB = currency held by the bank; BD = bank deposits at the central bank; 
DD = demand deposits help by the public; CD = certificates of deposit held by the 
public; and KB = bank capital 
The bank is subject to two types of reserve requirements 
ZD DD + z c CD < BD 
and 
(A) 
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I v(DD + CD) < BB (B) 
Because of the zero rate of return on deposits at the central bank, we assume that the 
first of these requirements is satisfied as an equality, and that any excess reserves are 
held in the form of government bonds. 
Equation (4.37) can be rewritten as 
L+ BB+ CB + KB =DD+ CD - zD DD - zcCD 
where zD DD + zc CD = BD 
Equation (4.37a) can be re-arranged as 
BB =DD+ CD - ZD DD - zc CD - CB - KB - L 
(4.37a) 
(4.37b) 
With the requirements stipulated above, the bank's profit per period can be written as 
IT=rLL+rBB -rpDD-rcCD 
= rLL(rL)+r[DD+CD-zDDD-zcCD-CB -KB -L(rL)]-ryDD-rcCD (4.38) 
where L(rL) = the volume of loans demanded (for simplicity, assumed to be a function 
of the loan rate only); r L = the loan rate; re = the CD rate; r = the bond rate; and ry= 
the fixed cost of providing demand deposits 
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Subject to a liquidity constraint 
L(rL) < DD+ CD-zD DD-zeCD-v(DD+ CD)-CB -KB (4.39) 
where this constraint has been derived by substituting equation (A) and equation (B) 
into equation (4.37a). If equation (B) holds as an equality, so does equation (4.39). 
The function to be maximized is 
F = rL L(rL) + r[DD + CD-zDCD-zeCD- CB - KB - L(rL)]- lj/DD-r eCD 
+A [DD+ CD-zD DD-zeCD-v(DD+CD)-CB -KB -L(rL)] 
Kuhn-Tucker's first-order conditions are 
oF = L oL(rL) L( L)- oL(rL) _ ,, oL(rL) < O 
L r L + r r L /L, , _ a- a,. a,. a-
rL > 0 and rL oF a'L = Q 
oF =rcCD -rze cCD -re cCD -CD+A cCD -AZe cCD -AVcCD <O 
a, e a, e a,e a,e a, e a, e a, e -
r e > 0 and r e oF a,.e = 0 
oF - = DD+ CD-zD DD-zeCD-L(r L)-v(DD+ CD)> 0 
ol 
oF 
J > 0 and J- = 0 ol 
( 4.40) 
(4.41) 
(4.42) 
(4.43) 
(4.44) 
( 4.45) 
( 4.46) 
There are two possible outcomes depending on whether or not the liquidity constraint is 
binding. 
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4.5.a. Non-binding liquidity constraint 
If the constraint is not binding, then equation ( 4.45) holds as an inequality and A = 0. 
The first-order conditions equations ( 4.41) and ( 4.43) become 
oF _ L oL(rL) L( L)- oL(rL) _ O 
L-r L + r r T -a- a- a-
which implies rL(I + _!_)= r, 
eL 
oL L(rL) < 0 
and a,L = (r _ rL) 
where e L denotes the elasticity of loan demand, and 
oF =rXD -rzc XD -re XD -CD=O 
a,c a,c a,c a,c 
1 
r c(I+ - ) 
ec 
or r = (I-zc ) 
where e c denotes the elasticity of demand for CD. 
(4.47) 
(4.47*) 
(4.48) 
In equation ( 4.4 7), the loan rate is set where the marginal revenue from loans is equal to 
the marginal opportunity cost of lending, the bond rate. In equation ( 4.4 7*), we know 
that the loan rate should at least be marginally higher than the bond rate, otherwise 
banks would wholly invest in bonds and supply no loans. Although bonds yield a lower 
rate of return than loans, banks generally hold bonds above the legally required level in 
order to shield their loan supply from a short-run fluctuation of funds. 
In the money supply equation ( 4.22), banks can offset a decline in unborrowed reserves 
(RU) by either selling excess bonds in the repurchase market (that is, squeezing excess 
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1 ,,,, reserves (RE)), or increasing borrowing at the discount window by placing bonds as 
collateral (that is, increasing borrowed reserves (RB)). In an extreme case where a fall 
in RE and a rise in RB are sufficient enough to offset a fall in RU, the loan supply 
function ( 4.25) is not influenced by changes in the real money supply; this scenario can 
refer to the dashed arrows in Figure 4.1. 
To discourage banks from substituting from bonds into loans, the cost of borrowing in 
the central bank's reserve market must not be the same as the interest rate earned on 
government bonds. In other words, banks must pay a premium when entering the 
central bank's reserve market as a borrower. Lower liquidity will increase the 
probability that the bank will have to enter the market as a borrower, which will, in 
turn, increase the marginal cost of funds. 
To see how the borrowing premium can affect bank lending behaviour, we simplify 
equation (4.37a) by assuming that there is one type of deposits denoted by D with a 
proportion of D, denoted by z, held as zero-yielding deposits at the central bank and a 
proportion, v , held as bonds, i.e. zD + vD ~ total required reserves. It should be noted 
that on the basis of profit maximization, banks will never choose to hold deposits at the 
central bank (BD) above the required level as BD earn no interest; BD should thus be 
strictly equal to zD. However, banks are likely to hold bonds above the required level 
as a bulwark against an unanticipated shortfall of deposits, i.e. BB > vD. If BB > vD, 
this implies that total bank reserves consist of both required reserves and excess 
reserves. 
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Equation (4.37) can now be written as 
L+BB +CB +KB +BD=D (4.37c) 
Following Tobin (1982) and King (1986), let x be a random component of deposits with 
mean zero and x > -l. Also let f(x) be the density function and F(X) be the probability 
distribution function that x < X with F(-1) = 0. At the beginning of the period, the bank 
is assumed to know the distribution of x, but not its realization. 
Equation (4.37c) becomes 
L + BB + CB + KB = D(l - z )(1 + x) (4.37d) 
If the net bond holding, is, at least, at the required level (i.e. BB = vD), a net return of r 
is obtained, but if below the required level ( BB < vD ), the cost of short-term borrowing 
to meet the legal reserve requirement is incurred. It is assumed that the borrowing cost 
exceeds r by a premium b. According to Tobin (1982) and King (1986), the position of 
the net bond holding depends on the random component of deposits (x). 
For given L, the critical value of x at which the net excess bond holding becomes zero 
(or BB = vD) is given by 
X= (vD+L+CB +KB) _
1 
D(l-z) 
Equation (4.37e) is derived from (4.37d) where BB = vD. 
(4.37e) 
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If the bank is risk neutral, it will choose to maximize the expected profit: 
F=rLL(rL)+r[D(I-z)-CB -KB -L(rL)]-rDD 
(vD+L+CB +KB) 
+b f
1 
D(I-z) 
1
[D(I-z)(l+x)-CB -KB -L(rL)]f(x)dx 
(4.37f) 
where rn = a deposit rate 
The last term of equation ( 4.3 7f) captures the expected cost of entering the central 
bank's reserve market as a borrower. 
Differentiating equation ( 4.3 7f) with respect to r L using Leibnitz' s rule, yields 
oF =rL oL +L(rL)-r oL - oL b{J(vD+L+CB+KB)_Il- V }=o 
a,.L &L a,.L &L .Ll D(I - z) J (1- z) 
(4.37g) 
After some simple manipulation, we obtain 
rL(l+-I )=r+b{J(vD+L+CB +KB) _ 11_ v } 
e L 
1 l D(l - z) J (1 - z) (4.37h) 
. v dFlvD+L+CB+KB 1] 1 h . hb ... Since -- < 1 an ------- - = , t e term 1n t e races 1s pos1t1ve . 
1-z D(I-z) 
Equation ( 4.3 7h) implies that for a given level of deposits, the marginal cost of 
extending loans increases with the volume of loans as the bank becomes less liquid. If 
the incremental cost of borrowing is zero, i.e. b=O, then equation ( 4.3 7h) reduces to 
equation ( 4.4 7); loans will be made to the point where the marginal return to loans is 
equal to the bond rate. In the real world, it is unlikely that the borrowing premium will 
be zero. Traditionally, the central bank exerts its influence in the reserve market to 
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affect the loan rate. Other things being equal, a rise in the borrovving premium will lead 
to a rise in the loan rate. 
In short, in the case of a non-binding liquidity constraint, banks are likely to shield their 
loan supply from an unanticipated shortfall of deposits by changing their bond holding 
position. For instance, unexpected inflows of deposits will be matched by an increase in 
the holdings of bonds in the short run, while unanticipated outflows of deposits will be 
matched by a decrease in the holding of bonds. Given the possibility that banks can and 
will alter their bond holding in response to deposit and reserve fluctuations, the 
existence of the lending channel does not require banks to be completely incapable of 
substituting bonds into loans; it merely requires banks to face the incremental cost of 
borrowing in the central bank's reserve market. 
In addition, in the case of a non-binding constraint, the existence of a CD market ( or 
any other specific deposit markets) should have. no direct and immediate impact on 
bank lending activities as banks can adjust their bond holdings to offset any short-term 
fluctuation of deposit flows. However, once banks reach a binding liquidity constraint, 
the deposit markets, especially short-term wholesale deposit markets, for example, the 
CD market, will become crucial to bank lending activities. 
4.5.b. Binding liquidity constraint 
If the constraint is binding, then equation ( 4.45) holds as an equality and A > O. 
Equation (4.41) can be manipulated into 
.. 
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L l 
J=r (l+-)-r (4.41 *) 
eL 
Condition equation ( 4.43) can be manipulated into 
1 
r-rzc -rc(l+-)+J(l-zc -v) = 0 
ec 
(4.43*) 
Substituting equation ( 4.41 *) into equation ( 4.43 *), yields 
1 1 
r L (l + -)(1 - z c - v) + vr = r c (l + -) 
eL ec 
(4.49) 
where e c denotes the interest rate elasticity of demand for CD 
Substituting equation ( 4.48) into equation ( 4.49), we have 
L l C 1 
r (l+-)=r (l+-)0 
eL ec 
(4.50) 
1 
where 0 = (l-zc ) 
In equilibrium, the marginal cost of CD is set equal to its marginal return, and the loan 
rate is a markup over the CD rate. If the liquidity constraint becomes binding, banks 
have no excess bond holding, and their loan-making decision will depend on how easy 
and cheaply banks can replace lost (retail) deposits with other sources of funds. The 
existence of the lending channel does not require banks to be totally incapable of 
replacing lost deposits, it only requires that banks do not face a perfectly elastic demand 
for their managed liabilities. If the demand for bank managed liabilities were perfectly 
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elastic, then the effectiveness of the lending channel would depend on whether or not 
there is a reserve requirement on the managed liabilities. 
By slightly manipulating equation ( 4.50), we have 
rL(l +-1 ) = r c[l + a,c CDl 
eL iCD r e 0 
( 4.51) 
If a-c is very small, ceteris paribus, the loan rate will rise only slightly in response to 
iCD 
the issuance of CD. As a consequence, a large volume of new CD issuance is expected 
to be issued. On the contrary, if a- c is large, the loan rate will rise significantly, and 
iCD 
fewer new CD will be issued (Kashyap and Stein, 1993). 
Bernanke and Gertler (1995) contend that despite financial deregulation and innovation, 
it remains likely that the demand for bank managed liabilities is not perfectly elastic. 
This is because of, inter alia, lack of deposit insurance and liquidity. Many CD are non-
negotiable or difficult to trade on secondary markets. As a result, new investors will 
only be induced to hold CD if they are paid higher interest rates 14 . 
In an extreme case in which the demand for managed liabilities is perfectly elastic with 
respect to the CD rate, i.e.~~ • co or ~D • 0, equation (4.51) reduces to 
a,c 
14 In the context of our theoretical model in which the real wealth is assumed to be fixed, the demand 
for bank 1nanaged liabilities is unlikely to be perfectly elastic as there are portfolio restrictions; this will 
be discussed below. 
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oLD L(rL) 
a,.L ere_ rL (4.52) 
In equation ( 4.52), if the demand for managed liabilities is perfectly elastic and there is 
. . d C h . h oLD L(rL) If 1 ' no reserve requirement impose on D, t at 1s, 8 = 1, t en -L- = e T • oans a r -r 
and bank-issued "bonds"(i.e, reserve-free CD) are perfect substitutes, then °~ • -oo 
a-
as re • rL; the lending view's three-asset model collapses to the conventional money 
view's two-asset model. 
Generally, a reserve requirement has two major impacts on banks' ability to provide 
intermediary services. 
· First, changes in reserve requirement restrain the banks' capacity to expand credit 
through a reserve multiplier defined as 
s 1 
M =-MIB (4.53) 
z 
where L5 = loan supply, z = reserve requirement ratio, MB= the monetary base 
[ unborrowed reserves (RU) + borrowed reserves (RB)] 
Second, by requiring banks to set aside part of their deposits as required reserves which 
earn low or no rate of return, changes in the reserve requirement ratio can influence the 
banks' ability to attract deposits. To see this effect, let us assume that both CD and DD 
earn interest, re and rD respectively. 
II= rL L(rL) + r[DD + CD- zD DD- zcCD- CB - KB - L(rL)]- rD DD- re CD 
( 4.54) 
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Differentiating equation ( 4.54) with respect to r e and rD and then after some simple 
algebra, we have 
rD=r(l-zD) 
1 
(1+ - ) 
eD 
r e = r(l-ze ) 
1 
(1+ - ) 
ee 
(4.55) 
For given elasticities of demand for deposits, rD < r e as zD > z e and rD > r e as 
ZD < z e . 
Two interesting things should be noted about bank liability management 
First, if the demand for bank managed liabilities is perfectly elastic and no reserve 
requirement is imposed on the managed liabilities, then banks should be able to 
circumvent a reduction in bank reserves induced by open market operations by issuing 
CD. As a result, a reserve nexus between open market operations and the supply of 
loans is broken as banks can fully offset a decline in bank reserves. This scenario can 
refer to the dashed arrows in Figure 4.1. In equation ( 4.27), if the supply of loans is not 
!JI} al 
influenced by the monetary shock, then om = 0 and in equation ( 4.31) an =O. The 
lending channel is weak. 
Nonetheless, the interest rate link between open market operations and the loan rate 
may still exist, even when the reserve link is severed. In the three-asset world where 
private and public bonds are assumed to be perfect substitutes, a rise in interest rates on 
the public bonds should permeate to interest rates on the private bonds. This interest 
rate link can refer to the dotted arrow in Figure 4.1 and equations ( 4.48) and ( 4.50). 
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In equations ( 4.48) and ( 4.50), it can be seen that the bond rate, the CD rate and the 
loan rate are related. By substituting equations ( 4.48) into ( 4.50), we obtain 
1 1 l 
I Cl+ - ) I 
1 c ec j rL(l+~)=r=r l (1-zc) (4.50a) 
In the lending view's three-asset model, government bonds and bank-issued "bonds" 
are assumed to be perfect substitutes, implying that ec is equal to infinity from the 
point of view of bond and CD investors. That is, 
r e 
r = C 
1-z 
(4.50b) 
Bank loans and bonds are, on the other hand, considered imperfect substitutes, implying 
that e L is not equal to infinity from the point of view of borrowers. Though bonds and 
CD are assumed to be perfect substitutes in the three-asset model, in reality they are not 
because of the reserve requirement ratio imposed on CD. Equation ( 4.50b) reiterates 
what is argued earlier that if the monetary policy instrument is traditional open market 
operations, which are conducive to changes in the bond rate, the lending channel is 
merely an enhancement mechanism to the conventional money channel. 
Second, bank liability management is basically nothing more than a method of inducing 
the public to switch from more to less liquid bank liabilities. In the money supply 
equation ( 4.22), at a given level of reserves supplied by the central bank, liability 
management is simply a technique for enticing the public to change their currency 
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holding ratio (h). For example, if the non-bank public is tempted to hold less currency, 
a fall in h will, inter alia, lead to a rise in M, which can be offset by an increase in the 
reserve requirement ratio (z). 
In the short run, it is plausible that with liability management banks may be able to 
maintain or perhaps even increase their lending capacity. In the long run, it is, however, 
questionable whether a reserve-generating process through liability management will 
necessarily create an adequate supply of reserves to meet banks' reserve demand. 
During the period of monetary tightening, the central bank's open market sales of 
government bonds means that the household sector should have already held more 
bonds ( BH) and less of the money stock (CH+ DD) in its portfolios. 
At a given real net wealth of the household sector, which can be expressed as 
WH =CH+DD+CP+CD+BH-LH 
Open market sales of government bonds imply a decline in the household's money 
stock (CH+ DD) and a rise in bond holdings ( BH ). Thus, banks attempting to induce 
the household sector to hold more of their "bonds" may find it difficult to squeeze any 
further funds from the already-squeezed household sector. Once the market cannot 
generate an adequate supply of funds, a liquidity shortage will then emerge. Banks will 
eventually have to reduce their loan supply. 
In fact, apart from running down their excess bond holdings or issuing certificates of 
deposit, banks can also raise funds through loan securitization. Loan securitization is a 
process of pooling and re-packaging homogenous loans (for example, home mortgages) 
into securities and then selling to a group of investors, who purchase a financial 
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instrument evidencing the indebtedness without recourse to the original lender. This 
securitization generates funds for banks for further lending activities. In a broader 
sense, loan securitization or loan selling is analogous to excess bond selling because 
rather than selling excess bonds, banks instead sell loans outstanding in the form of 
collateral-backed securities (that is, "bonds" in the three-asset model). 
In the simplified balance sheet (Table 4.1 ), loan securitization operations entail no 
change in overall total assets and liabilities. In the context of the lending view's three-
asset model, loan securitization is merely a process of substituting loans for collateral-
backed "bonds". If this substitution could be done easily and costlessly, then the 
existence and effectiveness of the lending channel would be in doubt. 
4.6. The Lending Channel and the Money Channel in an Open Economy 
Our model makes two major assumptions: a constant price level and a closed economy. 
A constant price level or, more realistically, an imperfect price adjustment is assumed 
essentially to prevent "monetary neutrality"15 . The closed-economy assumption is made 
to exclude the exchange rate channel of monetary policy transmission. With the 
increasing globalization of the world financial market, it is almost impossible to 
completely ignore the exchange rate channel. Although the main thrust of our analysis 
is about the lending channel, in this section we will briefly analyze the exchange rate 
channel. 
15 According to Kashyap and Stein (1993), if prices adjust frictionlessly, a change in nominal bank 
reserves will be met with an equi-proportionate change in prices, and both bank and corporate balance 
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Like the conventional money channel, the exchange rate channel also involves interest 
rate effects. This is because when domestic real interest rates rise, domestic currency 
becomes relatively more attractive and entices capital flows causing the domestic 
currency to appreciate. The higher value of the domestic currency makes domestic 
goods more expensive, thereby causing a fall in net export and output. 
Conceptionally, the exchange rate channel derives from what is known as the interest 
rate parity theorem which states that the differential in domestic and foreign interest 
rates is equal to the forward exchange rate premium or discount. The interest rate parity 
theorem is basically a statement about the law of one price, which asserts that securities 
or assets in all markets that share the same characteristics should yield the same rate of 
return (Rivera-Batiz, 1989): 
r-r* =f = (F-e) 
e 
( cover interest rate parity) 
where r = domestic interest rate, r * = foreign interest rate, e = exchange rate, and f = 
forward pre mi um or discount, and F forward exchange rate 
In an open economy, the effectiveness of monetary policy depends critically on the 
exchange rate regime. Under a flexible exchange rate, monetary policy is powerful as 
discussed above. On the contrary, under a fixed exchange rate, monetary policy is 
impotent due to what is known as an off setting capital-flow effect. 
sheets will remain unaltered in real terms. In this case, there can be no real effects of monetary policy 
through either the lending channel or the conventional money channel. 
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The central bank's simplified balance sheet in an open economy 
Assets: B c + IR 
Liabilities: C + BD 
where IR = international reserves; C = currency; BD = bank deposits at the central 
bank; and B c = government bonds held by the central bank 
MB = H = C + BD = B c + IR 
where MB = monetary base, H = high-powered money 
MB is related to the money supply through the money multiplier. 
Ml=µMB 
where µ = money multiplier 
In an open economy under a fixed exchange rate system, two factors influence the 
monetary base: the central bank' s actions and the balance of payments situation of the 
economy. Consider the case of the central bank's credit actions. For example, the 
central bank's open market sales of government bonds imply a fall in the central bank's 
government bond holdings and a fall in bank deposits at the central bank (i.e. a fall in 
bank reserves) and hence a decline in the monetary base. At a given money multiplier 
and price level, this leads to a decrease in the real money balance and a rise in interest 
rates. A rise in domestic interest rates will attract capital inflows. To maintain a fixed 
exchange rate, the central bank will be obliged to buy foreign currencies; thereby 
increasing its foreign reserves. 
107 
'I 
On the liability side of the central bank's balance sheet, open market sales of bonds 
mean a fall in bank reserves, while the central bank's purchases of foreign currencies 
mean a rise in domestic currency. In an extreme case where a fall in the monetary base 
was proportionately equal to a rise in the international reserves, the central bank would 
be unable to change the overall money supply, unless it was able to effectively sterilize 
the effect of capital flows. 
In equation ( 4.36), under a pegged exchange rate, a conventional monetary policy in the 
form of traditional open market operations is ineffective, i.e. dm = 0. In this case, the 
central bank will have to rely more on direct credit actions, such as, credit ceilings, to 
bring down the loan supply. If banks were fully compliant with the central bank's credit 
ceilings, the effectiveness of monetary policy would depend on to what extent firms can 
obtain funds elsewhere. 
In the real world, only a handful of firms with an exceptional reputation can borrow 
freely in foreign capital markets. Thus, the central bank's "binding" credit ceilings are 
likely to affect bank-dependent firms which are unable to obtain funds elsewhere, and 
also banks which experience high liquidity due to capital inflows, but are unable to lend 
due to the ceilings. In Thailand, financial liberalization and the establishment of the 
Bangkok International Banking Facility (BIBF) have made it easier for domestic 
borrowers to obtain external funds and hence weakened the effectiveness of monetary 
policy in general and credit controls in particular16 . 
16 Theoretically, Thailand should not have an independent monetary policy, given that it was an open 
economy with a de facto fixed exchange rate regime (before July, 2, 1997). Practically, Thailand seems 
to have a considerable degree of monetary autonomy, thanks to several fonns of capital controls imposed 
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In a broader sense, the central bank's credit ceiling behaves somewhat like exogenous 
credit rationing; that is, it is imposed exogenously from outside the banking system. In 
theory, there is also a possibility of endogenous credit rationing introduced by banks 
themselves. If banks do ration credit, how does the endogenous credit rationing affect 
the theoretical propositions and arguments discussed in the pervious sections? What are 
the implications of the existence of the endogenous credit rate in monetary policy 
transmission? Does the lending view critically depend on whether or not banks ration 
credit? The following section will attempt to find conceptual answers for these 
questions. 
4. 7. Monetary Policy Shocks in the Presence of Endogenous Credit Rationing 
In the real world, some kind of credit rationing may initially exist before monetary 
policy is tightened. How important is credit rationing in monetary policy transmission? 
While the lending view forecasts a leftward shift in the loan supply and a rise in the 
loan rate after monetary tightening, credit rationing predict no changes in the loan 
supply and the loan rate. According to Jaffee and Modigliani (1969), there are two 
types of credit rationing: equilibrium rationing and dynamic rationing. 
4. 7.a. Equilibrium credit rationing 
Equilibrium rationing results from heterogeneity in bank customers' risk classification. 
Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) argue that it may pay banks to operate below a Walrasian 
by the Bank of Thailand (Warr and Nidhiprabha, 1996). In the early 1990s, most of these capital controls 
were removed as part of financial liberalization, leaving the Bank of Thailand with less and less control 
over the domestic money supply. 
109 
equilibrium, even if in doing so excess demand for loan is created. The existence of 
excess demand generally may not induce banks to increase the interest rate: to do so 
might reduce their expected rate of return. 
Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) provide two reasons for the possible inverse relationship 
between the rate of interest charged and the expected return to banks. First, at the higher 
interest rate, the proportion of high-risk borrowers is increased (the adverse selection 
effect). Second, at the higher interest rate, each borrower may be tempted to engage in 
riskier investment (the incentive or moral hazard effect). As a result, in equilibrium, a 
loan market may be characterized by credit rationing: banks are concerned about the 
interest rate they receive on loans and the riskiness of the loans. 
As shown in Figure 4.3, assume that initially the volume of loans extended is L0 ; a 
tight monetary policy would reduce the volume of loans even further to L1 , provided 
that C2 holds. Excess demand AB is a result of the credit rationing, while excess 
demand CA is a consequence of monetary tightening. If the excess demand (CA) 
cannot be satisfied by other sources of finance which are close substitutes to bank loans 
(i.e C 1 holds), then monetary policy will have real effects. As a consequence, the 
presence of credit rationing merely intensifies the impact of the tight monetary policy. 
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Figure 4.3: Equilibrium Credit Rationing 
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4.7.b. Dynamic credit rationing 
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Dynamic rationing is defined as the transitory difference in the quantity of excess 
demand for funds that arises from loan market imperfection which is reflected in the 
sluggish movement of interest rate to a new equilibrium after changes in monetary 
policy. Generally, the interest rate adjustment lag is considered an impediment to 
monetary policy transmission. However, if there was some significant degree of credit 
rationing, lending rate stickiness might turn out to be a blessing rather than a curse for 
the contractionary monetary transmission mechanism. 
Let Figure 4.4 represent the market for bank loans, and suppose there is a monetary 
tightening which causes the loans supply to shift to the left. With the existence of an 
interest rate adjustment lag, a tight monetary policy will have two effects: the interest 
rate effect (AC) and the dynamic credit rationing effect (AB). In Figure 4.4, the interest 
rate adjustment lag means that excess demand for loans may persist for some time 
before the loan rate is adjusted enough to clear the market and the equilibrium is re-
established at point C. 
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Figure 4.4: Dynamic Credit Rationing 
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As in the case of the equilibrium rationing, the real effect of dynamic credit rationing 
also depends on whether or not the lending view's two necessary conditions are met, In 
Figure 4.4, C2 must hold so that the loan supply curve will shift leftward. Cl must also 
hold so that the excess demand AB cannot be satisfied elsewhere. In short, the 
conditions for the existence and the effectiveness of the lending view are still required 
to hold with and without the credit rationing. 
Therefore, suffice it to say that the presence of credit rationing should not change the 
nature of the lending view. A tight monetary policy would simply make the banks 
which may be initially rationing credit even more cautious above extending loans. By 
the same token, an expansive monetary policy would make loans more available to 
those initially facing credit rationing. As pointed out by Kashyap and Stein (1993, page 
3), " .. it (the lending channel) does not hinge critically on whether or not there is 
quantity rationing in the loan market. As a matter of practical reality, shifts in bank 
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loan supply may well be accompanied by variations in the degree of rationing, but this 
is not necessary for there to be a meaningful lending channel". 
4.8. Conclusion 
This chapter has set up a theoretical framework for understanding the lending view of 
monetary policy transmission. The lending view's main point of departure from the 
conventional money channel is its assumption of market imperfection and rejection of a 
perfect substitution between bank loans and bonds. The lending view stresses the 
important role banks play in alleviating imperfect information in the capital market, and 
calls for the recognition of the role of bank lending in monetary policy propagation. In 
the conventional money channel, bank loans are considered irrelevant to investment and 
spending decisions, because loans and bonds are implicitly assumed to be perfect 
substitutes. 
Although there is a possibility that monetary policy can be transmitted through the 
lending channel, it appears that the lending channel may only play a supplementing 
role, rather than an independent role to the money channel if monetary policy is 
conducted through conventional open market operations. However, if the central bank 
is prepared to cause a "credit crunch" by bringing down the supply of loans more 
directly, say, through direct credit actions, then it is possible that the lending channel 
can operate independently. Except for direct credit actions which can be deemed as 
special cases, the existence and effectiveness of the lending channel depends crucially 
on how banks respond to monetary tightening. 
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If bank liquidity constraint is non-binding, banks are likely to offset a tight monetary 
policy by running down their excess bond holdings; the lending view does not really 
require that banks be completely unable to substitute excess bonds for loans, it only 
requires that banks face the incremental cost of borrowing in the central bank's reserve 
market. In the case of binding constraint, banks are likely to raise new funds through 
CD issues. The lending view does not require that banks be totally incapable of 
replacing lost deposits; it merely requires that banks do not face a perfectly elastic 
demand for their managed liabilities. If the demand for bank managed liabilities were 
perfectly elastic, the existence of the lending channel would rest on whether or not there 
is a reserve requirement on the managed liabilities. 
The theoretical model developed in this chapter is primarily based on the closed-
econon1y assun1ption which allows us to exclude the exchange rate channel and focus 
on analyzing the money and the lending channels. Section 4.6 briefly discussed the 
concept of the exchange rate channel. It is argued that in an open economy with a fixed 
exchange rate, monetary policy is ineffective. In such an economy, the central bank has 
to rely on direct credit actions, such as, credit ceilings, to bring down the loan supply. 
In a broader sense, the central bank credit ceilings behave like exogenous credit 
rationing. In theory and reality, there is also a possibility of endogenous credit rationing 
introduced by banks themselves. In the literature, the lending channel has been 
perceived by some to be critically dependent on bank credit rationing. Section 4.7 tried 
to explain conceptually that the lending channel does not essentially hinge on ~rhether 
or not there is a quantity rationing in the loan market. 
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Chapter Five 
Econometric Technique and Model Specification 
5.1. Introduction 
Before proceeding to the empirical analysis of the lending view, it is useful to spell out 
the econometric tools to be used in the analysis. Though the relationship between 
financial and monetary variables and economic activity can be examined in a variety of 
ways, this study will use an econometric technique known as a vector autoregression 
(VAR). Introduced by Sims (1980), the VAR model is a useful tool for analyzing the 
inter-relationship or inter-dependence between time-series variables. Though it is a 
relatively new tool of macroeconometrics, the VAR has rapidly become quite popular 
as it provides a flexible and tractable framework for analyzing economic time series. 
The VAR model allows users to examine the dynamic characteristics of the model by 
stimulating the response of the variables to particular shocks. The VAR generates 
residuals or innovations which can be thought of as unexpected shocks to the variables 
in the model (Keating, 1990). 
This chapter is organized into eight sections. Section 5 .2 and 5 .3 describe the two 
categories of the VAR model: UV AR and SVAR. Section 5.4 and 5.5 explain a test of 
causality (Granger causality test) and a test of stationarity (unit root test) respectively. 
Section 5 .6 outlines the estimating procedure of the SV AR model. Section 5. 7. 
illustrates the model specification and restrictions adopted in estimating the SV AR 
model. Section 5. 8 concludes 
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5.2. Unrestricted VAR (UV AR) Model 
In the UV AR, all the variables are allowed to interact linearly with their own and other 
current and past values. Historical data are used to determine the quantitative impact 
each variable has on its own future values and the future values of the other variables. 
However, since current and past values of each variable appear in every equation of the 
UV AR model, the number of coefficients to be estimated tend to be large compared to 
the number of observations on the variables. With so many coefficients available to 
explain and so few observations, the estimated coefficients are subject to over-fitting. A 
traditional solution to the over-fitting problem of large UV AR models has been to use 
"prior beliefs" to reduce the number of coefficients to be estimated (Todd, 1984). 
Imposing "prior beliefs" on the VAR model is strongly criticized by Sims (1980), who 
considers identification restrictions as simply "incredible". Sims (1980) chooses to 
ignore any prior restriction as well as the endogenous and exogenous distinction. In his 
view, the role of economic theory in the VAR modeling is simply to select relevant 
observed data series (Spanos, 1987). However, critics of the UV AR model argue that 
the lack of theoretical structure could render the UV AR model inappropriate not only 
for explanation and test of theories but also for policy analysis. Most recent studies, 
including those recently conducted by Sims (1986, 1992), choose to impose some sort 
of restrictions on the VAR model. 
5.3. Structural VAR (SV AR) Model 
SV AR was introduced to deal with "organizing" instantaneous or contemporaneous 
relationships among relevant variables, normally left hidden in the variance/covariance 
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matrix of innovations in the UV AR model. The SV AR model basically attempts to find 
a "sensible" solution to the problem of how to deal with the contemporaneous 
correlation among time series variables under the study, by imposing a "proper" set of 
restrictions (Amisano and Giannini, 1997). 
Since the inception of the VAR literature, many different approaches have been 
proposed to obtain more efficient estimates in the VAR model. However, the most 
popular ones are those proposed by Sims (1986) and Blanchard and Quah (1989). 
Blanchard and Quah (1989) propose a restriction on a nominal demand shock. Under 
this approach, exogenous shocks are dichotomized into two kinds of shock: a nominal 
demand shock and a real supply shock. Blanchard and Quah postulate that an aggregate 
demand shock does not have a long-run effect on real output (GNP); only an aggregate 
supply shock does. 
Although acknowledging that Blanchard and Quah' s restriction method is quite 
theoretically appealing, we will not adopt it in our study. The main reason for this is 
that as far as our theoretical model is concerned, we have made no distinction between 
a (temporary) nominal shock and a (permanent) real shock. The main objective of our 
study is to provide a theoretical framework for understanding the lending view and the 
distinction between the conventional money channel and the lending channel. 
Our theoretical model was developed primarily from the modification of the 
conventional IS-LM model. In theory, we know that the IS-LM model only accounts 
for the demand side of the economy; the IS and the LM curves can be combined to 
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derive the aggregate demand curve. Based on this theoretical basis and our theoretical 
model, the money channel affecting the LM curve and the lending channel affecting the 
CC curve (the modified IS curve) only generate temporary nominal effects1. 
Given the nature and the main objective of our study, we have chosen to adopt Sims 
(1986)'s approach to obtain the exact identification. Sims' (1986) approach involves a 
constraint on the free parameter space by providing an interpretation of 
contemporaneous correlation among variables (i.e. imposing restrictions on 
contemporaneous coefficients). This interpretation is called a "structuralization" of the 
VAR model. 
In the SVAR model, Sims' (1980) original non-orthogonal vector automoving average 
(V AM) representation is transformed into an orthogonalized V AM representation. Most 
forms of transformation are carried out via a Choleski decomposition of the variance 
and covariance matrix of the reduced form disturbances, which involves modeling 
contemporaneous relationships among the variables in a triangular recursive form. 
In the SV AR analysis, two issues are generally of particular interest: what is the 
dynamic response of endogenous variables to exogenous shocks? and what is the 
relative importance of exogenous shocks to movements in endogenous variables?. The 
first question is answered by a structural VAR model and impulse response function. 
The second question is answered by variance decomposition (Watson, 1994). 
1Monetary policy regardless of its transmission channel has no long-run effect as its effect is essentially 
dependent on a short-run imperfect price adjustment to prevent monetary neutrality. For instance, if the 
price level adjusts frictionlessly, a change in nominal bank reserves will be met with an equi-
proportionate change in the price level. Both bank and corporate balance sheets will remain unchanged 
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To illustrate the SV AR model, we follow Enders (1995), who provides a simple but 
very insightful explanation for the SVAR model. Consider a first-order bivariate SVAR 
system: 
[ 
1 b12 j[Y, j = [blO j + [r 11 Y 12 j[Yt-1 j + [& yt j 
b21 1 z, b20 r 21 r 22 2 ,-1 & zl 
(5.1) 
where y 1 and z, are assumed to be stationary time-series variables, and & yt and & zt 
are white noise disturbances 
Since system (5.1) is not identified owing to the presence of a contemporaneous effect 
between y, and z, , it cannot be directly estimated. However, by transforming system 
(5.1) into reduced-form equations, it is possible to obtain consistent estimates of the 
parameters. 
System (5.1) can be written in matrix form 
Bx, = 1 0 + f'1x,_1 + &1 (5.2) 
where B = [bl 
21 
b12 j = [Y,j [' = [blO j [' = [Y11 ' x, ' o b ' 1 l z , 20 Y 21 
r l 2 j ' £ 
1 
= [ £ yt j 
Y 22 & zt 
Premultiplying system (5.1) by B-1 , we obtain 
[
Y,j 1 {[b1o -b12 b20 j [Y11 -b12 Y 22 
z, = (1- b12b21 ) b20 - b10 b21 + r 21 -b21 Y 11 
r 12 - b12 r 22 j[Y,-1 j [5 y1 - b12 5 z, l} 
r 22 - r 12 b21 2 ,-1 + & zl - b2l & yt 
(5.3) 
in real terms. In this case, there will be no real effect of monetary policy through either the lending 
channel or the conventional money channel (Kash yap and Stein, 1993: 8). 
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System (5.3) can be rewritten in an equivalent form: 
[Y,] = [alO] + [all al2 ][Y,-1] +[el/] 
z, a20 a21 a22 z,_1 e2, (5.4) 
or in a more compact form 
x, = A0 + A1x,_1 + e, (5.4a) 
where Ao =B-1ro,A1 =B-1I'i,e, =B-1&, 
e11 and e2, are reduced-form innovations. Since they are composites of the two white 
noise disturbances in the structural VAR model, both e11 and e2, have zero means, and 
constant variance, and are individually serially uncorrelated. 
Estimating system (5.4) by OLS yields consistent estimates of the reduced-form 
parameters. However, in a macroeconomic VAR analysis, it is the residuals, not 
estimated parameters, that are of more interest, as they can be used to study the 
dynamic response of the variables in the model to the exogenous shocks: the residuals 
can be thought of as unanticipated shocks. 
5.3.a. Impulse response function 
Converting system (5.4) into lag operator form, yields 
[
1- a11 L 
-a21L 
-a12 L ][Y,] [alO] [el,] 
1 - a
22 
L z, = a 20 + e 2, 
[
1- a11 L -a12 L 1-1 Premultiplying system (5.5) by 
1 
, we obtain -a21 L - a22 L 
(5.5) 
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[Y1]=_!_[l-a22L a12 L ][a10 ]+_!_[l-a22L a12 L ][e1,] z, 11 a21 L l - all L a20 11 a21 L l - a11 L e21 (5.6) 
L1 = (1-allL)(l- a22 L)-(a12 L)(a21 L) = 1-(a11 + a22 )L + (a11 a22 -a12 a21 )L2 where 
= (1-Al L)(l- A2L) 
where Ai and ~ are the roots of the equation 
In order to have a convergent expansion for y, and z, in terms of e1, and e2,, it is 
required that the roots of the equation are less than one in absolute value, i.e. 
1/4 1 I < 1, l/4 2 I < 1. Once this stability condition is satisfied, y 1 and z, can be expressed as 
functions of the current and lag value of e1, and e21 . 
System (5.6) can be rewritten as 
[Y,] = I ~J + [¢11 (L) ¢12 (L)][e11] z, lz ¢21 (L) rp 22 (L) e21 (5.7) 
where y, z represent the two constant terms and ¢ iJ represent the four coefficients of 
the error terms. 
In system ( 5. 7), ¢ iJ are called impulse response functions: they show the current and 
lagged effects of changes in e11 and e2,, on y, and z,. System (5.7) is, thus, called a 
structural moving average model, since the elements of e it can be interpreted as 
exogenous shocks to economic variables. 
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Unlike the structural VAR, the reduced-form VAR has no explicit structural economic 
interpretation. Therefore, if one is interested in analyzing the impacts of the structural 
shocks on the endogenous variables, it is essential to recover all information present in 
the primitive system (the structural VAR model) from the estimated system (the 
reduced-form VAR model). 
However, since the primitive system is not identifiable, it is not possible to recover all 
the information from the estimated system straight away. In the estimated system, OLS 
yields nine parameters: ( a10 , a11 , a12 , a20 , a 21 , a22 ) and the calculated values of var ( e1,) 
and var ( e2,) and cov ( e1, ,e2, ), while in the primitive system there are 10 parameters: 
two intercepts, four autoregressive coefficients, two feedback coefficients, and two 
standard deviations ( b10 , b20 , b12 , b21 , r 11 , r 12 , r 2i, r 22 , CT~, CT~). Thus, unless one of the 
parameters in the primitive system is restricted, system (5 .1) is under-identified. 
For example, let b21 =0, system ( 5 .1) becomes 
[
1 bl2 ][Y,] = [blO] + [r 11 Y 12 ][Y,-1] + [8 yt] 
0 1 z I b 20 r 21 r 22 z 1-1 8 zl 
(5.1 *) 
and hence system ( 5. 3) becomes 
[Y,] = [blO - b12 h20] + [r 11 - b12r 22 z, b20 Y 21 Y12 -b12Y22][Y,-1]+[
8
y1 -b12&z,] 
r 22 z,-1 £ zl 
(5.3*) 
Estimating the system using OLS yields the theoretical parameter estimates: 
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Y, = a10 + a11Y,-1 + a12 2 ,-1 + e1, 
z, = a20 + a21Y,-1 + a22zt-1 + e2, 
where 
(i) a10 = b10 - b12 b20 
(ii) all= Y11 -b12r21 
(iii) al2 = r 12 - b12r 22 
(iv) a20 = b20 
(v) a21 = r 21 
(vi) a22 = r 22 
Since e11 = & Y' - b12 & zt and e2, = & zt, we can calculate the parameters of the 
variance/ covariance matrix as 
( • ') 2 2 2 Vll Var(e1)=a- y +b120"z 
(viii) Var(e2) = a-; 
(iv) Cov(ei,e2) = -b12 a-; 
There are now nine parameter estimates: a10 , a11 , a 12 , a20 , a21 , a22 , var(e1 ), var(e2) and 
cov( ei, e2) that can be substituted into the nine estimated equations above in order to 
simultaneously solve for blO, b20, bl2, r ll, r 12, r 21' r 22, (j"~, a-;. However, the most 
sought-after estimates are { £ Y' } and { £ zt } sequences which have to be recovered from 
the estimated system, using the fact that ev = & yt - b12 & zt and e2, = & zt. Decomposing 
the matrix of the residuals in this triangular fashion is called the Choleski 
decomposition. 
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In an n-variable VAR model, if the variance/covariance matrix of the structural 
disturbances is diagonal, then n(n -1) restrictions are automatically imposed on the 
model, leaving only n(n - l) additional necessary restrictions (Watson, 1994). For 
2 
example, in the above two-variable model, one restriction must be made. 
The Choleski decomposition is, however, criticized as being "atheoretical" (Keating, 
1990). The above Choleski decomposition which restricts b21 to zero implies a 
recursive structure of the underlying structural residuals. Both £ yt and £ zt shocks are 
allowed to affect the contemporaneous value of y,, but only £ zt shocks affect the 
contemporaneous value of z, . This implies that z, is "prior" to y,. This kind of 
ordering should have a theoretical foundation; otherwise the underlying shocks will be 
improperly identified. 
Moreover, without a theoretical foundation, the ordering could be subjective and the 
order could affect the results significantly2• In the above discussion, setting b21 = 0 
gives more weight to innovations in £ zt shocks, since £ z, shocks are allowed to have a 
contemporaneous effect on both y, and z,. In addition, the amplitude of the impulse 
response attributable to £ zt shocks will be increased, as the ordering increases the 
magnitude of a "typical" shock in £ zt and decreases the magnitude of a "typical" shock 
in£ yt (Enders. 1995, page 327). 
2 According to Enders (1995: 309), the importance of the ordering depends on the magnitude of the 
correlation coefficient between e It and e2, . If the correlation is small, the ordering should not be of 
maJor concern. 
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The aim of the structural VAR model is to use economic theory, rather than a mere 
Choleski decomposition, to recover the structural innovations from the estimated 
reduced-form residuals. As pointed out by Watson (1994: 2903), "the identifying 
restrictions must be dictated by the economic model under consideration. It makes little 
sense to discuss the restrictions without reference to a specific economic system". 
5.3.b. Variance decomposition 
In the VAR analysis, another question of interest is the relative importance of 
exogenous shocks to the variability in the endogenous variables. 
Following Enders (1995), consider unrestricted VAR (5.4a) 
Xi =Ao+ A1x1-1 + e1 
where x, = [ :: ] 
Suppose we know the coefficients of A0 and A1 , and wish to forecast the various 
values of x
1
+1 conditional on the observed value of x 1 • 
Updating system (5.4a) one period 
X1+1 = Ao + A1 X1 + e1+1 (5.8) 
and then taking the conditional expectation of x I+1, i.e. E(xI+1 I xJ, we have 
E1x1+1 = Ao + A1 X1 (5.9) 
The one-period ahead forecast error is 
x1+1 - Ex1+1 = e1+1 (5.10) 
For n-period ahead forecast 
Elxl+n = (I +A1 +A12 + .... +A;-1)Ao +A;xl (5.11) 
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and the associated forecast error is 
x,+n -Exl+n = e,+n + Alel+n-1 + A12e1+n-2 + .... +A;-]el+I 
(5.12) 
For illustration purposes, focus only on the {y,} sequence in the n-period ahead 
fore cast error, 
Yt+n - E,Y1+n = ¢11 (0)& y t+n + ¢11 (l)& y t+n-1 + .... +¢11 (n - l)& yt+I 
+¢12 (0)& zl+n + ¢12 (l)& zl+n-1 + .... +¢12 (n - l)& zl+I 
(5.13) 
Let the variance of the n-period ahead forecast error variance of Yi+n be denoted by 
a Y (n)2 = a~ [¢11 (0)2 + ¢11 (1)2 + .... +¢11 (n -1)2] + a; [¢12 (0)2 + ¢12 (1)2 + .... +¢12 (n -1)2] 
(5.14) 
The forecast error variance decomposition (5.14) imparts the proportion of the 
movements in the { y 1 } sequence due to its "own" shocks, & Y', versus shocks to the 
other variable, & zt • For instance, if & zt shocks explain none of the forecast error 
variance of {y,} at all forecast horizons, the {y,} sequence is said to be exogenous. In 
such a circumstance, the {y,} sequence would evolve independently of the & zt shocks 
and the { z, } sequence. 
On the other hand, if & zt shocks could explain all the fore cast error variance in the { y 1 } 
sequence at all forecast horizons, then the {y1 } sequence is said to be entirely 
endogenous. It should be noted that the variance decomposition has the same 
identification problem as in the impulse response function analysis. Thus, in order to 
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identify { & yt) and { & zt } sequences, it is necessary to impose some restrictions on the 
VAR model. 
5.4. Granger Causality Test 
One important feature of the SV AR model, (5.1), is that it allows for univariate time-
series characteristics of each element of y, and z, and also for serial cross correlation 
between different elements of y
1 
and z
1
• This means that the model allows for a link 
from, say, y 1_ 1 to y 1 , and from z1_ 1 to y, as well as from y,_1 to y 1 • Because the VAR 
model allows for such a variety of dynamic cross linkages, it is a useful vehicle for 
looking at "causality". A test of causality revolves around whether the lags of one 
variable significantly enter into the equation for another variable. 
Reconsider system (5.4) 
[Y,] = [alO] + [al 1 a12 ][Yt-1] +[el/] z, a20 a21 a22 z,_1 e2, 
In system (5.4), it is possible to test the hypothesis that a 12 = 0 using at-test. In a two-
equation model with one lag, { z, } is said to Granger-cause { y 1 }, if a12 * 0 . That is, 
{ z,} is said to Granger-cause {y,}, if the past value of { z,} can be used to obtain a 
forecast of future value of { y
1
} that is more accurate than using the past value of { y,} 
alone. In the n variable case in which Au ( L) represents the coefficients of lagged values 
of variable j on variable i, variable j does not Granger-cause variable i if all coefficients 
of the polynomial Au (L) can be set equal to zero. 
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In the VAR model, Granger non-causality test is called a block exogeneity test as it is 
used to detect whether or not a variable Granger-cause other variables included in the 
VAR system, or in other words, testing whether a variable should be included in the 
model (Enders, 1995, page 316). For example, in the VAR model with four variables, 
say, y 1 , zl' wl' x 1 , the block exogeneity test involves testing whether lags of, say, w1 
Granger-cause the other three variables. In essence, the block exogeneity test restricts 
all lags of w, in y 1 z,, and x I equations to be equal to zero. This cross restriction can be 
properly tested by a likelihood ratio (LR) test. 
The likelihood ratio statistic is given by 
T(loglI r I - logliu I) 
where T = number of usable observations 
logjI r I = the natural logarithm of the determinant of the variance/covariance matrix of 
the restricted residuals, Ir, that is. residuals from the equations in which all lags of w
1 
are restricted to zero. 
logliu I = the natural logarithm of the determinant of the variance/covariance matrix of 
the unrestricted residuals, Lu 
This LR statistic has an asymptotic chi-squared distribution with the degree of freedom 
equal to the number of restrictions in the system. 
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In the above illustration of the SV AR model, y
1 
and z
1 
are assumed stationary. This 
assumption is crucial because the validity of most time series econometric techniques 
depends on the assumption of stationarity. A stationarity time series is one created by a 
data generating process which ensures that mean, variance and temporal 
autocorrelations of the time series are constant over time. Since most macroeconomic 
time series are typically non-stationary, particularly nominal variables, there is a need 
for checking the stationarity. In macroeconomic analysis, if there is a shock involved in 
the model, whether the effects of the shock will die away, or become permanent, 
depends crucially on whether or not there is unit root. 
5.5. Unit Root Tests 
Unit root tests are a useful means for determining stationarity of time-series variables. 
Following Maddala (1992), consider a zero mean first-order autoregressive model 
Yr = PYr-1 + Er (5 .15) 
If p=l and suppose there is a jump C in Er, then YrYr+1'Yr+2 , ... all increase by C. The 
effect of the shock will, thus, become permanent. But if lpl<l, then the effect of the 
shock will fade away over time. Thus, a time series with a unit root has a stochastic 
trend as each new innovation has a permanent effect on the level of the series. 
I\ 
A unit root testing procedure is to regress Yr on Yt-l to obtain, an estimated p, p, and 
I\ 
then calculate t-ratio: p-; . This t-ratio has to be compared with the Dickey and Fuller 
SE(p) 
tabulated critical value rather than the conventional t-ratio because the distribution of 
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the least squares estimate of the autoregressive parameter p has a non-standard 
distribution when there is a unit root. 
Although y 1 is nonstationary, its first difference, Liy1 may be stationary, assuming that 
8 1 is white noise. 
Y1 - Y1 - 1 = /JY1 - 1 + 81 (5.16) 
where /3 = (p- l) 
Equation( 5 .16) is the basis for a standard form of AD test and the null hypothesis is that 
p = 1 or /J=O. If the null hypothesis is not rejected, it would indicate that y
1 is 
integrated to order one, or I(l ), which means that one must take the first difference to 
get stationary Li y 1 • Equation ( 5 .16) is based on the assumption that 8 1 is white noise. If 
& 
1 
is not white, for example, E( 8 18 s) -:t= 0, i.e. there exists serial correlation, the 
augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test is appropriate. 
The standard form of the ADF test is 
k 
Liyl = /3Y1-I + L B;LiY1-i + 8 1 
i-1 
or if constant and trend are included 
k 
Liy1 =a+ b't + /3y1_1 + L B;Liy1_1 + 8 1 
J= I 
(5.17) 
(5.18) 
Generally speaking, a univariate time series y 1 is said to be integrated of order d 
[ denoted by I(d)], if it has a stationary, invertible, non-deterministic ARMA 
representation after differencing d times. Using this definition, one can classify a 
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stationary time series as being an I(O) process and a non-stationary time series as I(l) 
process, if it becomes stationary after first differencing. 
After having some insight into the VAR model and related econometric techniques, we 
can now outline the estimating procedure of the VAR analysis. 
5.6. The Estimating Procedure of the SV AR Model 
As suggested by Pagan (1987), the estimating procedure of the SV AR model generally 
involves four steps: 
5.6.a. Transform relevant variables into a form which fits into the VAR analysis 
This first step involves a transformation of the variables so that each variable 1s 
stationary. This transformation is necessary as the statistical theory requires all relevant 
variables to be stationary; otherwise the effect of shocks will not dampen out ( see 
Section 5.3(a)). This step typically involves conducting unit root tests and if variables 
are found to be non-stationary, taking first or higher order differences of each variable 
to achieve stationarity, as explained above. 
5.6.b. Choose an appropriate lag length and dimension of the VAR model 
In principle, it is possible to include many variables and lags in the VAR model. 
However, degrees of freedom are quickly eroded as more variables and lags are 
included. Economic theory has a role in choosing the dimension and specific element of 
the vector of variables (Pagan, 1987). If the dimension is small, a large number of lags 
may be required to proxy omitted variables (Darnell, 1994). However, one has to tread 
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carefully in selecting the lag length ( or the order of the VAR model). If the lag number 
is too large, degrees of freedom are wasted. On the other hand, if the lag number is too 
small, the model may be misspecified. 
Two selection criteria are usually used to determine the appropriate lag length: the 
Akaike information criterion (AIC) and the Schwarz Bayesian criterion (SBC). 
Basically, these criteria for selecting the order of the V AR(p), where p represents the 
maximum order selected by the user, involve choosing the VAR model with the highest 
value of AIC and SBC (Pesaran and Pesaran, 1997). In practice, SBC tends to suggest 
the selection of a lower order VAR than AIC. 
5.6.c. Try to simplify the VAR by imposing some restrictions on the coefficient 
matrix. 
As discussed in Section 5.3, imposing restrictions has been the subject of much 
criticism since the inception of the VAR literature. To ascribe any meaning to impulse 
response for the orthogonal innovations, it is necessary that the innovations be treated 
as structural shocks, and that requires the imposition of prior restrictions on the causal 
structure of the system, sometimes known as a Wold causal representation (Pagan, 
1987) (Darnell, 1994). 
Under Choleski decomposition, the ordering of the equations is critically important in 
determining the importance of innovations and can be arbitrary, which can make the 
interpretation of the orthogonal innovations ambiguous and a source of criticism. That 
is why economic theory usually has to be called upon to provide a theoretical 
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justification for the imposition of restrictions, and this will be discussed in the 
following section 
5.6.d. Use the orthogonalized innovation representation to address the question of 
interest 
In the macroeconomic VAR analysis, two questions are generally of particular interest: 
what is the dynamic response of endogenous variables to exogenous shocks? and what 
is the relative importance of exogenous shocks to movements in endogenous variables?. 
These two questions are the main focuses of this study. 
Steps I, II, and IV are rather straightforward, whereas step III needs further elaboration 
as it is a contentious issue in the SV AR model. The following section will explain the 
model specification and restrictions used in this study. 
5. 7. Model Specification and Restriction 
5. 7 .a. Model specification 
Generally, studies on the links between the real economy and monetary policy centre on 
two key issues. First, by what mechanism(s) do changes in monetary policy affect the 
real economy? That is a transmission question. Second, among various monetary and 
financial variables, which are the best or the most useful predictors of future economy 
activity? That is a forecasting question. As far as the first question is concerned, it is 
generally agreed that monetary tightening through an open market sale will have an 
impact on both liabilities (deposits) and assets (loans and securities) of the banking 
system. 
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The ability of the central bank to affect the scale of bank balance sheets is not 
controversial and is widely accepted as part of both the money and the lending channels 
(Bemanke, 1993). However, what appears to be controversial is how a reduction in 
bank assets and liabilities goes on to affect the economy. In the conventional money 
view, the critical effect comes from a reduction in bank liabilities (deposits), as a 
shortage of the transaction medium increases interest rates, which, in turn, discourages 
spending through a cost-of-capital effect. On the contrary, in the lending view, a fall in 
bank assets ( securities and loans) is considered potentially important in the transmission 
of the monetary policy. 
A loss of reserves (securities) caused by monetary tightening will over time induce 
banks to cut back their loan supply, provided that reserve requirement is binding on the 
behaviour of banks3 . Given that there are borrowers who do not have access to 
alternative sources of financing apart from bank loans, a decline in bank lending will 
slow down the aggregate demand side of the economy, and for some economists (for 
example, Blinder, 1989) possibly aggregate supply of the economy as well 4. 
3 As analyzed in Chapter Four, if reserve losses failed to constrain the behaviour of banks, then both the 
money channel and the lending channel would be in serious doubt. The money channel could be 
weakened if there were assets that are close money substitutes, but subject to low or no reserve 
requirement. The lending channel could be attenuated if banks managed to raise loanable funds without 
being subject to reserve requirement. 
4Alan Blinder (1989) developed a theoretical model which could explain a possible effect of monetary 
policy through the supply side of the economy. Since the main aim of the model developed in this thesis 
is to see how the lending view can be distinguished from the conventional money view, an in-depth 
analysis of the supply-side effect is beyond the scope of this thesis. 
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To examine a monetary policy transmission through the lending channel, the first thing 
one has to do is to find out which variable( s) can be used as a proxy for monetary 
policy stance. In this study, we opt to use the inter-bank rate as an indicator of monetary 
policy. In most studies on the lending view, for example (Bernanke and Blinder, 1990), 
(Gerlter and Gilchirst, 1992), (Kashyap, Stein, and Wilcox, 1993), (Oliner and 
Rudebusch, 1993), and others, the inter-bank rate was used as the indicator. 
Strictly speaking, the interest rate used in these studies is really not the inter-bank rate, 
but the Federal Funds rate. As pointed out by Perry and Klein (1988), the Federal Funds 
rate is quite a misnomer in the sense that it has nothing to do (directly) with the US 
Federal Reserves Bank. Federal Funds traditionally refer to the reserves of the member 
banks of the US Federal Reserve system, which are traded between these banks at the 
Federal Funds rate. 
In Thailand's banking system, the inter-bank rate can be considered as an equivalent of 
the Federal Funds rate. Traditionally, Thai commercial banks obtain reserves from three 
major sources: the inter-bank market, the repurchase market, and the discount window 
facility. The latter two are directly controlled by the Bank of Thailand. Although the 
Bank of Thailand has no direct control over the inter-bank market, it can, by acting as 
lender of last resort, significantly influence the market. For example, by reducing the 
amount of reserves to the banking system, the Central Bank can drive up the inter-bank 
rate, a major cost of acquiring reserves. 
135 
The inter-bank rate is by no means the only potential indicator of monetary policy; 
there are other potential candidates, such as, the discount rate and the repurchase rate. 
Despite being a relatively minor source of reserves for the commercial banks (see Table 
2.5 in Chapter Two ), a change in the discount rate is normally considered by the 
market as a signal of a change in the central bank's monetary policy stance. However, 
to be used as the monetary policy indicator in the empirical model, the discount rate has 
one major shortcoming, which is that it is rarely changed. 
Table 5.1: Inter-Bank Rate (INTER) and Discount Rate (Discount) 
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In addition, for the banks, access to the discount window facility is considered a 
privilege, not a right. They have to comply with rules and regulations imposed by the 
Bank of Thailand making borrowing from the discount window relatively difficult and 
normally inaccessible. Even though the discount window facility is not the source of 
funds the commercial banks usually resort to, a change in the discount rate generally 
reflects the Central Bank' s monetary policy stance. In Figure 5 .1, it can be seen that the 
inter-bank rate does appear to move in tandem with the discount rate. 
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The repurchase rate is also another potential candidate for the indicator. Nonetheless, as 
explained in Chapter Two under the current system used in the repurchase market, the 
Bank of Thailand's ability to influence the liquidity in the banking system through the 
repurchase market is limited. Given the shortcomings of the discount and the 
repurchase rates, we opt to use the inter-bank rate as the policy indicator. Monetary 
tightening (a positive innovation in the inter-bank rate) is expected to result in a fall in 
the holding of securities and the supply of loans (banks' assets), and a contraction in the 
volume of deposits (banks' liabilities). 
With regard to the forecasting question, if bank loans do matter, then one would expect 
that both money and credit measures should be useful predictors of the future economic 
activity. Yet, by choosing to use Ml as a measure of the conventional money channel 
and bank credit as a measure of the lending channel, our empirical model may suffer an 
"identification" problem. Both MI and bank credit are, in fact, components on both 
sides of bank balance sheets. Banks create money every time they increase the 
aggregate volume of bank loans outstanding in the economy. 
In addition, it is quite difficult to identify the existence of the lending channel merely 
through a co-movement between bank credit and output. Kashyap, Stein, and Wilcox 
(hereafter KSW)(1993) argue that a decline in output may, in fact, be attributable to the 
conventional money channel. The fall in the quantity of loans may simply reflect a 
decline in loan demand due to reduced output (through the conventional money 
channel), not a reduction in loan supply. 
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KSW suggest that one way to avoid this type of identification problem is to focus on 
bank customers' substitution between bank loans and commercial paper (which are 
taken as a representative of non-bank finance). KSW propose two measures to test the 
existence of the bank credit channel. One is the mix of external finance used as an 
indicator of restrictions on a bank's ability to lend. The mix measure is defined as the 
ratio of bank loans outstanding to the sum of bank loans and commercial paper 
outstanding. The other measure is the spread between the prime rate charged by banks 
on short-term loans and the rate on six-month commercial paper. 
The intuition behind these tests is that suppose monetary policy operated solely through 
the money channel, and that there was a fall in bank loans after monetary tightening, 
which was due merely to an output-induced effect on credit demand. One would expect 
that the demand for non-bank finance and hence the volume of commercial paper 
should also fall as well. However, if the central bank's tightening primarily reduced the 
supply of bank loans, one would expect to see an increase in commercial paper 
issuance. Similarly, if firms could only borrow from banks, then one would expect to 
see a rise in the interest rate spread when bank lending was restricted more than other 
types of lending. 
The KSW approach is, nonetheless, not without its critics. Romer and Romer (1993) 
argue that the mix and spread may not be good indicators of banks' ability to lend . . 
Firms that depend on banks for financing are generally riskier than firms that can 
borrow in the open markets. Thus, bank loans may fall relative to commercial paper in 
response to a tight monetary policy not because banks have difficulty in obtaining 
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funds, but because lenders do not wish to lend to relatively risky firms at the time when 
interest rates are high and the economy is weakening. 
In spite of having some shortcomings, the KS W approach does have some appeal. If 
data on Thailand's commercial paper were readily available, we would contemplate 
applying the KSW approach to Thailand. Given the data that are currently available, 
however, our empirical model will focus on testing two key issues: how monetary 
policy can be transmitted through the lending channel, and how changes in monetary 
policy, affecting the loan supply, affect the real economy. 
The empirical analysis will, thus, involve estimating two SVAR models. Though it is 
possible to investigate the two issues in one single model, we believe that it is more 
appropriate to have two separate models. One specifically deals with the financial 
sector and a test of the transmission process (hereafter Model A). The other deals with 
the real economy sector and a test of the forecasting power of the monetary and 
financial variables (hereafter Model B). In addition, since the Choleski decomposition, 
which is sometimes criticized as being "atheoretical", is to be used to obtain an exact 
identification, it is necessary to provide some theoretical justification for the restrictions 
in the SV AR model. By having two separate models, it will be easier to apply a more 
logical theoretical justification for the restrictions. 
As mentioned in Section 5.3, the identifying restrictions must be dictated by the 
economic model under consideration. The aim of the SV AR is to use economic theory, 
rather than a mere Choleski decomposition to recover the structural innovations from 
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the estimated reduced-form residuals. Therefore, the theoretical justification is needed, 
even though all restrictions are automatically set according to the ordering of the 
variables in the estimating process. 
5.7.b. Model restriction and justification 
5. 7.b.i. Testing the transmission of monetary policy through the lending channel 
(Model A) 
Four variables are included in this model: the inter-bank rate, bank reserves, demand 
deposits, and bank credit. With four variables, six restrictions are needed to obtain an 
exact identification, assuming that the variance/ covariance matrix of the structural 
disturbances is diagonal. 
1 0 0 0l1INTER1 blO Y11 Y12 . Yn r 14 INTER,_l £ INTER1 
h21 1 0 0 TR, h20 Y21 Y22 r23 r 24 TR,_l &TR I - + + -
h31 h32 1 0 DD, h30 r 31 r 32 r 33 r 34 DD,_1 &DD I 
h41 h42 b43 1 BC, h40 r 41 r 42 r 43 r 44 BC,_l &BC I -
(A) 
or in a more compact form with p lags 
p 
Bx, = 1 0 + rix,_i + &, 
i=l 
where x = {INTER,, TR,, DD,, BC,} is a vector, the elements of which denote the inter-
bank rate, bank reserves, demand deposits, and credit, respectively. 
(A) implies the following six restrictions. 
I. The contemporaneous value of BC does not enter the inter-bank rate equation. 
II. The contemporaneous value of DD does not enter the inter-bank rate equation. 
III. The contemporaneous value of TR does not enter the inter-bank rate equation. 
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IV. The contemporaneous value of BC does not enter the reserve equation. 
V. The contemporaneous value of DD does not enter the reserve equation. 
VI. The contemporaneous value of BC does not enter the deposit equation. 
The conceptual rationalization of the above six restrictions is that a policy-driven rise in 
the inter-bank rate forces banks to squeeze their reserves in the short-run. Monetary 
tightening should lead to a fall in deposits in the banking system and eventually a fall in 
the loan supply. Loans are unlikely to fall dramatically in the short run due to their 
quasi-contractual nature ( a large proportion of loans are extended on a pre-arranged 
credit line, for example, overdraft loans). 
In the theoretical model, it is contended that banks are likely to react to a tight monetary 
policy by reducing excess reserves. But once excess reserves are exhausted ( or nearly 
exhausted), banks may be tempted to replenish their declining reserves through issuing 
short-term monetary instruments ( e.g. certificates of deposit). Given the semi-
contractual nature of bank loans and the existence of bank liability management, the fall 
in the loan supply after monetary tightening may not be imminent. But if monetary 
tightening persists, liquidity in the whole banking system will gradually reduce and the 
supply of loans will eventually fall. 
Ideally, we wish to replace demand deposits (DD) with CDs to see the effect of bank 
liability management. But we are unable to obtain the data on CDs in Thailand. CDs 
were just introduced into Thailand's financial market in the early 1990s and have so far 
accounted for just about 1-2% of total deposits. Moreover, no monthly or quarterly data 
141 
.. 
on CDs have been officially published. Annual data were only published once in the 
Bank of Thailand's (1995) annual report (see Table 2.4 in Chapter Two). 
5. 7.b.ii. Testing the forecasting power of money and credit shocks (Model B) 
This model, like the previous one, has four variables: money measure, credit measure, 
output measure, and price measure. Therefore, six restrictions are needed to be 
introduced into the model. 
1 0 0 0 BC, blO Y11 r 12 Yn r 14 BC,_; 6 sc I 
h21 1 0 0 Ml, h20 Y21 Y22 r23 r 24 Ml,_; E - + + MI, I (B) -
b31 b32 1 0 Y, b30 r 31 r 32 r 33 r 34 Y,_; Er. I 
b41 h42 b43 1 ~ b40 r 41 r 42 r 43 r 44 ~-i Ep I 
where x={ BC,, Ml,, Y,, ~} is a vector, the elements of which denote credit measure, 
money measure, output index, and price index, respectively. 
(B) implies the following six restrictions 
I. The contemporaneous value of Ml does not enter the credit equation 
II. The contemporaneous value of P does not enter the money equation 
III. The contemporaneous value of Y does not enter the money equation 
IV. The contemporaneous value of P does not enter the credit equation 
V. The contemporaneous value of Y does not enter the credit equation 
VI. The contemporaneous value of P does not enter the output equation 
Restriction I implies that, ceteris paribus, a tightening of bank credit expansion caused 
by a tightening of the Central Bank's reserves supply should lead to a contraction in the 
deposit expansion of the banking system and hence the expansion of the monetary 
aggregate (Ml). As will be shown in the following chapter, there would be little effect 
on the SVAR results, if the ordering of Ml and BC were swapped: the correlation 
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coefficient between Ml and BC residuals is so low that the orthogonalization should 
have little effect. 
Restrictions II-V imply that P and y shocks have no direct effects on Ml and BC, but 
there are indirect effects of Y and P on the contemporaneous values of Ml and BC. This 
asymmetric decomposition implies an ordering of the variables, i.e. Ml and BC are 
implicitly assumed to be "prior" to P and y5_ It is important to note that Ml denotes a 
nominal monetary aggregate. Theoretically, for monetary policy to have a real effect, it 
must be assumed that in the short run, say, a month, a price adjustment is less than 
perfect, so that an increase in a nominal money supply results in a rise in real money 
balances. It can also be assumed that individuals take the aggregate price level as given 
and choose to adjust their short-run level of nominal money balances. In this case, it is 
nominal, not real money balances, that matter (Wells, 1995). 
Restriction VI is similar to one of the restrictions imposed in Sims (1986). It implies 
that Y will not adjust to changes in P within a month, while P is assumed to 
immediate! y respond to changes in Y. 
All the restrictions imposed in both models fit into the Choleski decomposition, i.e. all 
elements above the principle diagonal are zero. This triangular decomposition implies a 
recursive structure of the underlying structural residuals, i.e, the matrix of estimated 
innovations is equal to the lower triangular matrix of structural disturbances. This 
recursive structure, sometimes known as a Wold causal chain, demands that the current 
5 Note that in the unrestricted VAR, no variables are assigned to be exogenous: every variable is allowed 
to influence every other variables with a distributed lag of reasonable length, but in the structural VAR, a 
Choleski decomposition implies that certain variables are implicitly assigned to be exogenous (Clement 
and Mizon, 1991). 
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values of BC in Model A and P in Model B are determined by current values of all the 
other three variables in each model, and there is no feedback. 
The persuasiveness of this no-feedback assumption depends essentially on the 
frequency of observations. The greater is the frequency of observations the more 
persuasive is the assumption (Darnell, 1994). For instance, if daily data are available on 
all variables, then it may be quite reasonable to impose a one-way causal chain, but if 
the data are monthly, then the uni-causal chain may not be quite appropriate. Since 
monthly data are used in this study, a bi-causal relationship among variables cannot 
entirely be ruled out. 
5.8. Conclusion 
This chapter spells out econometric techniques to be used in the empirical analysis. The 
main econometric tool is the structural VAR (SV AR). The beauty of SV AR is its 
relatively flexible framework for analyzing the inter-relationship or inter-dependence 
between time-series variables. The impulse response function and variance 
decomposition are of particular interest in the empirical analysis. The former is used to 
analyze the dynamic response of endogenous variables to exogenous shocks. The latter 
is employed to study the relative importance of the exogenous shocks to the variability 
in the endogenous variables. Two empirical models are set to be investigated in the 
following chapters. One focuses on testing the transmission of monetary policy through 
the lending channel and the other on testing the forecasting power of money and credit 
shocks. 
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., Chapter Six 
Empirical Analysis of Monetary Policy Transmission through the 
Lending Channel 
6.1. Introduction 
The objective of this chapter is to undertake an empirical analysis of the lending 
channel. The empirical analysis will centre on two key empirical tests: testing the 
transmission of monetary policy through the lending channel (Model A) and testing the 
forecasting power of money and credit shocks (Model B). This chapter consist of four 
sections. Section 6.2 provides data description. Section 6.3 undertakes empirical 
estimation. Section 6.4 presents estimation results and interpretations. Unit root tests, 
variance decomposition, and impulse response function are among the results 
presented. Section 6.5 analyzes a narrative approach used to analyze the effect of 
monetary shocks. Section 6.6 concludes. 
6.2 Data Description 
Data employed in this study are monthly seasonally adjusted data from January 1970 to 
June 1996. The data are for seven variables: bank credit to the private sector (BC), 
money supply (Ml), the inter-bank interest rate (INTER), bank reserves (TR), demand 
deposits (DD), the industrial price index (P), the industrial output index (Y). Details 
concerning definitions and sources of the data are provided in Appendix III. 
The industrial price index (P) is the Laspeyres index computed by the following 
formula: 
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where P;, are the price indexes of five industrial outputs: beverages (beer and soft 
drink); petroleum products; automobiles ( cars, transportation vehicles, and 
motorcycles); textiles Gute products and synthetic fiber); and construction materials 
(cement, white cement, and iron sheet). 
These five industrial outputs are chosen as they are the only ones that have been 
consistently and continuously available since 1970. P;, are adjusted to account for the 
changes in the base year. Since 1970, the base year has been changed three times; from 
January 1970 to December 1979, the base year was 1968; from January 1980 to 
December 1990, the base year was 1976; and from January 1991 to the present, the base 
year has been 1985. The data between 1980 to 1990 are, thus, multiplied by the average 
monthly price index of 1976 divided by 100. The data from 1991 are multiplied by the 
average monthly price index of 1985 divided by 100. 
Since the sample size covers the data from 1970 to 1996, the year at the mid-point of 
the sample, 1983, is chosen as the base year for computing P, and also for the following 
Paasche industrial output index (Y). Thus, P;0 is the arithmetic mean of the 12 monthly 
observations for 1983 of the five industrial price indexes, and Q;o is the arithmetic 
mean of the 12 monthly observations for 1983 of the five industrial outputs. 
The output index (Y) is the Paasche output index computed by the following formula: 
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where Q;1 are the five industrial outputs mentioned earlier. 
Data availability plays an important role in the choice of using the industrial output as 
the output measure, rather than some broader based measures, such as, GDP. Quarterly 
GDP is not available in Thailand. Monthly GDP is typically not available in most 
countries. Both industrial output and price indexes are products of our own calculation. 
In Thailand, it was not until 1995 that the monthly industrial ( or manufacturing) price 
and output index became officially available. These newly available official indexes are 
unfortunately insufficient for the VAR estimation. 
As a result, we have to compute our own output and price indexes from output and 
price data that were consistently been reported in the Bank of Thailand monthly bulletin 
from January 1970 to June 1996. As mentioned in Chapter Five, using monthly data 
may make the no-feedback assumption implied in the SAVR model probably more 
persuasive than otherwise might have been, had quarterly or annual data been used. 
Except for the inter-bank rate which is expressed as a percentage, all seven variables, 
including Y and P, are in logarithms. 
In our empirical analysis, we will first use all the data available, that is, from January 
1970 to June 1996, and then we will investigate two sub-periods: January 1970 to 
December 1984 and January 1985 to June 1996. The main reason for splitting the data 
into two sub-periods is to see the effect of changes caused by financial deregulation and 
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economic development since 1985. In Chapter Two, we explained that Thailand's 
financial system has undergone major changes, especially since the mid 1980s. These 
major changes include, among other things, financial deregulation, the introduction of 
modern technology in the banking operation, and the introduction of many new 
monetary and financial instruments. 
In addition, the basket-pegged exchange rate system which was just abandoned in July 
1997 had also been reintroduced in November 1984. The reintroduction of the basket-
pegged system also marked the beginning of Thailand's decade-long rapid economic 
growth. According to the World Bank, during 1985-1995, Thailand was the world's 
fastest growing economy. To take into account Thailand's financial and economic 
development during the last decade, we will carry out empirical investigations using all 
the data available and data between the two sub-periods. 
6.3. Estimations 
6.3.a. Unit root tests 
The first step in performing VAR is to check the stationarity of the variables. In Table 
6.1, all of the seven variables are stationary in difference, i.e. they are all I(l ). 
According to the standard form of ADF test: (I) and (II), the unit root hypothesis can be 
rejected if the t-test statistic is smaller than the critical value. In Table 6.1, the null 
hypothesis can only be rejected after the variables are transformed into the first 
difference, e.g ~r; = r; - r;_1 • . These results are hardly a surprise, as most 
macroeconomic time series are typically non-stationary, particularly nominal ones. 
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Table 6.1: Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) Unit Root Test 
Variables Null Hypothesis T- Statistic Null Hypothesis T- Statistic 
Constant, No Trend Constant, Trend 
y A(1)=0 .37571 [-2 .57] A(1)=0 -1 .5799(-3 .13] 
A(0)=A(1 )=0 5.8323(3.78] A(0)=A(1 )=A(2)=0 4.8424[4.03] 
A(1 )=A(2)=0 1.4657[5.34]* 
11 y A(1 )=0 -4.8843[-2.57]* A(1)=0 -4.9091 [-3.13]* 
A(0)=A(1 )=0 11.932[3.78] A(0)=A(1 )=A(2)=0 8.0408[4.03] 
A(1 )=A(2)=0 12.057[5.34] 
p A(1 )=0 -2.2664[-2.57] A(1)=0 -2.0767[-3.13] 
A(0)=A(1 )=0 5.5012[3.78] A(0)=A(1 )=A(2)=0 4.5082[4.03] 
A(1 )=A(2)=0 3.8142[5.34]* 
11 p A(1 )=0 -3.3426[-2.57]* A(1 )=0 -3. 7999[-3.13]* 
A(0)=A(1 )=0 5.591[3.78] A(0)=A(1 )=A(2)=0 4.8497[4.03] 
A(1 )=A(2)=0 7.2698[5.34] 
M1 A(1)=0 -.0293[-2 .57] A(1)=0 -2.4588[-3.13] 
If 
A(0)=A(1 )=0 4 .9779[3.78] A(0)=A(1 )=A(2)=0 5.4048[4.03] 
A(1 )=A(2)=0 3.0398[5.43]* 
/1M1 A(1 )=0 -3.9686(-2.57]* A(1 )=0 -3 .964[-3.13]* 
A(0)=A(1 )=0 7.875[3.78] A(0)=A(1 )=A(2)=0 5.2591 [4.03] 
A(1 )=A(2)=0 7.8886[5 .34] 
BC A(1 )=0 -0.3375[-2.57] A(1)=0 -2.6538[-3 .13] 
A(0)=A(1 )=0 6.3511[3.78] A(0)=A(1 )=A(2)=0 6.6329[4.03] 
A(1 )=A(2)=0 3.5215[5.34]* 
/1 BC A(1 )=0 -4.916[-2 .57]* A(1 )=0 -3.7104[-3.13]* 
A(0)=A(1 )=0 12.086[3 .78] A(0)=A(1 )=A(2)=0 4.6553[4.03] 
A(1 )=A(2)=0 6.9803(5.34) 
INTER A(1 )=0 -2 .1909[-2.57] A(1 )=0 -2.2469[-3.13] 
A(0)=A(1 )=0 2.4146[3.78] A(0)=A(1 )=A(2)=0 1.8827[4.03]* 
A(1 )=A(2)=0 2.8096[5.34]* 
/1 INTER A(1 )=0 -5.0922[-2.57]* A(1)=0 -5.1414[-3.13]* 
A(0)=A(1 )=0 12.965[3.78] A(0)=A(1 )=A(2)=0 8.8218[4.03] 
A(1 )=A(2)=0 13.232[5.34] 
TR A(1 )=0 0.27779(-2.57] A(1 )=0 -1 .8109[-3.13] 
A(0)=A(1 )=0 10.356[3.78] A(0)=A(1 )=A(2)=0 8.0939[4.03] 
A(1 )=A(2)=0 1. 7358[5.43]* 
/1 TR A(1 )=0 -5.07 42[-2.57]* A(1 )=0 -5.0941 [-3.13]* 
A(0)=A(1 )=0 12.875[3.78] A(0)=A(1 )=A(2)=0 8.6943[4 .03] 
A(1 )=A(2)=0 13.040[5 .34] 
DD A(1 )=0 -0.3375[-2.57] A(1 )=0 -2 .366(-3 .13) 
A(0)=A(1 )=0 6.3511[3.78] A(0)=A(1 )=A(2)=0 6.1299(4 .03) 
A(1 )=A(2)=0 2.801 (5.34)* 
/1 DD A(1 )=0 -4.916[-2.57]* A(1 )=0 -4.904(-3.13)* 
A(0)=A(1 )=0 12.086[3.78] A(0)=A(1 )=A(2)=0 8.028(4.03) 
1' 
A(1 )=A(2)=0 12.043(5.34) 
J ! Numbers in parenthesis are asymptotic critical values at 10% 
* significant at 10% level 
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The standard form of ADF test is based on the following models: 
k 
~Y; = A(O) + A(l)yl + L B;~Yt-i + 6 1 (with constant but no trend) (I) 
i=I 
k 
~Y; = A(O) + A(l)y1 + A(2)t + L B;~Yi-; + &1 (with constant and trend) (II) 
i=I 
The unit root test is on A(l). The ADF test hinges essentially on the assumption that the 
error process is statistically independent and has a constant variance. Phillips and 
Perron (1988) developed a unit root test which allows for less rigid assumptions 
regarding the distribution of the error process. Monte Carlo studies found that the 
Phillips-Perron test also has greater power to reject a false null hypothesis of a unit root 
(Enders, 1995). Therefore, we will counter-check the ADF test with the Phillips-Perron 
test. 
Table 6.2 shows results for the Phillips-Perron unit root test. It should be noticed that 
since the Phillips-Perron test is a generalized version of the Dickey-Fuller unit root 
tests, its test statistics are just modifications of the Dickey-Fuller t-statistics that take 
into account the less restrictive nature of the error process. However, the critical values 
in the Phillips-Perron test are the same as those in the Dickey-fuller tests. As in the 
ADF test, in the Phillips-Perron test the unit root hypothesis can be rejected if the t-test 
statistic is smaller than the critical value. 
In Table 6.2, P and BC are unambiguously I(l ). Y, Ml, TR, and DD are less 
ambiguous, depending on whether or not trend is included. For example, Y has a unit 
root, if trend is excluded, but has no unit root, if trend is included. The most surprising 
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Table 6.2: Phillips-Perron Unit Root Test 
Variables Null Hypothesis T-Statistic Null Hypothesis T-Statistic 
Constant, No Trend Constant, Trend 
y A(1 )=0 -0.33(-2.57) A(1 )=0 -4.01(-3.13)* 
A(0)=A( 1 )=0 3.99(3.78) A(0)=A(1 )=A(2)=0 7.69(4.03) 
II A(1 )=A(2)=0 8.01 (5.34) 
I !). y A(1 )=0 -31.83(-2.57)* A(1 )=0 -31.83(-2.57)* 
A(0)=A(1 )=0 506.64(3. 78) A(0)=A(1 )=A(2)=0 336.62(4.03) 
A(1 )=A(2)=0 506.6(3. 78) 
p A(1 )=0 -2.11 (-2.57) A(1 )=0 -0.94(-3.13) 
A(0)=A(1 )=0 15.89(3. 78) A(0)=A(1 )=A(2)=0 10.6(4.03) 
A(1 )=A(2)=0 2.31 (5.34)* 
!). p A(1 )=0 -17.72(-2.57)* A(1 )=0 -17.9(4.03)* 
A(0)=A( 1 )=0 157.08(3.78) A(0)=A(1 )=A(2)=0 106.9(4.03) 
A(1 )=A(2)=0 160.4(5.34) 
M1 A(1 )=0 -0.12(-2.57) A(1 )=0 -3. 78(-3.13)* 
A(0)=A( 1 )=0 9. 71 (3. 78) A(0)=A(1 )=A(2)=0 11.35(4.03) 
A(1 )=A(2)=0 7.21 (5.34) 
!). M1 A(1 )=0 -13.3(-2.57)* A(1 )=0 -13.28(-3.13)* 
A(0)=A(1 )=0 88.48(3. 78) A(0)=A(1 )=A(2)=0 58.82(4.03) 
A(1 )=A(2)=0 88.22(5.34) 
BC A(1 )=0 0.71 (-2.57) A(1 )=0 -1 . 16 ( -3. 1 3) 
A(0)=A(1 )=0 212.87(3.78) A(0)=A( 1 )=A(2)=0 142.17(4.03) 
A(1 )=A(2)=0 0.99(5.34) 
!). BC A(1 )=0 -11.41(-2.57)* A(1 )=0 -11.42(-3.13)* 
A(0)=A(1 )=0 65.16(3. 78) A(0)=A(1 )=A(2)=0 43.5(4.03) 
A( 1 )=A(2)=0 65.25(5.34) 
INTER A(1 )=0 -3.53(-2.57) A(1 )=0 -3.53(-3.13)* 
A(0)=A( 1 )=0 6.25(3.78) A(0)=A( 1 )=A(2)=0 4.2(4.03) 
A(1 )=A(2)=0 6.3(5.34) 
!). INTER A(1 )=0 -15. 96(-2.57)* A(1 )=0 -15.94(-3.13)* 
A(0)=A(1 )=0 127.4(3. 78) A(0)=A(1 )=A(2)=0 84.76(4.03) 
A(1 )=A(2)=0 12 7. 1 ( 5. 34) 
TR A(1 )=0 -0.67(-2.57) A(1 )=0 -8. 99(-3.13)* 
A(0)=A( 1 )=0 3.59(3.78) A(0)=A(1 )=A(2)=0 28.77(4.03) 
A(1 )=A(2)=0 40.42(5.43) 
!). TR A(1 )=0 -32.47(-2.57)* A(1 )=0 -32.41 (-3.13)* 
A(0)=A(1 )=0 526. 9(3. 78) A(0)=A(1 )=A(2)=0 350.04(4.03) 
A(1 )=A(2)=0 525.06(5.34) 
DD A(1 )=0 -0. 7 4(-2.57) A(1 )=0 -4. 7 4(-3.13)* 
A(0)=A(1 )=0 3.07(3. 78) A(0)=A(1 )=A(2)=0 9.26(4.03) 
A( 1 )=A(2)=0 11.22(5.34) 
!). DD A(1 )=0 -23.45(-2.57)* A(1 )=0 -23.41 (-3.13)* 
A(0)=A(1 )=0 27 4. 9(3. 78) A(0)=A(1 )=A(2)=0 182.7(4.03) 
A(1 )=A(2)=0 274.06(5.34) 
Numbers in parenthesis are asymptotic critical values at 10% 
* significant at 10% level 
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result is that INTER appears to be I(0) in the Phillips-Perron test. This result may stem 
from the fact that INTER is the only variable which is not in log. In the literature, 
interest rates are often found to be I(l ), as is also the case for most other 
macroeconomic variables. As a result, in our SV AR estimation all the variables are in 
first-difference form1. For the sake of neatness, the first-difference sign (Li) is to be 
omitted from all the · seven variables referred to hereafter. One should, thus, bear in 
mind that these variables are all in first-difference, even though the first-difference sign 
( Li ) is not shown. 
In performing unit root tests, structural breaks should also be taken into account. In the 
presence of structural breaks, Dickey ... Fuller and Phillips-Perron test statistics are biased 
towards accepting the null-hypothesis of a unit root, even if the series may be stationary 
within each of the sub-periods. One of the easiest ways to test a unit root in the 
presence of structural breaks is to split the sample into two parts and then use Dickey-
Fuller tests in each part (Enders, 1995). The ADF test is, thus, carried out on the 
proposed two sub-periods: 1970Ml-1984M12 and 1985Ml-1996M6. The results, not 
shown, confirm that all the variables are I(l ). 
6.3.b. Checking the order of VAR (the lag length) 
Two selection criteria, Akaike information criterion (AIC) and Schwarz Bayesian 
criterion (SBC) are used to help select the lag length. According to these criteria, the 
model with the highest value of AIC and SBC should be chosen. In Table 6.3 and 6.4, 
1 To allow for a possibility that INTER may, in fact, be I(O) and that results in the following tests could 
have changed significantly, had a different process of INTER been included in the model, we 
alternatively include INTER in level and in difference in the model. The empirical results are, however, 
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the order of the VAR model suggested by AIC and SBC is between zero and three. A 
zero lag is ruled out, as it would not be in the spirit of the VAR analysis. 
As a result, the choice we have is between one and three lags. In Table 6.3 and 6.4, AIC 
and SBC tend to suggest a different lag length. SBC tends to suggest a lower lag length 
than does AIC. As mentioned in Chapter Five, if the dimension of the VAR is not so 
large, more lags may be needed to proxy omitted variables. However, too many lags are 
generally not recommended either, as degrees of freedom may be wasted. Therefore, 
whenever there is a conflicting recommendation by AIC and SBC, we will choose one 
which recommends a higher lag length. 
It should be noticed that a common lag length is applied to all the variables or, in other 
words, in all equations in the models. The reason for this is that in the VAR model, a 
system of multi-regressions, each variable is regressed on its own lags and the lags of 
other variables in the model. Once the lag length is chosen, an econometric software 
program (Microfit Version 4 for this study) automatically estimates the VAR model 
with the same lag length in all equations. 
6.3.c. Diagnostic Tests 
The diagnostic tests shown in Tables 6.5 to 6.8 are for each of the four equations in 
Model A and B. Since our empirical analysis uses all the data available and the data 
between the two sub-periods, the results of the diagnostic tests for each of the three 
found to change only slightly. Therefore, for a sake of conformity in presenting the results we will only 
present the results in which INTER in difference is included. 
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Table 6.3: Choice Criteria Selecting the Order of the VAR (Model A) 
Order 1970-1996 1970-1984 1984-1996 
AIC SBC AIC SBC AIC 
12 1230.9 866.3 732.2 426.6 498.6 
11 1232.6 897.8 740.1 459.5 499.4 
10 1223.5 918.4 744.4 488.7 493.4 
9 1232.9 957.6 754.3 523.53 500.6 
8 1227.2 981 .6 760.2 554.4 499 .5 
7 1233.4 1017.7 759.8 578.9 507.5 
6 1238.5 1052.5 759 603.1 516.9 
5 1240.3 1084 756.1 625.1 517.7 
4 1239.2 1112. 7 759.9 653.9 523 
3 1242.7 1146 762.1 681 530.2 
2 1245.6 1178.7 767.7 711 .6 531.2 
1 1192.6 1155.4 747.2 716.1 503.4 
0 1114.4 1107 700.2 693.9 471.4 
Table 6.4 : Choice Criteria Selecting the Order of the VAR (Model B) 
Order 1970-1996 1970-1984 1984-1996 
AIC SBC AIC SBC AIC 
12 2935.9 2571 .3 1518.7 1213.1 1408.9 
11 2939 2604.2 1524.4 1243.7 1403.1 
10 2938 .8 2633 .8 1527.7 1272.1 1409.3 
9 2938.9 2663.6 1531 .6 1300.9 1409.3 
8 2946.4 2700.9 1541 .5 1335.8 1421 .5 
7 2943.5 2727.7 1544 1363.1 1421 .2 
6 2945.4 2759.4 1548.5 1392.6 1426.7 
5 2939 2782.7 1538.6 1407.7 1422.2 
4 2947.9 2821 .4 1546.4 1440.4 1433 
3 2960.8 2864.1 1557.1 1476 1438.5 
2 2960.1 2893.2 1559 1502.9 1440 
1 2936.9 2899.7 1552.7 1521 .5 1429.4 
0 2894 2886.5 1533.3 1527.1 1414.9 
SBC 
211 .7 
235 .9 
253.4 
283 .9 
306.3 
337.7 
370.6 . 
394.8 
423.5 
454.1 
478.5 
474.2 
465 .6 
SBC 
1122.1 
1139.7 
1169.3 
1192.7 
1228.3 
1251.4 
1280.4 
1299.2 
1333.5 
1362.3 
1387.3 
1400.1 
1409 
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II Table 6.5: Diagnostic Tests for INTER and TR Equations (Model A) 
INTER TR 
1970-96 1970-84 1985-96 1970-96 1970-84 1985-96 
Serial Correlation LM Version 33.6(.001] 16.5[.168] 27.7(.006] 34[.001] 34.5(.001] 16.6[.165] 
F Version 2.9[.001] 1.3[.202] 2.45(.007] 2.9[.001] 3.15(.000] 1.3[.209] 
Functional Form LM Version 1.3[.249] 1.3[.238] .533[.456] 3.3[.112] 1.1 [.293] 3.9[.108] 
F Version 1.2[.256] 1.3[.251] .497[.482] 3.2[.113] 1.0[.307] 3.8[.11 0] 
Normality LM Version 9.6[.008] 29[.000] .693[. 707] 9.08(.011] 2. 7[.251] 7 .5[.023] 
F Version na na na na na na 
Heteroscedasticity LM Version 1.2[.273] 4.8[.028] .276[.599] 1.9[.160] 1.9[.164] .03[.853] 
F Version 1.2[.274] 4.9[.028] .273[.602] 1.9[.161] 1.9[.166] .03[.855] 
Numbers in brackets are marginal significance levels 
Table 6.6: Diagnostic Tests for DD and BC Equations (Model A) 
DD BC 
1970-96 1970-84 1985-96 1970-96 1970-84 1985-96 
Serial Correlation LM Version 27.0(.008] 36[.000] 8.3[.758] 25.4(.013] 13.7[.317] 35[.000] 
F Version 2.3[.008] 3.3[.000] .62[.816] 2.1[.014] 1.0[.368] 3.3[.000] 
Functional Form LM Version 1.9[.168] 2.2[.133] 0.18[.667] .26[.607] .48[.485] .002[.961] 
F Version 1.8[.174] 2.1[.144] .17[.679] .25[.613] .46[.498] .002[.962] 
Normality LM Version 8.6[.013] 2.4[.295] . 72[.696] 6.2[.045] 1.4[.483] .13[.937] 
F Version na na na na na na 
Heteroscedasticity LM Version 5.0[.024] 2.0[.157] 1.5[ .219] 2.4[.115] 1.9[.165] .008[.926] 
F Version 5.1 [.024] 2.0[.158] 1.5[.222] 2.4[.116] 1.9[.167] .008[.927] 
Numbers in brackets are marginal significance levels 
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Table 6.7: Diagnostic Tests for BC and Ml Equations (Model B) 
BC M1 
1970-96 1970-84 1985-96 1970-96 1970-84 1985-96 
Serial Correlation LM Version 24.2[.019] 12.9[.375] 35.0[.000] 9.4[.667] 22.3(.034] 4.5[.971] 
F Version 2.0[.023] 1.0[.430] 3.3[.000] . 7 44[. 707] 1.8[.040] .33[.981] 
Functional Form LM Version .34[.556] .001 [.970] .61[.434] .33[.565] 2.5[.109] 2.8[.148] 
F Version .33[.565] .001[.971] .56[.452] .31 [.574] 2.4[.119] 2.7[.156] 
Normality LM Version 19.3(.000] 2. 7[.252] .04[.977] 7.7[.021] 10.0(.006] .34[.843] 
F Version na na na na na na 
Heteroscedasticity LM Version 1.4[.235] 1.9[.160] .71 [.398] . 76[.383] .03[.860] .31 [.572] 
F Version 1.4[.237] 1.9[.162] .70[.401] .75[.385] .03[861] .31 [.575] 
Numbers in brackets are marginal significance levels 
Table 6.8: Diagnostic Tests Y and P Equations (Model B) 
y p 
1970-96 1970-84 1985-96 1970-96 1970-84 1985-96 
Serial Correlation LM Version 8.5[.739] 14.3[.280] 19.3[.081] 6.3[.899] 11.0[.526] 10.5[.568] 
F Version .67[.774] 1.14[.328] 1.5[.104] .49[.917] .86[.585] .80[.643] 
Functional Form LM Version 2.3[.125] .56[.450] 2.3[.124] .2E-4[.99] 1.2[.264] .05[.814] 
F Version 2.2[.133] .53[.464] 2.2[.138] .2E-4[.99] 1.1 [.278] .05[.821] 
Normality LM Version 2.9[.229] .22[.892] 8.0[.018] 7793[.00] 3368[.00] 110[.00] 
F Version na na na na na na 
Heteroscedasticity LM Version 6.0[.014] 1.1 [.273] 2.5[.11 0] 13.3(.000] 3.5[.061] 1.0[.300] 
F Version 6.1 [.014] 1.1 [.276] 2.5[.111] 13.8(.000] 3.5[.062] 1.0[.304] 
Numbers in brackets are marginal significance levels 
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periods 1970-96, 1970-84 and 1985-96 are also provided. The test statistics of four 
diagnostic tests (serial correlation; functional form; normality; and heteroscedasticity) 
are reported here. The null hypotheses for these four diagnostic tests are that there is no 
serial correlation ( disturbances are serially uncorrelated), functional form 
misspecification, non-normality ( disturbances are normally distributed) and 
heteroscedasticity (error-variances are constant or homoscedasticity) respectively. 
In Tables 6.5 to 6.8, the functional form misspecification does not seem to be a problem 
since the null hypothesis of no functional form misspecification cannot be rejected in 
both models. Heteroscedasticity is, however, found in INTER, DD, Y, and P equations. 
In the presence of heteroscedasticity, ordinary least squares (OLS) estimators are still 
unbiased but inefficient. But the estimates of the variances are biased, invalidating the 
tests of significance for parameters. In the VAR analysis, parameters are typically not 
of interest, and hence the effects of heteroscedasticity on the tests of significance should 
not be of major concern. 
One of the traditional remedies usually prescribed for solving the heteroscedasticity is 
transforming the data to logs to reduce the heteroscedasticity in the error variances. 
This is exactly what we have done, all the data (except INTER) are transformed to logs; 
but still there is no guarantee that the heteroscedasticity can be entirely eliminated. 
Nonetheless, the heteroscedasticity does not seem to be so rampant. TR, BC (in both 
models) and M 1 equations have no heteroscedasticity at all. Breaking down the data in 
sub-periods seems to help alleviate the problem; the heteroscedasticity disappears in 
DD, Y, and P sub-period equations. 
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Serial correlation is found in all, but Y and P equations. The consequences of 
autocorrelated errors are unbiased but inefficient OLS estimators and biased error 
variances, which could exaggerate t and F statistics. According to Maddala (1988), one 
of the factors that could lead to the presence of serial correlation is that some variables 
that should have been included in the equations are omitted, and these omitted variables 
are themselves autocorrelated. In our empirical analysis, there are only four variables in 
each model. It is, thus, possible that some variables that should have been included in 
the model may have been omitted. 
However, expanding the models to include more variables to accommodate the possible 
serial correlation may complicate the empirical analysis, and make it extremely difficult 
to provide a sensible theoretical justification for the inclusion of new variables. As a 
result, we will adhere to our proposed models by making no modification to the 
models, even though this may come at the price of having some serial correlation. 
Normality appears to be of major concern, as the null hypothesis of normally 
distributed errors can be rejected in every equation, albeit not in all sub-period 
equations. Splitting the data into two groups seems to help in some cases, such as, in 
DD and BC equations. According to Darnell (1994), a significant test statistic of the 
normality test which rejects the null hypothesis of normally distributed errors, can be 
interpreted as an indication of outliners ( observations substantially different from the 
rest of the observations), since the larger is the proportion of large residuals the less 
likely is the null hypothesis of normality. 
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If a data set is found to contain outliners, then a common response is to delete those 
particular observations and re-estimate the equations. This simple response may, 
however, be problematic in practice, and, without proper justification, could be 
arbitrary. In the VAR estimation, a sufficiently large number of observations are 
needed, especially when we have to investigate two sub-periods. As a result, we choose 
not to delete any observation and press on with the VAR estimation with all the data we 
have. 
6.3.d. Testing whether contemporaneous covariances between shocks in different 
equations are correlated 
As discussed in Chapter Five, in the SV AR model the Choleski decomposition implies 
the ordering of variables and a recursive structure of the underlying structural residuals 
(Wold causal representation). The importance of the ordering depends on the magnitude 
of the correlation coefficients between the disturbances. If the correlation coefficients 
were small, the Wold ordering should have little effect on variance decomposition and 
impulse response function results, if the ordering was altered. 
In Table 6.9 and 6.10, it can be seen that contemporaneous covariances between the 
shocks in both models are very small. To check whether these covariances ( the off-
diagonal elements of the covariance matrix of the errors) are statistically significant 
from zero, the log-likelihood ratio (LR) test is used. A null hypothesis that the shocks 
in different equations are contemporaneously uncorrelated is tested against an 
alternative hypothesis that they are contemporaneously correlated. 
159 
r I 
Table 6.9: Estimated System Covariance Matrix of Errors (Model A) 
(1970-1996) 
INTER TR DD BC 
INTER 1.3555 
TR -0.0059735 0.0079034 
DD -0.016054 0.0019664 0.0035098 
BC 0.0014339 -0.0007002 0.0004117 0.00097 
(1970-1984) 
INTER TR DD BC 
INTER 0.58865 
TR -0.0048025 0.0080957 
DD 0.0015135 0.0020235 0.0023181 
BC 0.0015448 -0.0005397 0.0004574 0.0001243 
(1985-1996) 
INTER TR DD BC 
INTER 2.3776 
TR -0.011443 0.0073109 
DD -0.040014 0.0018673 0.0052013 
BC 0.0017674 -0.0007297 0.0003671 0.0006145 
Table 6.10: Estimated System Covariance Matrix of Errors (Model B) 
(1970-1996) 
BC M1 y p 
BC 0.0009614 
M1 0.000323 0.005061 
y 0.0003956 0.0008636 0.00285 
p 0.00001912 -0.0001045 0.000425 0.002626 
-
7(1970-1984) 
BC M1 y p 
BC 0.00129 
M1 0.000308 0.003803 
y 0.00001239 0.0005367 0.0035221 
p -0.0000475 -0 .0000865 0.0001731 0.003947 
(1985-1996) 
BC M1 y p 
BC 0.0006177 
M1 0.0002007 0.006745 
y 0.0008852 0.001313 0.0020102 
p 0.0000087 0.0001155 0.0006028 0.001043 
1,i 
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Table 6.11: Log-likelihood Ratio Test for Covariance Correlation (Model A) 
Equation 1970-96 1970-84 1985-96 
Log-likelihood 
INTER -490 -199 -250 
TR 319 1 79 148 
DD 447 290 171 
BC 1013 549 447 
.......................................................... .................................. ·-····-································ ········ .. ········································· 
LL 1289 819 516 
R 
LLu 
Log-likelihood 
Ratio Statistic 
1329 
80 
846 
54 
567 
102 
Table 6.12: Log-likelihood Ratio Test for Covariance Correlation (Model B) 
Equation 1970-96 1970-84 1985-96 
Log-likelihood 
BC 
Ml 
y 
1013 
752 
481 
855 
546 477 
450 316 
253 237 
447 441 
······································-········································"·········· 
3101 1696 1471 
······································-······· 
LLu 3108 1698 1476 
························································ .. .......................... . 
Log-likelihood 14 4 10 
Ratio Statistic 
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The log-likelihood (LR) test statistic is given by 
LR(H0 I H1 ) = 2(LLu - LLR) 
where LLu and LL R are the maximized values of the LR function under the alternative 
and the null hypotheses respectively. This LR statistic has a z 2 distribution. 
In Table 6.11 and 6.12, LLu is the value of the "system log-likelihood", and LLR is the 
summation of the single equation log-likelihood values of the four equations. The 95%, 
99%, and 99.5% critical values of the ,r2 distribution with 6 degrees of freedom are 
12.6, 16.6, and 18.5 respectively. According to these critical values, the null hypothesis 
in model A can be rejected at any of the three critical values. In model B, the null 
hypothesis cannot be rejected at the 95% critical value for period (1970-84) and (1985-
1996). For period (1970-1996), the null hypothesis cannot be rejected at 99%. 
Although there is a possibility that contemporaneous covariances between the shocks 
are non-zero A, the impact of the covariance correlation is likely to be minimal, since 
the magnitude of the covariance between the shocks is very small. The vanance 
decomposition and the impulse response function results are found to be virtually 
unchanged when the ordering of the variables is experimentally altered. 
After undertaking all the tests important for the VAR estimation, we now proceed to 
estimate the VAR model. In our study, two models are to be estimated. Model A deals 
with the financial sector, and will test the transmission of monetary policy through the 
lending channel. Model B deals with the real economy sector, and will test the 
forecasting power of money and credit shocks. As explained in Chapter Five, the inter-
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bank rate (INTER) is used as a proxy of monetary policy stance. For example, a policy-
driven rise in INTER is expected to induce banks to squeeze their reserves in the short-
run. Monetary tightening should lead to a fall in loans and deposits in the banking 
system. Loans are, however, unlikely to fall dramatically in the short run possibly due 
to their quasi-contractual nature and the existence of bank liability management. But 
over time it is expected that loans and deposits will eventually fall. 
The ability of the central bank to affect the scale of bank balance sheets is, in fact, not 
controversial and is widely accepted as part of both the coventional money channel and 
the lending channel (Bernanke, 1993). However, what appears to be controversial is 
how a reduction in bank assets and liabilities goes on to affect the economy. In the 
conventional money view, the critical effect comes from a reduction in bank liabilities 
(deposits). In the lending view, a fall in bank assets is considered potentially important 
in the transmission of the monetary policy. To see the relative importance of money and 
credit aggregates in monetary policy transmission, Model B will examine the relative 
importance of the forecasting power of money and credit shocks. 
In each model, two questions are asked: what is the relative importance of exogenous 
shocks to movements in endogenous variables? and what is the dynamic response of 
endogenous variables to exogenous shocks? The first question is answered by variance 
decomposition. The second question is answered by the impulse response function. 
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6.4. Results 
6.4.a. Model A 
In Model A, we want to analyze the inter-relationship or inter-dependence between four 
time-series financial variables: inter-bank rate (INTER), total bank reserves (TR), 
demand deposits (DD), and bank credit (BC). We first look at the results for the 
variance decomposition. Remember that the forecast error variance decomposition 
imparts the proportion of the movements in one variable, say, INTER, due to its own 
shocks versus shocks to the other variables, that is, TR, DD and BC. For example, if 
TR, DD, BC (disturbance) shocks explain none of the forecast error variance of INTER 
at all forecast horizons, then INTER would be exogenous ( or evolve independently) of 
TR, DD, and BC (disturbance) shocks. 
In Table 6.13, it can be seen that BC shocks explain about 3% of INTER's forecast 
error variance, TR and DD shocks explain around 1 %2 • These results are not 
unexpected, given that the inter-bank rate is one of the most important costs for 
acquiring reserves. Other things being equal, a rise in bank lending would put upward 
pressure on the inter-bank rate. In Table 6.14, it is interesting to see that BC shocks 
contributed to INTER' s forecast error variance during 1970-1984 more than during 
1985-1996. 
2Granger non-causality test discussed later will explain how statistically significant these variables and 
other variables in the study are. It may be noticed that the contribution of a variable's own shocks to its 
forecast error variance tends to be far larger than that of other variables' shocks. This seems to be the 
case not only for INTER but also for most other variables under the study. Two factors are discovered to 
be influential to these outcomes: lag length and time horizon. If lag length and time horizon are 
elongated, the contribution of a variable's own shocks are found to decrease, while that of other 
variables' shocks increases. However, the overall relative contribution remains, by and large, unchanged. 
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Table 6.13: Forecast Error Variance Decomposition of INTER 
in Percentage at 24-month Horizon (1970-1996) 
Horizon INTER TR DD BC 
1 95.985 0.679 1.2203 2.1155 
6 94.676 0.938 1.221 3.1646 
12 94.652 0.945 1.2224 3.1807 
18 94.651 0.946 1.2224 3.1808 
24 94.651 0.946 1.2224 3.1808 
Table 6.14: Forecast Error Variance Decomposition of INTER 
in Percentage at 24-month Horizon (1970-1984) and (1985-1996) 
Horizon INTER TR DD 
70-84 85-96 70-84 85-96 70-84 85-96 
1 95.483 95.938 0.44662 0.98799 0.44851 1.2245 
6 93.778 94.449 0.54036 1.5281 0.53233 1.3381 
12 93.76 94 .371 0.54626 1.5387 0.53388 1.3427 
18 93.759 94.368 0.54639 1.539 0.53391 1.3428 
24 93.759 94.368 0.54639 1.539 0.55339 1.3428 
Table 6.15: Forecast Error Variance Decomposition of TR 
in Percentage at 24-month Horizon (1970-1996) 
Horizon INTER TR DD BC 
1 0.20768 98.398 1.3938 0.00067 
6 0.61956 96.421 2.9329 0.2687 
12 0.61814 96.373 2.9799 0.2877 
18 0.61812 96.373 2.9804 0.2881 
24 0.61812 96.373 2.9804 0.2881 
Table 6.16: Forecast Error Variance Decomposition of TR 
in Percentage at 24-month Horizon (1970-1984) and (1985-1996) 
Horizon INTER TR DD 
70-84 85-96 70-84 85-96 70-84 85-96 
1 0.40775 0.45967 94.387 99.488 5.2044 0.477 
6 0.40863 1.3565 91 .205 96.254 8.122 0.73714 
12 0.40444 1.35504 91 .08 96.205 8.2502 0.75547 
18 0.40436 1.3506 91 .078 96.203 8.2523 0.75595 
24 0.40435 1.3506 91 .078 96.203 8.2524 0.75597 
BC 
70-84 85-96 
3.5853 1.8497 
5.1489 2.6845 
5.1603 2.7472 
5.1603 2.7499 
5.1603 2.7501 
BC 
70-84 85-96 
0.00566 0.00446 
0.00265 1.6522 
0.26551 1.6889 
0.26504 1.6902 
0.26504 1.6902 
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Table 6.17: Forecast Error Variance Decomposition of DD 
in Percentage at 24-month Horizon (1970-1996) 
Horizon INTER TR DD BC 
1 4.572 17.158 77.058 1.1851 
6 4.505 19.473 74.396 1.6251 
12 4.4958 19.647 74.236 1.6214 
18 4.4956 19.651 74.233 1.6213 
24 4.4956 19.651 74.232 1.6213 
Table 6.18: Forecast Error Variance Decomposition of DD 
in Percentage at 24-month Horizon (1970-1984) and (1985-1996) 
Horizon INTER TR DD 
70-84 85-96 70-84 85-96 70-84 85-96 
1 0.22118 11 .389 26.799 10.213 72.09 76.338 
6 0.34002 11.401 29.519 11 .857 69.038 73.287 
12 0.33885 11 .382 29.702 12.015 68.858 73.151 
18 0.33883 11 .381 29.707 12.018 68.854 73.148 
24 0.33883 11 .381 29.707 12.018 68.854 73.148 
Table 6.19: Forecast Error Variance Decomposition of BC 
in Percentage at 24-month Horizon (1970-1996) 
Horizon INTER TR DD BC 
1 1.6364 1.1518 5.324 91 .888 
6 1.4259 1.1679 4.9875 92.419 
12 1.4229 1.1821 4.9875 92.408 
18 1.4228 1.1823 4.9875 92.407 
24 1.4228 1.1823 4.9875 92.407 
Table 6.20: Forecast Error Variance Decomposition of BC 
in Percentage at 24-month Horizon (1970-1984) and (1985-1996) 
Horizon INTER TR DD 
70-84 85-96 70-84 85-96 70-84 85-96 
1 3.1592 2.2192 0.42181 3.3016 5.8262 7.1489 
6 3.4446 2.0468 0.42316 2.0689 5.5507 6.5939 
12 3.4456 2.0267 0.42858 3.0744 5.5536 6.5884 
18 3.4456 2.0258 0.42869 3.0731 5.5536 6.5879 
24 3.4456 2.0258 0.42869 3.073 5.5536 6.5879 
BC 
70-84 85-96 
0.88994 2.0601 
1.1034 3.4554 
1.1004 3.4525 
1.1003 3.4525 
1.1003 3.4525 
BC 
70-84 85-96 
90.593 87.33 
90.582 88.29 
90.572 88.311 
90.572 88.313 
90.572 88.313 
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Financial development since 1985 may hold the key to these results. As shown in Table 
2.5 (Chapter Two), in post financial deregulation, the commercial banks have become 
heavily dependent on external short-term borrowing: financial liberalization made it 
easier for them to obtain external funds. Prior to July 2, 1997, the Thai government's 
policy of maintaining a stable exchange rate also provided a major incentive for the 
banks to borrow overseas. The commercial banks' increased reliance on external 
borrowing during the first half of the 1990s may, to a significant extent, have weakened 
the relationship between BC and INTER, as external short-term funds can be acquired 
easily. Thailand's worst financial crisis in 1997 is a classic example of over-borrowing 
by the financial institutions. 
Table 6.15 shows the forecast error variance decomposition of total bank reserves (TR). 
DD shocks explain approximately 3% of TR's forecast error variance, relatively much 
more than INTER and BC shocks. But when comparing the results from the two sub-
periods, the relationship between TR and DD appears to weaken during 1985-96. 
During 1970-84, DD shocks account for over 8% of TR' s forecast error variance, 
whereas during 1985-96, DD shocks account for less than 1 % (Table 6.16). 
These results may be attributable to changes in the banks' funding behaviour. In Table 
2.6 (Chapter Two), the proportion of bank funding from deposits remains relatively 
stable, though declining somewhat between 1994-1995, while that from borrowing 
increases significantly from around 11 % to · over 24%. Apart from borrowing, the 
commercial banks also have many other ways of raising short-term and long-term 
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funds. Certificates of deposit were introduced in the early 1990s, and many other new 
financial instruments were also introduced into the market (see details in Chapter Two). 
Tables 6.17 and 6.18 reaffirm a link between TR and DD and also show that TR shocks 
are more important to DD than DD shocks to TR. In Table 6.17, TR shocks account for 
nearly 20% of DD's forecast error variance. Table 6.18 shows that while TR shocks 
become less important to DD during 1985-1996 ( as is also the case for DD shocks to 
TR discussed above), INTER shocks become more important, increasing from just 
0.34% to over 11 %. In Table 6.19, DD shocks are relatively the most important shocks 
to BC's forecast error variance. The relationship between BC and DD remains, more or 
less, stable over the two sub-periods (Table 6.20). 
From the results discussed so far, it can be said that TR is important to DD and DD is, 
in tum, important to BC. This relationship seems to be, by and large, in line with what 
is discussed in the previous chapter. However, one can argue the inter-relationship 
between TR, DD, and BC may be just a result of the ordering of the variables in the 
VAR model. As discussed in Section 6.3 .d the correlation coefficients between TR and 
DD and DD and BC are so low that the Wold ordering should have little effect. That is, 
if the ordering of TR and DD in the VAR model were swapped, the variance 
decomposition and impulse response function would change only slightly. 
After examining the variance decomposition, we now look into the dynamic response 
of each variable to exogenous shocks (i.e. shocks generated by other variables and own 
disturbance). In the impulse response function, we will look at how the inter-bank rate 
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(INTER), total reserves (TR), demand deposits (DD), and bank credit (BC) respond to 
changes in monetary policy. The inter-bank rate is used as a proxy of monetary policy 
stance. This means that we identify the disturbances to the inter-bank rate equation in 
the VAR as shocks to monetary policy, and interpret the responses of other variables in 
the system to the INTER shocks as the structural responses of those variables to an 
unanticipated change in monetary policy. 
Figure 6.1 to 6.4 show the estimated dynamic responses of INTER, TR, DD, and BC to 
a positive one-standard-deviation shock to the inter-bank rate, interpreted as an 
unanticipated tightening of monetary policy. Since all of the variables except the inter-
bank rate are measured in logs, the response can be interpreted as proportions (i.e 0.001 
= 0 .1 percent) of the baseline levels. 
In Figure 6.1, after rising sharply initially, INTER starts to fall precipitously after two 
months. Within nine months, the inter-bank rate quickly returns to its baseline level. 
Figure 6.2 illustrates that TR falls after a tightening of monetary policy and then 
fluctuate up and down before tailing off after twenty one months. Figure 6.3 shows DD 
jumping sharply before beginning to return to the baseline path in seven months. Figure 
6.4 shows that BC also rises sharply after monetary policy is tightened, and then falls to 
the baseline path in twelve months. 
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Figure 6.1:Orthogonalized Impulse Response of INTER to One SE Shock to INTER 
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Figure 6.2: Orthogonalized Impulse Response of TR to One SE Shock to INTER 
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Figure 6.3: Orthogonalized Impulse Response of DD to One SE Shock to INTER 
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Figure 6.4: Orthogonalized Impulse Response of BC to One SE Shock to INTER 
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Bernanke and Blinder (1990) suggest that a plausible explanation for a "perverse" 
short-term behaviour of loans may arise from the fact that as sales and cash flows fall at 
the beginning of a downturn, firms may demand more credit in order to finance 
inventories and payrolls. This could be the reason why in the short run credit may 
initially increase, rather than decrease. A pre-arranged line of credit may also make it 
difficult for banks to cut their loan supply unilaterally. In addition, by running down 
their reserves or resorting to a liability management technique, it is not impossible for 
banks to maintain or perhaps even increase their supply of loans in the short run. 
The results from variance decomposition and the impulse response function seem to 
vindicate, more or less, what we discuss in our theoretical model that monetary 
tightening resulting in reserve losses would affect the scale of bank balance sheets. 
Loans and deposits are expected to be eventually affected. In the short run, banks may 
be able to withstand the impacts of monetary tightening, but over time bank lending 
activity will be affected as reserves become scarce and costly to acquire. 
As mentioned earlier, the ability of the central bank to affect the scale of bank balance 
sheets is not controversial. What is controversial is how a reduction in bank assets and 
liabilities goes on to affect the real economy. In the conventional money view, the 
effect critically come from a fall in the bank liabilities. In the lending view, a fall in 
bank assets is considered potentially important in the monetary policy transmission. To 
see the relative importance of money and credit aggregates in monetary policy 
transmission, the following section will examine the relative importance of the 
forecasting power of money and credit shocks. 
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6.4.b. Model B 
In Model B, we first look at the inter-relationship between four time-series variables: 
bank credit (BC), narrow money supply (Ml), industrial output index (Y), and 
industrial output price index (P). In Table 6.21, Ml shocks contribute slightly more to 
BC's forecast error variance than P and Y shocks. Table 6.22 shows that during 1985-
1996 Y shocks explain more of BC's forecast error variance than Ml and P shocks by a 
clear margin of 5.19 %. 
It is very intriguing to see that BC shocks are more important to the forecast error 
variance of Y and P than Ml shocks. Tables 6.25 and 6.27 show that on the overall data 
span, BC fares better than Ml in explaining the future error variance of Y and P. These 
result seems to lend support to the lending view's call for the recognition of bank loans 
in monetary policy transmission. However, one may argue that a poor performance of 
Ml could be attributable to financial liberalization and innovation. Prior to financial 
liberalization, the central role of banks in issuing liquid liabilities functioning as 
"money" ensured that bank deposits and currency (that is Ml) had a reasonably close 
relationship with major macroeconomic variables, such as price and output. Financial 
liberalization and innovation have, however, undermined this role. 
Since the mid 1980s, many new financial products which are close substitutes to money 
have been introduced. These include a number of non-Ml assets which can readily 
substitute for the transaction assets in Ml. Ml now contains saving-type assets subject 
to portfolio redistribution. Traditionally, assets in Ml do not earn interest, so Ml 1s 
considered not to be subject to the portfolio redistribution impact affecting the 
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Table 6.21: Forecast Error Variance Decomposition of BC 
in Percentage at 24-month Horizon (1970-1996) 
Horizon BC M1 y p 
1 97.767 1.0042 0.25552 0.97343 
6 93 .751 2.2768 1.8559 2.1163 
12 93.627 2.343 1.8638 2.166 
18 93.623 2.3451 1.8639 2.1676 
24 93.623 2.3452 1.8639 2.1677 
Table 6.22: Forecast Error Variance Decomposition of BC 
in Percentage at 24-month Horizon (1970-1984) and (1985-1996) 
Horizon BC M1 y 
70-84 85-96 70-84 85-96 70-84 85-96 
1 98.229 97.56 0.55967 2.4339 0.15633 0.00975 
6 97.568 92.487 0.60439 2.0255 0.81087 5.2085 
12 97.566 92.498 0.60502 2.0123 0.81271 5.1996 
18 97.566 92.498 0.60502 2.0118 0.81272 5.1991 
24 97.566 92.498 0.60502 2.0118 0.81272 5.199 
Table 6.23: Forecast Error Variance Decomposition of Ml 
in Percentage at 24-month Horizon (1970-1996) 
Horizon BC M1 y p 
1 2.1216 97.44 0.02212 0.4353 
6 2.5395 94.898 1.2422 1.3198 
12 2.5474 94.853 1.2656 1.3335 
18 2.5474 94.853 1.2657 1.3335 
24 2.5474 94.853 1.2657 1.3335 
Table 6.24: Forecast Error Variance Decomposition of Ml 
in Percentage at 24-month Horizon (1970-1984) and (1985-1996) 
Horizon BC M1 y 
70-84 85-96 70-84 85-96 70-84 85-96 
1 1.8839 1.2015 96.124 98.645 1.0549 0.14561 
6 1.9408 1.6346 95.349 95.415 1.3426 2.8773 
12 1.941 1.6445 95.341 95.403 1.3493 2.8796 
18 1.941 1.645 95.341 95.402 1.3494 2.8797 
24 1.941 1.645 95.341 95.402 1.3494 2.8797 
p 
70-84 85-96 
1.0553 0.05344 
1.0164 0.27873 
1.0161 0.29039 
1.0161 0.29086 
1.0161 0.29088 
p 
70-84 85-96 
0.93678 0.08185 
1.368 0.7298 
1.3683 0.7321 
1.3683 0.7322 
1.3683 0.7322 
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Table 6.25: Forecast Error Variance Decomposition of Y 
in Percentage at 24-month Horizon (1970-1996) 
Horizon BC M1 y p 
1 0.42919 0.26487 99.169 0.13692 
6 1.1076 0.29683 96.867 1.7287 
12 1.1143 0.30175 96.845 1.7392 
18 1.1143 0.30176 96.845 1.7393 
24 1.1143 .0.30176 96.845 1.7393 
Table 6.26: Forecast Error Variance Decomposition of Y 
in Percentage at 24-month Horizon (1970-1984) and (1985-1996) 
Horizon BC M1 y p 
I 
70-84 85-96 70-84 85-96 70-84 85-96 70-84 85-96 
1 0.03836 4.8997 0.1865 0.67296 99.34 94.073 0.46987 0.35408 
6 0.96614 5.1224 0.71883 1.8145 95.731 92.027 2.5841 1.0363 
12 0.96812 5.1309 0.7206 1.8157 95.723 92.017 2.5878 1.0365 
18 0.96813 5.1313 0.7206 1.8157 95.723 92.016 2.5878 1.0365 
24 0.96813 5.1313 0.7206 1.8157 95.723 92.016 2.5878 1.0365 
Table 6.27: Forecast Error Variance Decomposition of P 
in Percentage at 24-month Horizon (1970-1996) 
Horizon BC M1 y p 
1 0.5505 0.9453 0.3295 99.521 
6 2.1996 0.9643 1.0115 95.825 
12 2.2331 0.97175 1.0345 95.761 
18 2.2338 0.97187 1.0346 95.76 
24 2.2338 0.97188 1.0346 95.76 
Table 6.28: Forecast Error Variance Decomposition of P 
in Percentage at 24-month Horizon (1970-1984) and (1985-1996) 
Horizon BC M1 y p 
70-84 85-96 70-84 85-96 70-84 85-96 70-84 85-96 
1 0.13205 0.77851 0.37905 1.0558 0.32693 2.8603 99.162 95.305 
6 2.309 0.85287 1.2494 1.2038 0.6263 3.0906 95.815 94.853 
12 2.3172 0.86044 1.2493 1.204 0.6295 3.0908 95.804 94.845 
18 2.3172 0.86066 1.2493 1.204 0.62951 3.0908 95.804 94.845 
24 2.23172 0.86067 1.2493 1.204 0.62951 3.0908 95.804 94.845 
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broader aggregate (such as M2). As a result, Ml is commonly believed to correspond to 
movements in spending, rather than interest rate induced asset shifts. Should random 
portfolio shifts across monetary aggregates become more common, they could limit the 
information value of Ml movements, and make Ml less reliable as a guide to policy 
(Blundell-Wignall and Gizycki, 1992). 
Though financial deregulation has undermined banks' position as providers of 
"money", it has not affected banks' position as providers of credit for small borrowers 
who find it difficult to borrow directly in open markets. As shown in Table 3 .1 (Chapter 
Three), despite losing large corporate clients to non-bank institutions, such as the equity 
market and the debt instruments market, the commercial banks are still the main 
lending institutions for small and some medium-sized firms, traditionally dependent on 
banks for financing. 
Figures 6.5 and 6.6 illustrate the impulse responses of Y and P to one-standard 
deviation shocks from BC and Ml disturbances. Figure 6.5 shows that there appears to 
be a similar pattern of dynamic response of Y to BC and Ml. Y begins to return to its 
baseline path in about twelve months. However, there appears to be an opposite pattern 
of dynamic response of P to BC and Ml. Figure 6.6 shows that the response of P to BC 
looks much like a mirror reflection of the response of P to Ml. However, in either case 
P returns to its baseline level in around twelve months. 
In the VAR analysis, it is also interesting to examine the causal link between the 
variables under study. As described in Chapter Five, a test of causality centres on 
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Figure 6.5: Orthogonalized Impulse Response of Y to One SE Shock to BC and Ml 
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Figure 6.6:Orthogonalized Impulse Response of P to One SE Shock to BC and Ml 
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whether the lags of one variable significantly enter into the equation for another 
variable. In the VAR model, the Granger non-causality test is sometimes called a block 
exogeneity test as it is used to detect whether or not a variable Granger-cause other 
variables included in the VAR system, or in other words, testing whether a variable 
should be included in the model (Enders, 1995). 
Tables 6.29 and 6.30 show the likelihood ratio (LR) test of block Granger non-causality 
for Model A and Model B respectively. The test statistics shown in Tables 6.29 and 
6.30 are for testing the null hypothesis that the coefficients of the lagged values of, say, 
INTER, in the block of equations (in Model A) explaining the variables TR, DD, and 
BC are zero. In Model A, the lags of INTER in TR, DD, and BC equations are 
statistically insignificant, whereas the lags of the other three variables are significant 
(Table 6.29). The causality results for INTER cast doubt not only on the use of the 
inter-bank rate (INTER) as the proxy of the monetary policy stance but also on the 
inclusion of INTER in the model. 
However, it may be premature to conclude that INTER is not a good measure of the 
monetary policy stance. The insignificance of the INTER's lags may be related to the 
chosen lag length. For example, if we increase the lag length, say, from 2 to 12 lags, the 
lags of INTER become significant (results are not shown). This is also the case for 
Model B. In Table 6.30, the lags of BC and Ml are insignificant in the equations of the 
other three variables in the model. But with a longer lag length, they are significant. To 
comply with a conventional VAR estimating procedure, we choose 
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Table 6.29: Likelihood Ratio (LR) Test of Block Granger Causality (Model A) 
1970-1996 1970-1984 1985-1996 
INTER 4.57 5.02 1.91 
(0.6) (0.541) (0.928) 
TR 22.39 9.44 14.57 
(0.001) (0.150) (0.024) 
DD 18.42 21 .33 8.53 
(0.005) (0.002) (0.202) 
BC 15.96 14.71 12.53 
(0.014) (0.023) (0.051) 
Numbers in parenthesis are marginal significance levels 
Table 6.30: Likelihood Ratio (LR) Test of Block Granger Causality (Model B) 
1970-1996 1970-1984 1985-1996 
BC 13.05 7.39 5.97 
(0.16) (0.286) (0.426) 
M1 9.86 3.85 8.13 
(0.362) (0.696) (0.229) 
y 12.41 5.34 15.89 
(0.192) (0.501) (0.014) 
p 20.36 12.6205 1.41 
(0.016) (0.049) (0.965) 
Numbers in parenthesis are marginal significance levels 
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not to deliberately increase the lag length just to render the lags of some variables 
significant, but stick with the initial lag length suggested by AIC and SBC. 
In Chapter Five, we have admitted that our empirical approach using Ml as a measure 
of the conventional money channel and bank credit as a measure of the lending channel 
may suffer an "identification" problem. Both Ml and bank credit are actually 
components on both sides of bank balance sheets. Commercial banks create money 
every time they expand the aggregate volume of bank loans outstanding in the 
economy. In addition, it is difficult to identify the existence of the lending channel by 
just examining the relationship between bank credit and output. For example, a decline 
in output may, in fact, be attributable to the conventional money channel. The fall in the 
quantity of loans may simply reflect a decline in the loan demand due to reduced output 
(through the conventional money channel), not a reduction in the loan supply (Keshyap, 
Stein, and Wilcox, 1993). 
Difficulties in identifying the existence of the bank lending channel remind us of the 
controversy of whether the lending channel is an independent channel or merely a 
supplementing channel to the conventional money channel. As pointed out in Chapter 
Four, some advocates of the lending channel believe that the lending channel is merely 
an enhancement mechanism, not a truly independent channel, whereas some other 
believe otherwise. 
The crux of this conflicting view may stem from the way in which monetary policy is 
implemented. If monetary policy is carried out through conventional open market 
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operations, then it is likely that the lending channel may only be an enhancement 
mechanism. Monetary tightening through open market sales of government bonds 
ensues a contraction of both money (deposits) on the liability side of banks' balance 
sheet and credit on the asset side of banks' balance sheet. The lending view tries to 
highlight that a fall in banks' assets should also be considered potentially important as 
in the case of a fall in banks' liabilities. 
In the conventional money view, a fall in bank loans does not matter as firms can 
supposedly maintain their investment and spending by borrowing elsewhere. The 
lending view disagrees and argues that due to the existence of imperfect information in 
the capital market, there are a large number of firms who cannot borrow in open 
markets and have to rely on banks for financing. The lending view believes that a 
distinct recognition of bank loans in monetary policy transmission will provide a more 
complete explanation of monetary policy transmission. 
As far as the mechanism of monetary policy is concerned, the lending channel can only 
operate independently of the conventional money channel, if monetary policy is in the 
form of direct credit actions, such as, credit ceilings. Direct credit actions allow the 
central bank to affect the loan supply more directly without going through the 
traditional reserve mechanism as in the case of open market operations. In this special 
case, only the asset side of the bank sheet is targeted. 
In the real world, direct credit actions are often used in conjunction with conventional 
monetary policy methods, such as, open market operations. In this case, the direct 
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lending channel through the direct credit actions should help strengthen the impact of 
the conventional money channel ( one which emanates from the effect of monetary 
tightening on the liability side of the bank balance sheet) and the indirect lending 
channel ( one which stems from the effect of monetary tightening on the asset side of 
the bank balance sheet). 
If monetary policy is carried out solely through direct credit actions, then the lending 
channel should become an independent channel with an independent effect in the sense 
that this effect is driven primarily by a credit crunch. However, if monetary policy is 
implemented by a combination of direct methods ( credit controls) and indirect methods 
( open market operations), the lending channel and the conventional money channel 
should reinforce each other. 
6.5. Narrative Approach 
One of the best ways to identify the effect of a credit crunch caused by direct credit 
actions is to delve into a historical record. This historical approach is advocated by 
Romer and Romer (1989) who contend that purely statistical tests may not always be 
the best way to study the real effects of monetary shocks. Instead, they propose a 
"narrative" approach to identify whether or not monetary policy disturbances matter. 
Romer and Romer's narrative approach, which they have applied to the U.S, basically 
involves studying a historical record to identify monetary shocks, defined as periods 
when concerns about the current level of inflation prompted the Federal Reserve Bank 
to take actions to induce a decline in output growth. 
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Romer and Romer (1993) note that in most episodes in which tight monetary policy 
was found to lead to recession, monetary policy had a large impact only when open-
market operations were supplemented by actions or regulations aimed directly at 
restricting bank lending. Without such direct actions and regulations, banks would hav~ 
had sufficient flexibility in their portfolios and in their ability to raise funds to avoid 
sharp reductions in their lending. Romer and Romer, like many other advocates of the 
lending view, believe that through the lending channel, monetary policy can have an 
impact over and beyond changes in the general level of interest rates. However, unlike 
other lending-view proponents, Romer and Romer (1993) find that the main effect of 
the lending channel comes from direct credit actions. 
To see the impact of monetary policy operating through the ( direct) lending channel, we 
will use the narrative approach for two purposes. One is to identify the period when the 
Bank of Thailand opted to use direct policy actions to bring down the loan supply more 
directly. The other is to study the impact of the direct credit actions. 
Delving into the Bank of Thailand's annual and quarterly reports, we found that there 
was one episode in 1984 when the Bank of Thailand clearly took unprecedented drastic 
actions to bring down the loan supply to achieve its monetary policy goals. 
Traditionally, controlling inflation and promoting a short-term stabilisation of income 
growth and external balance are the Bank of Thailand's principal monetary policy goals 
(Warr and Nidhiprabha, 1996). 
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A current account deficit of over 7% of GDP in 1983 prompted the Bank of Thailand to 
tighten monetary policy to rein in excessive external imbalance. Table 6.31 shows that 
the current account deficit in 1983, about B$ 66.3 billion, was the worse during the 
1980s. The balance of payments in 1983 was in the red for the first time in the 1980s. 
As shown in Figure 6.7, there was a sign of excessive lending by the banks; bank credit 
growth rate surged to over 32.4% in 1983. 
In response to the worsening external balance and the exuberant growth of bank 
lending, the Bank of Thailand imposed an unprecedented credit ceiling of 18 % in 
January 1984. The banks were instructed to cap their credit growth at 18% of loans 
outstanding at the end of 1983. In Figure 6. 7, it can be seen that credit growth rate was 
drastically reduced from 32.4 % in 1983 to 18.1 % in 1984. The loan interest rate ceiling 
was also lifted from 19% to 21 %. Other key interest rates, such as the discount and the 
inter-bank rates were also driven up (see Figure 5.1 in Chapter Five). 
A drastic credit control in 1984 led to a "credit crunch" and caused considerable 
difficulty to the business sector and a sharp slow-down in the country's economic 
growth. In the short and medium term, economic hardship was reflected in a record 
number of unhonoured checks during February to March 1984 and a sharp fall in the 
investment index (Bangkok Bank Review, 1984). The monetary tightening successfully 
brought down the current account deficit from 7.30 % of GDP in 1983 to 4.1% in 1985, 
followed by a small surplus in 1986. The rate of inflation fell sharply to a historic level 
of 0.8% in 1984 (Figure 6.8). The rate of inflation of industrial price index tumbled to 
below 0% (Figure 6.9). 
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Table 6.31: Current Account and Balance of Payments 
Year Current Account Balance Balance of Payments 
in billion baht in % of GDP in billion baht in % of GDP 
1980 -48.4 -6.4 5.2 0.26 
1981 -54.7 -7.4 2.5 0.08 
1982 -25.6 -2.8 3.3 0.14 
1983 -66.3 -7.3 -18 .1 -0.79 
1984 -49.5 -5.1 10.6 0.4 
1985 -41 .9 -4.1 12.5 0.5 
1986 6.5 0.6 33.6 1.3 
1987 -9.3 -0.7 18.2 0.7 
I 
11, 
1988 -41 .8 -2.8 40.5 1.6 
1989 -65.4 -3.7 111 .5 4.3 
Source: The Bank of Thailand Annual Report 
I:· 
Figure 6.7: Growth Rate of Bank Credit to Private Sector 
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Figure 6.8: Annual Consumer Price Index (CPI) 
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Figure 6.9: Annual Industrial Price Index 
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Source: Author' s own calculation; primary data from the Bank of Thailand Monthly Bulletin 
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Figure 6.10: Annual GDP Growth Rate 
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Figure 6.11: Annual Industrial Output Index 
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However, the improved external balance came at a very high price, as the country's 
economic growth had to be sacrificed. The GDP growth rate fell from 7.3% in 1983 to 
3 .4 % in 1985 (Figure 6.10). The industrial output growth rate plunged from 25% in 
1984 to -12% in 1985 (Figure 6.11). These GDP and industrial output growth rates 
were at the lowest level recorded between 1980-1996. 
Of course, one cannot entirely attribute the improvement of the current account balance 
to the tight monetary policy. There were many other factors which might also have 
significantly contributed to the decline in the current account deficit in 1985 and the 
small surplus in 1986. Inter alia, a 15% devaluation of the baht after the reintroduction 
of the basket-pegged exchange rate system in November 1984 was also likely to have 
been one of the main contributing factors to the improvement of the current account 
balance and the economic growth in 1986. 
Despite being very effective, a blunt credit control in 1984 was strongly criticized as 
being too harsh. Since 1984, no official credit control has been employed. However, a 
"moral" credit control in the form of a credit target has occasionally been used. Under 
the credit targeting scheme, when bank credit growth is deemed to be unusually high 
and there is a sign that the economy is overheating, the Bank of Thailand will set a 
target range for credit growth. Even though the credit target is not legally binding, the 
financial institutions are supposed to take into account the credit target when they set 
up their credit planning. Implicit and explicit threats of limitations on banks' access to 
the discount window and the Central Bank's statutory power to regulate bank lending 
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activity, and to alter existing reserve requirements or impose new ones ensure the 
Central Bank enough leverage to implement its policy. 
Direct credit actions when used in conjunction with a conventional monetary policy, 
typically involving the Central Bank's attempt to influence the cost and the availability 
of bank reserves, could significantly enhance the effectiveness of monetary policy. 
However, as mentioned in Chapter Four, direct credit actions, such as, credit ceilings, 
make it difficult for certain borrowers to obtain loans, or force particular borrowers to 
pay a premium for funds that is not justified by difference in risk. Certain borrowers are 
dissuaded from undertaking investment simply because of a lack of funds. Hence, direct 
credit actions may only create inefficiency in the provision of credit (Romer and 
Romer, 1993). 
Moreover, with the advent of the world-wide trend towards global financial 
liberalization, direct credit actions may become obsolete, ineffective, and undesirable. 
As commonly found in many countries, including Thailand, financial deregulation and 
innovation make it easier for potential borrowers to obtain funds from various sources. 
In Thailand, since the late 1980s the financial market has become much more 
diversified and sophisticated. The commercial banks, though still the main lending 
institutions, have experienced increasing competition from domestic and foreign 
financial institutions and also from non-bank institutions. 
With greater diversification and sophistication of the domestic financial market, there 
has been a call for a "widening" of monetary policy from being largely bank-oriented to 
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more market-oriented. The development of the (private) bond market and the adoption 
of a flexible exchange rate system should enable the Bank of Thailand to conduct its 
monetary policy more effectively through a conventional market-based mechanism, 
such as, open market operations. 
Chapter Two explained that apart from being a source for mobilizing long-term funds, 
the bond market can also provide different kinds of market-based monetary policy 
instruments to substitute for direct instruments which tend to be ineffective in a 
liberalized financial system. Given the demand for the central bank's liabilities in the 
forms of bank notes and reserve deposits held by banks for clearing purposes or 
meeting reserve requirements, the central bank can manipulate the cost and supply of 
reserves by buying and selling bonds and others money market instruments. This will, 
in turn, indirectly affect the availability of credit and interest rates. This kind of indirect 
mechanism will only work if there is a well-functioning market for bonds and short-
term commercial paper. 
6.6. Conclusion 
This chapter undertakes two empirical tests: one on the transmission of monetary policy 
through the lending channel (Model A) and the other on the forecasting power of 
money and credit shocks (Model B). In Model A, the impulse response function 
illustrates that monetary policy shocks result in a short-run rise in the inter-bank rate, a 
fall in reserves. Bank loans and deposits are found to increase, rather than decrease. A 
"perverse" short-term behaviour of loans may arise from the fact that as sales and cash 
flows fall at the beginning of a downturn, firms may demand more credit. A pre-
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arranged line of credit can make it difficult for banks to cut the loan supply. As 
discussed in the theoretical model, by running down their reserves or resorting to a 
liability management technique, banks may be able to maintain or perhaps even 
increase their supply of loans in the short run. 
In Model B, the variance decomposition shows that bank credit appears to fare better 
than Ml in explaining the future error variance of output and price measures. The poor 
performance of Ml may be attributable to financial liberalization and innovation which 
may have undermined a close relationship between MI and a measure of economic 
activity (Y). 
A narrative approach is employed to study the impact of monetary tightening, 
especially through direct credit actions. One episode in 1984 was identified as a period 
in which the Bank of Thailand clearly took a drastic action to bring down the loan 
supply by imposing an 18% credit ceiling. The 1984 credit crunch led to drastic impacts 
on the economy. It brought down the current account deficit, inflation, and economic 
growth. 
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Chapter Seven 
Conclusion 
This dissertation has analyzed the transmission of monetary policy through the bank 
lending channel. The objective of this thesis is twofold: first, to develop a simple 
theoretical model for understanding the lending view; and second, to undertake an 
empirical analysis of the lending channel. In the literature, little work has been done on 
the theoretical modelling of the lending view, even though there has been a resurgence 
of interest in the lending view in recent years. Most studies on the lending view tend to 
concentrate on empirical testing. To address the imbalance in the analysis of the lending 
view, this thesis attempts to study the lending view both theoretically and empirically. 
In addition, unlike other studies in the literature which are largely drawn from U.S. 
experience and data, this study applies the theory of the lending view to Thailand, an 
emerging developing country. 
As described in Chapter Two, Thailand's financial market has undergone maJor 
changes in recent years. The financial market has long been dominated by the 
commercial banks. The banks' dominant role in the financial market can be attributable, 
in part, to their special expertise in alleviating the imperfect information in the capital 
market, and, in part, to the under-development of the capital market in Thailand. 
However, during the past decade, the capital market has become more diversified and 
sophisticated. The stock market and the debt instrument market have grown rapidly 
since the mid 1980s. The banks, though still major institutions, have seen their 
dominance in the financial market, particularly in the capital market, gradually eroded. 
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To examine the importance of bank lending in monetary policy transmission in the light 
of structural changes in the financial market, this thesis began by providing an overview 
of Thailand's financial market, recent financial development, and monetary policy 
procedure. According to Kashyap and Stein (1993), the lending channel is likely to be 
sensitive to a number of institutional characteristics of the financial market. As 
described in Chapter Two, Thailand's financial market can be divided into two 
distinctive markets: the money market and the capital market. Prior to the mid 1980s, 
the distinction between the two markets was blurred, as the commercial banks in the 
absence of active equity and bond markets were by far the most dominant lending 
institutions in both money and capital markets. 
Given the institutional characteristics of the financial market, Thailand's monetary 
policy has traditionally been conducted via three major mechanisms: the discount 
window facility; the repurchase market; and the Exchange Equalization Fund (EEF). 
Through these mechanisms, the Central Bank exerts its influence over the supply of 
money and credit; domestic interest rates; and in some cases the value of the currency. 
However, in reality the BOT' s influence over bank lending activity through the three 
mechanisms is rather limited. The discount window facility is a relatively minor source 
of reserves for the banks. After the flotation of the baht in July, 1997, the role of the 
EEF in influencing bank liquidity is likely to reduce. 
The BOT' s ability to influence the cost and supply of bank reserves through the 
repurchase market is hampered by the current arrangement in the market which only 
allows the BOT to intervene in the market when there is an imbalance of bids and offers 
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outstanding. Self-initiated operations are not applicable within the existing 
arrangement. In recent years, the BOT has been very active in nurturing the bond 
market as a vehicle for conducting monetary policy. A well-functioning bond market is 
typically one of the prerequisites for effective open market operations. 
In the theoretical model, it is argued that if monetary policy is conducted through 
conventional open market operations, the lending channel is likely to play a 
supplementing role, rather than an independent role to the conventional money channel. 
However, if the central bank is prepared to cause a "credit crunch" by bringing down 
the supply of loans more directly, say, through direct credit actions, then it is possible 
that the lending channel can operate independently. 
To understand the operation of the lending channel, the distinction between the lending 
channel and the conventional money, and the conditions necessary for the existence of 
the lending channel, a simple model was developed by modifying the traditional IS-LM 
model. The loan market was introduced and then incorporated with the goods market. 
The incorporation of the goods market and the loan market resulted in the creation of 
the CC (credit and commodity market) curve, and the CC-LM model as an alternative 
to the conventional IS-LM model. By exploiting the principle of bank profit 
maximization, the theoretical model was then further expanded to analyze the 
conditions required for the existence and effectiveness of the lending channel. The 
existence and effectiveness of the lending channel were found to be critically dependent 
on how banks respond to monetary tightening. 
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To examine the importance of the lending channel in Thailand's monetary policy, the 
SV AR technique was employed. The empirical analysis focused on two key issues: 
testing the transmission of monetary policy through the lending channel (Model A) and 
testing the forecasting power of money and credit shocks (Model B). In Model A, the 
inter-bank interest rate was chosen as a measure of monetary policy shock. Monetary 
tightening ( a positive innovation in the inter-bank rate) is expected to result in a 
reduction in bank reserves, which should be followed by a decline in bank loans and 
deposits. However, in the short run loans might not fall immediately and could possibly 
even rise. But over time it is expected that loans will eventually fall. 
In Chapter Six, impulse response function results illustrated that bank reserves fall after 
a tightening of monetary policy, while deposits and loans increase. Bernanke and 
Blinder (1990) suggest that a plausible explanation for a "perverse" short-term 
behaviour of loans may arise from the fact that as sales and cash flows fall at the 
beginning of a downturn, firms may demand more bank credit in order to finance 
inventories and payrolls. A pre-arranged line of credit may also make it difficult for 
banks to cut their loan supply unilaterally. In addition, by running down their reserves 
or resorting to a liability management technique, it is not impossible for banks to 
maintain or perhaps even increase their supply of loans in the short run . 
Model B dealt with testing the forecasting power of bank credit and narrow money 
supply Ml. The SV AR results showed that bank credit appears to out-perform Ml in 
explaining the future error variance of output (Y) and price (P), especially during 1985-
1996. These results suggest that even if the commercial banks have gradually lost their 
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dominant role in the financial market in recent years, they are still an important source 
of financing. Anything which disrupts normal banking activity is likely to have real 
impacts. Financial liberalization and recent changes in the financial structure do not 
seem to have diminished the role of bank lending, at least up to the period covered in 
this study. 
Nonetheless, as pointed out in Chapter Six, these empirical results should be taken with 
some caution. A poor performance of Ml could be attributable to financial 
liberalization and innovation. It is also admitted that our empirical approach using Ml 
as a measure of the conventional money channel and bank credit as a measure of the 
lending channel may suffer an "identification" problem. Both Ml and bank credit are, 
in fact, components on both sides of bank balance sheets. Commercial banks create 
money every time they expand the aggregate volume of bank loans outstanding in the 
economy. 
Moreover, it is difficult to identify the existence of the lending channel by just looking 
at the relationship between bank credit and output. In the literature, many empirical 
approaches have been proposed to test the existence of the lending channel. The most 
notable one is Kashyap, Stein, and Wilcox (1993) (KSW). Although the KSW approach 
is appealing, it is not replicated in this study due to a lack of data. 
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Limitations of the study and suggestions for future research 
Since there are not many works on the theoretical modeling of the lending view, our 
theoretical model was inspired significantly by the work of Bernanke and Blinder 
(1988). Admittedly, our theoretical model may be rather too simple to analyze the 
lending view more comprehensively. However, given that in the literature there are few 
works on the theoretical modeling of the lending view, we hope that our theoretical 
model could serve as a stepping stone for anyone interested in the lending view to 
further develop a more advanced model. 
Applying the theory of the lending view to a developing country like Thailand, we 
faced difficulties in obtaining some data needed for the empirical analysis. The 
availability of the data plays an important role in shaping the course of our empirical 
analysis. Had we been able to obtain more data, we would have expanded our 
theoretical and empirical analysis to cover some other related interesting issues, such as 
analyzing the disproprotional impacts of monetary policy on banks and firms with 
different size. It can be expected that smaller banks and firms are likely to be affected 
proportionately more than larger ones. We hope that as more data become readily 
available in the future, issues left unaddressed in this study can be analyzed. 
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Appendix I 
Financial Instruments and International Financial Markets 
Financial Instruments 
Bill of Exchange 
A bill of exchange is a short-term instrument in the form of a document ordering the 
drawee (the debtor) to pay the drawer (the creditor) a stated sum at a specific date or "at 
sight" ( on demand). Once accepted, i.e. signed by the drawee and "endorsed"(signed on 
the back) by the drawer, the bill becomes negotiable and may be discounted, i.e. sold at 
discount on its face value. A bill of exchange normally has a maturity of up to six 
months. 
Certificates of Deposit (CDs) 
A document issued by a bank acknowledging a deposit of money with it, and 
considering a promise to repay that sum, to the bearer, at a specific future date. 
Certificates of deposit are "negotiable", i.e, they may be transferred by simple delivery. 
To ensure the marketability of the certificates, there needs to be a "secondary market" , a 
place where the holder of the certificates can sell then if he or she wishes. The 
secondary markets make the certificates highly liquid for the holder while securing the 
funds to the bank for a fixed period. Interest rate is paid on the certificates annually, if 
the term to maturity is longer than a year, or at maturity, if less. 
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Commercial Paper 
Commercial paper is a term for unsecured promissory notes generally issued by large 
corporations. Commercial paper represents a major source of short-term funds for 
corporations, especially those with a well-established reputation. Most commercial 
paper carries an initial maturity of sixty days or less and can be regarded as a close 
substitute for Treasury Bills, certificates of deposits and other money market 
instruments. Because of its relatively low risk and short maturity, investors 1n 
commercial paper tend to be large institutions, such as, insurance companies. 
Debentures 
Debentures are debt securities carrying a fixed rate of interest, usually issued by a 
company and secured on its assets. A debenture holder is a creditor of the company, 
and is entitled to be paid the interest regardless of whether or not the company makes 
profits, and before any distribution of dividends. 
Euro bonds 
Euro bonds are bonds denominated in currencies other than that of the country in which 
the bond is sold. For example, Thai corporations issue Japanese yen-denominated 
bonds and sell them in Singapore (Asian Eurobonds). 
Floating Rate Notes (FRNs) 
Floating rate notes are issued in Euromarkets and pay a floating interest, usually set at 
half a percent above the six-month LIBOR (London Interbank offered rate) with a 
stipulating minimum interest. The rate is adjusted at six-monthly intervals. 
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Euro currency 
Eurodollars are simply dollars held in the form of time deposits in banks outside the 
United States; these banks, in tum, lend these deposits out at a profit. The prefix "Euro" 
can be used interchangeably with "external" and refers to funds that are intermediated 
outside the country of the currency in which the funds are denominated. For instance, 
Euro-baht or offshore baht is a baht-denominated paper in the form of bonds, exchange 
contracts, certificates of deposit and other types of collateral. These are taken out of the 
country to be traded in foreign countries. Issuers of papers are major corporations and 
financial institutions in Thailand and abroad. Euro-baht commercial paper has become 
popular as a new way to raise funds as it carries higher returns and less foreign 
exchange risk than some other options. 
Currency Option 
The currency option provides a right but not obligation to buy or sell a specific 
currency at a specific price at any time prior to a specific date. Since options give the 
right without obligation, it means that commercial users of the market are able to obtain 
insurance against an adverse movement in the exchange rate, while still retaining the 
opportunity to benefit from a favourable exchange movement. The maximum risk to the 
buyers of the option is the actual cost of the option (premium). 
Interest Rate Option 
The interest rate option includes caps, floors, and collars. Unlike swaps and futures, the 
seller of the cap undertakes, over an agreed period, to compensate the buyer of the cap 
whenever a reference interest rate for example LIBOR exceeds a pre-agreed maximum 
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interest rate (the cap rate). By the same token, this principle is applied to a floor 
option, the investor will be protected by the seller whenever the reference rate falls 
below a pre-agreed minimum rate. The buyer will exercise the option only if interest 
rate falls below the agreed level and reap the benefits of the rate is over agreed rate. A 
collar Option is the simultaneous purchase and sale of a cap and a floor or a zero cost 
collar option. With the collar option, the cost of buying the floor exactly matches the 
premium received from selling the cap. 
Promissory Note 
A promissory note is a written unconditional promise made by one person to another to 
pay on demand or at a fixed or determinable future time a certain sum of money to, or, 
to the order of, a specific person, or to a bearer. 
Currency Swap 
A currency swap is simply an agreement to exchange certain amounts of two currencies 
on the spot (immediately) and to reverse the transaction at an agreed-upon exchange 
rate at a specific time in the future. In the swap transaction, the most important number 
is the swap rate ( the difference between the price at which a currency is brought and the 
price at which it is sold). 
Interest Rate Swap 
The interest rate swap is an exchange between two counter-parties of interest 
obligations (payment of interest) or receipts (investment income) in the same currency 
on an agreed amount of notational principle for an agreed period of time. The agreed 
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amount is called a notational principle because it is not a loan or investment; the 
principle amount is not initially exchanged or repaid at maturity. An exchange of 
interest obligations is called a liability swap, while an exchange of interest receipts is 
called an asset swap. Interest streams are exchanged according to predetermined rules 
and are based on the underlying notational principle amount 
Liability Management 
Liability management is a process which allows banks to move from passively 
accepting deposits to actively managing deposits. By raising funds through, e.g. issuing 
CDs, banks can raise wholesale deposits at market rates enabling them to tailor the 
inflow of deposits to match a seasonal demand for wholesale credit. A reserve 
requirement is a major regulation that could constrain the growth of CDs. Imposing a 
reserve requirement on CDs increases the cost of issuing CDs, while removing it 
decreases the cost, as banks will have the freedom to price CDs in line with the market 
short-term interest rates. 
Securitization of loans 
Securitization is the process of pooling and repackaging homogenous loans, which 
would otherwise be illiquid, into securities and selling them to a group of investors, 
who purchase a financial instrument evidencing the indebtedness without recourse to 
the original lender. Securitization generates funds for banks for further lending 
activities. Raising funds through this kind of marketable instrument is regarded as an 
asset sale, since the entire transaction takes place on the asset side of the balance sheet. 
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Appendix II 
The Chronological Evolution of the Exchange Rate System in 
Thailand since the End of the Second World War 
1945 to 1963: Multiple Exchange Rate System 
After the end of the Second World War, economic difficulties and a serious shortage of 
foreign exchange forced the government to adopt a multiple exchange rate system. 
1963 to 1972: Bretton Woods Par Value System 
With economic recovery, the multiple exchange rate syste1n was replaced by the par 
value system. Under this system (Bretton Woods System), the baht was pegged in terms 
of gold, and hence the US dollar at the rate of 20.80 baht per US dollar. The exchange 
Equalisation Fund (EEF) was established to handle the stabilisation of the exchange 
rate. For almost two decades, the parity of the baht was maintained. 
1972 to 1978: Par Value System with Devaluation and Appreciation 
A consequence of the 1967 sterling devaluation, the ensuing gold crisis, and the 
resultant US devaluation led to a 10% devaluation of the baht against the gold standard 
to maintain fixed parity with the US dollar. The baht was devalued again in 1973 by 
10% as a result of the first oil shock in the early 1970s. These two devaluations were, 
however, followed by a small appreciation around 4% in response to a gradual 
appreciation of major European currencies which had depressed the value of the baht 
against the currencies of Thailand's major trading counterparts. After this appreciation, 
there was no variation of the baht until the collapse of the Bretton Woods System in 
1978. 
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1978: Pegged to a Basket of Currencies 
For a short period in 1978 after the abolition of the par value system, a system of 
pegging the baht to a basket of currencies was introduced. This system permitted a 
greater degree of flexibility in the exchange rate adjustment to reflect more accurate 
economic and monetary conditions and to conform with the global economic trend. The 
exchange rate was solely determined by the EFF until the daily fixing system was 
adopted in late 1978. 
Late 1978 to 1981: Daily Fixing System 
Under daily fixing regime, the EFF and delegates from the commercial banks jointly 
determined the dollar exchange rate in tandem with the demand and supply of the US 
dollar in the market. The rates for six other major currencies were determined by using 
the crossing rates. The daily fixing system went smoothly until the US dollar strongly 
appreciated against all other currencies in 1981. Consequently, the baht continuously 
depreciated. In an attempt to stabilise the baht, the monetary authorities devalued the 
baht twice in mid 1981. 
However, the devaluations failed to win public confidence. In July 1981 , the daily 
fixing system was abandoned. The EFF resumed sole responsibility to determine the 
exchange rate but still provided an exchange swap arrangement for the commercial 
banks to hedge against exchange rate risk. From July 1981 to November 1984, the 
dollar exchange rate was fixed at 23 bath per US dollar. 
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November 1984 to July 1997: Pegged to the Basket of Currencies 
During the mid 1980s, the Thai economy faced a serious economic crisis, following the 
second oil shock in the early 1980s. The world-wide recession and continuous 
economic difficulties at home led to the devaluation of the baht in November 1984 by 
almost 15% before the monetary authorities decided to reinstate the system of pegging 
the baht to the basket of currencies once briefly adopted in 1978. Under this system, the 
exchange rate of the baht against the US dollar was announced daily by the EEF, which 
stood ready to buy and sell US dollars with commercial banks at the announced rated. 
This system made the baht one of the most stable currencies in the world and supported 
Thailand's rapid growth between 1986-1995. 
July 2, 1997: Managed Floated System 
The coincidental sharp slowdown of export and capital inflows in 1996, together with 
mounting bad debt problems in the financial sector caused by a slump in the property 
sector resulted in a rapid deceleration of investment and economic growth. Thailand's 
excessive high current account deficit around 8 % of GDP in 1996 heavily funded by 
short-term capital inflows attracted speculative attacks on the baht. After facing 
unprecedented speculative attacks and a rapid depletion of international reserves, the 
Bank of Thailand was left with no choice but to allow the baht to float. Since 2 July 
1997, Thailand's exchange rate system has been under a managed floated system. 
Under this system, the value of the baht is determined by market forces to reflect the 
country's economic fundamentals. However, the Bank of Thailand may occasionally 
intervene in the exchange markets to prevent excessive fluctuations of the baht. 
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Appendix III 
Definitions and Sources of Data 
Narrowly-defined money (Ml) 
Ml = currency held by the public plus demand deposits held by the non-bank private 
sector 
Source: IMF International Financial Statistics (line 34)(1970Ml-1996M6) 
Commercial bank claims on the private sector (BC) 
Commercial bank credit to the private sector 
Source: IMF International Financial Statistics (line 22d)(l 970Ml-1996M6) 
Inter-bank lending rate (money market rate)(INTER) 
The inter-bank lending rate is the rate at which the commercial banks accept short-term 
deposits from other banks and financial institutions. 
Sources: The Bank of Thailand's Quarterly Report(1970Ml-1976M12)(1996Ml-M6) 
IMF International Financial Statistics (line 60b) (1977Ml-1995M12) 
Total reserves (TR) 
Total reserves of the commercial banks. 
Source: IMF International Financial Statistics (line 20) (1970Ml-1996M6) 
Demand Deposits (DD) 
Demand deposits at the commercial banks: demand deposits earn no interest. 
Source: IMF International Financial Statistics (line 24) (1970Ml-l 996M6) 
Laspeyres's industrial output price index (P) 
Details on how this price index is computed are provided in Chapter Six. 
Sources: The Bank of Thailand's Quarterly Report(l 970Ml-1996M6) 
Paasche's industrial output index(Y) 
Details on how this output index is computed are in Chapter Six. 
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Sources: The Bank of Thailand's Quarterly Report(1970Ml-1996M6) 
Laspeyres's and Paasche's index numbers are probably the two most important index 
numbers in the statistical and economic theory of index numbers. Laspeyres's price 
index ( P/a ) and Paasche' s output index ( Qta) can be used to compute an index 
measuring aggregate output ( Y, ): P,La Qta = Y, (Karmel, 1965). 
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